Congratulations to Martha Bailey, Matias Cattaneo, Ying Fan, and David Miller on their promotions. Martha Bailey and Matias Cattaneo are now Professors of Economics, with tenure. Ying Fan and David Miller are now Associate Professors of Economics, with tenure.

The Board of Regents on Thursday, May 18, approved recommendations for new appointments and promotions for regular associate and full professor ranks, with tenure and/or promotion of faculty on the University of Michigan's Ann Arbor, Dearborn and Flint campuses. The complete list of promotions can be found here.

Bailey’s research focuses on issues in labor economics, demography and health in the United States within the long-run perspective of economic history. Her work has examined the implications of the diffusion of modern contraception for women’s childbearing, career decisions, and compensation. Recent work focuses on evaluating the shorter and longer-term effects of Great Society programs, including a co-edited book entitled the Legacies of the War on Poverty. This research has won the IZA Prize for the Best Young Labor Economist, the Arthur H. Cole Prize for the best article in the Journal of Economic History, and the CESifo Distinguished Research Affiliate Award for Best Paper by an Economist under 35.

Bailey's work has recently appeared in the American Economic Review and Quarterly Journal of Economics and has been funded by the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation. Bailey has also won two college level awards for outstanding teaching.

Cattaneo’s research interests are economic theory and applied econometrics.

Fan’s research interests are industrial organization and applied microeconomics.

Miller’s main research area is repeated game models of cooperative behavior, with a particular focus on methods for narrowing the set of relevant equilibria, motivated by a concern for realism. His research has explored how the potential for renegotiation and disagreement influences the design of optimal self-enforcing contracts, how social networks help communities support cooperative behavior, and how asymmetric information constrains the extent to which cartels can robustly collude.