Location: 2306 Mason Hall
Brought to you by: Mind and Moral Psychology Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop group.
Title: "Belief in Action"
Abstract:
Belief aims at the truth: it is guided by truth, and correct if true. Most think that this fact about belief's aim limits the agency we exercise as believers, especially since Williams's famous argument that you cannot believe 'at will.' But the structure of intentional action in particular seems to offer hope for a substantive explanation of this fact about belief's aim: when you act intentionally you apply a standard of success to what you do, and you guide it according to that standard. This talk reconciles these claims about belief with one another. It's true that you can't come to believe that p intentionally 'just like that,' as Williams pointed out. But it's also true that you can perform all sorts of epistemic accomplishments intentionally: you can figure out whether p, or determine which thing is F, come to know why p, etc. I show how you can perform these epistemic accomplishments intentionally with a model of non-basic action I set forth in detail in my new book Mental Means. The possibility of intentionally performing these epistemic accomplishments can help ground epistemic responsibility, and thereby also help ground the application of substantive epistemic norms to our thoughts."
Brought to you by: Mind and Moral Psychology Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop group.
Title: "Belief in Action"
Abstract:
Belief aims at the truth: it is guided by truth, and correct if true. Most think that this fact about belief's aim limits the agency we exercise as believers, especially since Williams's famous argument that you cannot believe 'at will.' But the structure of intentional action in particular seems to offer hope for a substantive explanation of this fact about belief's aim: when you act intentionally you apply a standard of success to what you do, and you guide it according to that standard. This talk reconciles these claims about belief with one another. It's true that you can't come to believe that p intentionally 'just like that,' as Williams pointed out. But it's also true that you can perform all sorts of epistemic accomplishments intentionally: you can figure out whether p, or determine which thing is F, come to know why p, etc. I show how you can perform these epistemic accomplishments intentionally with a model of non-basic action I set forth in detail in my new book Mental Means. The possibility of intentionally performing these epistemic accomplishments can help ground epistemic responsibility, and thereby also help ground the application of substantive epistemic norms to our thoughts."
| Building: | Mason Hall |
|---|---|
| Event Type: | Lecture / Discussion |
| Tags: | philosophy, Rackham |
| Source: | Happening @ Michigan from Department of Philosophy, Mind and Moral Psychology Rackham Interdisciplinary Working Group |
