# Brian Weatherson

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Born: April 20, 1973—Melbourne, Australia

Nationality: Australian

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Last Updated: March 11, 2018

## Current position

Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosopy, Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan

# Areas of specialization

Epistemology • Philosophy of Language

## Areas of competence

Ethics • Logic • Theory of Choice

## **Employment**

1999-2001	Sutton Faculty Fellow, Syracuse University
2001-2004	Assistant Professor, Brown University
2004-2007	Associate Professor, Cornell University
2008-2011	Associate Professor, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
2012-present	Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan
2008-present	Professorial Fellow Arché University of St Andrews (quarter-time appointment)

## Education

1994	BA(Hons) with Honors in Philosophy, Monash University
1998	PHD in Philosophy, Monash University. Thesis title: On Uncertainty.

### Publications & talks

### **Epistemology Articles**

Intrellectual Skill and the Rylean Regress. Philosophical Quarterly, 67: 370-386.  Interest-Relative Invariantism. In Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, edited by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Routledge, 240-253.  Games, Beliefs and Credences. Philosophical Research 41: 73-75.  Reply to Blackson. Journal of Philosophical Studies, 173: 3231-3233.  For Bayesians, Rational Modesty Requires Imprecision. Ergo, 2: 529-545.  Memory, Belief and Time. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45: 692-715.  Probability and Scepticism. In Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, edited by Elia Zardini and Dylan Dodd, OUR pp. 71-86.  Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise. In The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by Jennifer Lackey and David Christensen, OUP, pp. 54-75.  Margins and Errors. Inquiry, 56: 63-76.  Ross on Sleeping Beauty. Philosophical Studies 163: 503-512.  Dogmatism, Probability and Logical Uncertainty. Co-authored with David Jehle. In New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Greg Restall and Gillian Russell, Palgrave, pp. 95-111.  Games and The Reason-Knowledge Principle. The Reasoner 6: 6-7.  Knowledge, Bets and Interests. In Knowledge Ascriptions, edited by Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, OUP, 2012, pp. 75-103.  Induction and Supposition. The Reasoner 6: 78-80.  The Temporal Generality Problem. Logos & Episteme 3: 117-122.  Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism. Logos and Episteme 2: 591-609.  Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty. Philosophical Studies 155: 445-456.  Deontology and Descartes' Demon. Journal of Philosophy 105: 540-69.  The Bayesian and the Dogmatist. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 169-85.  Should we Respond to Evil with Indifference: Philosophy 105: 540-69.  The Bayesian and the Dogmatist. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107: 169-85.  Should we Respond to Evil with Indifference: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70: 613-35.  Scepticism, Rationalism and Externalism. Cosford Studies in Epistemology 1: 311-31.  Can we Do Without Pragmatic Encroachment: Philos	2018	Interests, Evidence and Games. <i>Episteme</i> , forthcoming.
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2017	Blame and Fragmented Desire
	· University of Graz, December 2017
2017	Inferentialism and Logical Knowledge
	· Conceptual Truth, Analyticity, and Conceptual Competence workshop, ConceptLab, University
	of Oslo, June 2017
2017	Interests and Evidence
	<ul> <li>Pragmatic Encroachment Conference, Sedona, AZ, February 2017</li> </ul>
	· Arché, University of St Andrews, June 2017
	<ul> <li>Episteme Conference, Galapagos Islands, July 2017</li> </ul>
2017	Thick Moral Ignorance
	· Blame Workshop, Arché, University of St Andrews, June 2017
	· University of Vienna, December 2017
2016	Signalling Games
	· Decisions, Games and Logic Workshop, University of Michigan, July 2016
2016	Accuracy and the Imps
	· Arché, University of St Andrews, May 2016
2016	Asymmetries in Disagreement
	· Complex Disagreement Workshop, University of St Andrews, May 2016
2015	Determinacy and Borderline Cases
2015	· University of Chicago, April 2015
2015	Memory, Belief and Time • Belief, Rationality and Time Conference, University of Wisconsin - Madison, September 2015
2014	Should We Act on Higher-Order Evidence
2014	Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference, ANU, July 2014
2014	Moral Ignorance is (Almost) Never Exculpatory
2011	· University of Sydney, April 2014
	· Australian National University, April 2014
	· University of Melbourne, May 2014
	· Arché Reading Party, June 2016
2014	Intellectual Skills and the Rylean Regress
	· Monash University, February 2014
2013	Rayo on Possibility
	· MIT, October 2014
2013	Stopped Clocks and Generative Testimony
	University of St Andrews, October 2013
2013	Games, Beliefs and Credences
	<ul> <li>Formal Epistemology Workshop/Rutgers Epistemology Conference, May 2012</li> </ul>
2013	Centrality and Marginalisation

	<ul> <li>Institute of Philosophy, University of London, February 2012</li> </ul>
2012	Running Risks Morally
	<ul> <li>Marshall M. Weinberg Lecture, University of Michigan, November 2012</li> </ul>
	Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, August 2013
	Ohio State University, September 2013
	· A Night of Philosophy, New York, April 2015
2012	Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise
	• Summer School on Disagreement, University of Zurich, August 2012
2012	Margins and Errors
2012	• University of St Andrews, June 2012
	• University of Edinburgh, June 2012
	Midwest Epistemology Workshop, University of Indiana, September 2012
2011	Reflections on Lewis, Meaning and Naturalness
2011	• CSMN, Oslo, August 2011
	· Arché workshop on naturalness in semantics and metaphysics, October 2011
	Rutgers University, October 2011
	· Univerity of Illinois, May 2012
2010a	Vague Events and the Problem of the Many
	· LOGOS Indeterminacy Workshop, Barcelona, January 2010
2010b	Do Judgments Screen Evidence?
	Massachussets Institute of Technology, March 2010
	· University of St Andrews, May 2010
	· Universität Konstanz, June 2010
	· University of Oxford, June 2010
	· University of Michigan, February 2011.
2010c	Rational Belief and Rational Action
	· University of St Andrews, May 2010
2010d	In Defence of a Kripkean Dogma
	<ul> <li>University of Leeds, May 2010</li> </ul>
2010e	Stalnaker on Sleeping Beauty
	<ul> <li>University of St Andrews, June 2010</li> </ul>
2009a	Rule Following and Basicness
	<ul> <li>University of St Andrews, May 2009</li> </ul>
2009b	Evidence Neutrality
	<ul> <li>University of St Andrews, June 2009</li> </ul>
2009c	Probability and Scepticism
	<ul> <li>Arché Scepticism Conference, University of St Andrews, June 2009</li> </ul>
2009d	Assertion, Knowledge and Action (with Ishani Maitra)
	Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, August 2009
2008a	Moderate Rationalism and Bayesian Scepticism
	· University of Edinburgh, May 2008
2008b	Content Relativism
	<ul> <li>Language and Law workshop, University of Oslo, June 2008</li> </ul>
2008c	Attitudes and Relativism
	· First Arché Contextualism and Relativism workshop, University of St Andrews, June 2008.
2007a	Causation and Causatives
	· Univesity of Massachusetts, Amherst, April 2007.
	Arizona Ontology Conference, Tuscon, January 2008.
	<ul> <li>Keynote address at Rutgers/Princeton graduate conference, Rutgers University, March 2008.</li> </ul>
2007b	Moral Psychology and Epistemic Deontology
200/0	Ryle at Ryerson conference, Ryerson University, Toronto, October 2007
2006a	Replacing Logic
2000a	Tapmong 2050
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• Institute of Philosophy, University of London, February 2012

 Contribution to author meets critics session on David Christensen's Putting Logic in Its Place, APA Pacific Division Conference, Portland OR, March 2006.

2006b Natural Quantities

- · University of Manitoba, March 2006
- · Stanford University, May 2006

2006c In Defence of a Dogmatist

- · University of Texas, May 2006
- · Stanford University, May 2006

Norms of Assertion and Expressivism

· Workshop on ethics and epistemology, University of Missouri at Columbia, September 2006

2006e The Bayesian and the Dogmatist

- · Rutgers University, October 2006.
- · University of Oklahoma, November 2006.
- · University of California at Berkeley, November 2006.
- · The Aristotelian Society, London, February 2007.

2006f Tracking, Closure and Conjunctions

 Contribution to author meets critics session on Sherri Rousch's *Tracking Truth*, Philosophy of Science Association cofnerence, Vancouver, November 2006.

2005a Vagueness as Indeterminacy

- · Australian National University, January 2005
- · Princeton University, February 2005
- · Arché Workshop on Vagueness, University of St Andrews, February 2005

2005b Dutch Books and Infinity

· Prague International Colloquium on Dutch Book Arguments, Prague, August 2005

2005c Knowledge, Justification and Practical Interests

- · Monash University, September 2005
- · Australian National University, October 2005

2005d Conditionals and Relativism

2004a

2004c

- · LOGOS Workshop on Relativising Utterance Truth, Barcelona, September 2005
- Workshop on Conditionals, University of Connecticut, April 2006

Morality in Fiction and Consciousness in Imagination

APA Pacific Division Conference, Pasadena, March 2004

2004b Uncertainty, Probability and Non-Classical Logic

Formal Epistemology Workshop, University of California at Berkeley, May 2004

Morality, Fiction and Possibility

· American Society for Aesthetics Conference, Houston, October 2004

2004d Intuitions and Meanings

- Fribourg Workshop on Intuitions, Fribourg Switzerland, November 2004.
- · Australian National University, January 2005.
- · University of Glasgow, February 2005.

2003a Prankster's Ethics (with Andy Egan)

- International Symposium on Theoretical and Applied Ethics, Louisiana State University, February 2003
- APA Central Division Conference, Cleveland OH, April 2003

2003b Scepticism, Rationalism and Externalism

- Cornell University, October 2003
- Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference, Washington State University and University of Idaho, April 2004

2002a Justification and Innateness

 Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, July 2002

2002b My Favourite Puzzle

· University of Melbourne, October 2002

	<ul> <li>University of California at Davis, January 2004</li> </ul>
2001a	Indicatives and Subjunctives
	Brown University, February 2001
	Rutgers University, February 2001
	<ul> <li>University of Colorado at Boulder, February 2001</li> </ul>
2001b	Growing Individuals and Intrinsic Properties
	APA Pacific Division Conference, San Francisco, March 2001
2001c	True, Truest
	University of Michigan, October 2001
	APA Central Division Conference, Chicago, April 2002
	Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, August 2003
2000a	Stages, Worms, Slices and Lumps
	• Syracuse University, May 2000
2000b	A Puzzle About Duplication
20000	Monash University, June 2000
2000c	Is This Title Ambiguous?
	Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, University of Queensland, July 2000
1999	What Good Are Counterexamples?
	Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, University of Melbourne, July 1999
1998	Supertruth
	Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, Macquarie University, July 1998
1997	The Dutch Bookie Goes to Market
	· International Economics and Philosophy Society Conference, University of New South Wales,
	July 1996, and published in conference proceedings: Julian Lamont and Christi Dawn Favor
	(eds.) Edited Proceedings of the 1997 International Economics and Philosophy Society Conference,
	97-100
1996a	The Possibility of Revealed Preference
	· International Economics and Philosophy Society Conference, University of Queensland, Bris-
	bane, Australia, July 1996, and published in conference proceedings: Julian Lamont (ed.) Edited
	Proceedings of the 1996 International Economics and Philosophy Society Conference, 121-125
1996b	Inductive Arguments and Probability
	· Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, University of Queensland, July 1996
	Panel Presentations and Invited Commentaries
2017	Arizona Ontology Conference, January 2017
2016a	APA Central Division, San Francisco, March 2016
2016b	APA Pacific Division, San Francisco, April 2016
2015	Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, 2015
2009	Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado at Boulder, August 2009
2008	Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, August 2008
2007	Rutgers Semantics Workshop, New Brunswick, October 2007
2006a	Arizona Ontology Conference, January 2006
2006Ь	Panel on Blogging in Philosophy, APA Pacific Division, March 2006
	NIVILC : WILL EL L 2006

NYU Causation Workshop, Florence, June 2006 2006c APA Central Division, Chicago, April 2005 2005 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, August 2004 2004 2003a APA Pacific Division, San Francisco, March 2003 Syracuse Workship on Metaphysics, Syracuse University, August 2003 2003b BloggerCon, Harvard University, October 2003 2003c Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Western Washington University, August 2001 2001 2000 Metaphysical Mayhem V, Syracuse University, August 2000

### Teaching

### Introduction to Philosophy

- Taught eight times: Spring 2005, Spring 2006, Fall 2006, Spring 2007 and Spring 2008, Winter 2013, Winter 2016, Winter 2018.
- · Topics included philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, scepticism and ethics
- In early years, mainly used readings. In later years, the focus was more on great books, such as Descartes' *Meditations* and Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*.
- All the courses were large introductory lecture courses, to between 80 and 150 students, except the Spring 2008 course, which was a freshman Honors seminar.

### Introduction to Logic

- · Taught four times: Spring 2003, Fall 2008, Fall 2009, Fall 2011.
- Topics included validity and soundness, the predicate calculus, models, and proofs in propositional and predicate logic.
- · The courses had no pre-requisites, and focussed on continuous assessment.
- · All the courses were large lecture courses, with 80 to 100 students.

### Intermediate Logic

- · Taught four times: Fall 2001, Fall 2002, Spring 2004, Fall 2004.
- · The course was on predicate logic, from introduction to the proof of completeness.
- The courses had between 20 and 40 students.

#### Advanced Logic

- · Taught four times: Fall 2000, Spring 2002, Fall 2003, Fall 2009.
- · Topics varied, but included non-classical logic, modal logic and the incompleteness of arithmetic.
- · All courses were small graduate focussed courses, with 5 to 10 students.

#### Philosophy of Language

- · Taught twice: Fall 2001, Spring 2003.
- · Topics included reference and description, implicature and vagueness.
- $\cdot$  Course was a small undergraduate seminar, with some graduates sitting in, with 5 to 10 students.

#### Decision Theory

- · Taught five times: Spring 2000, Fall 2004, Fall 2008, Fall 2011, Winter 2016.
- Topics included probability and utility functions, paradoxes of decision theory, game theory and collective decision making.
- · Courses were targeted at juniors and seniors, with between 5 and 20 students.

### 300-level Epistemology

- · Taught twice: Fall 2013, Winter 2015.
- · Topics included scepticism, analysis of knowledge and social epistemology.
- · Courses were targeted at intermediate level philosophy students, with roughly 40 students.

#### 400-level Groups and Choices

- · Taught twice: Winter 2017, Winter 2018.
- · Topics include game theory, voting theory and group minds.
- Courses are targeted at upper level undergraduates and beginning graduate students, with courses being 25 or 50 students.

Undergraduate courses taught just once (all student numbers approximate)

- · History of Political Philosophy, Spring 2001, 50 students
- · Time Travel, Fall 2003, 20 students
- · Mid 20th Century philosophy, Spring 2005, 5 students
- · Applied Ethics, Summer 2005, 40 students
- · Semantics, Fall 2007, 5 students
- · Philosophical Babies, Fall 2012, 20 students
- · 400-level Epistemology, Winter 2013, 10 students
- · 400-level Ethics, Fall 2015, 10 students
- · Honors Logic, Fall 2016, 18 students
- · 300-level Formal Methods, Winter 2017, 45 students

### **Graduate Seminars**

- · Intuitions, Fall 1999
- · Vaguness, Spring 2002
- · Conceivability, Spring 2002
- · Philosophy of Economics, Spring 2004
- · David Lewis, Spring 2006, Fall 2013
- · Dissertation Workshop, Spring 2008
- · Probability, Spring 2009
- · Scepticism, Fall 2010
- · Game Theory, Summer 2011
- · Scepticism, Winter 2012
- · Normative Uncertainty, Fall 2014
- · Responsibility, Fall 2017

### Professional service

2006-2012 Editor-in-Chief, Philosophy Compass.
 2006-07 Co-editor, Philosophical Review.
 2012-2014 Associate Editor, Thought.
 2013- Associate Editor, Philosophical Review

External examiner for graduate degrees at Rutgers University, Australian National University, University of Oslo, University of Melbourne and Monash University.

External reviewer for funding proposals for FWO (Belgium), AHRC (UK) and PETAF (Spain).

Reviewed book manuscripts or proposals for Oxford University Press, Princeton University Press, MIT Press, Harvard University Press and Routledge.

Referee for, among others, American Philosophical Quarterly, Analytic Philosophy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Australasian Journal of Logic, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Dialectica, Ethics, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, Linguistics and Philosophy, Mind, Mind and Language, Noûs, Philosophers' Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, The Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Ratio and Synthese.

## Departmental and university service

2014-6	Chair, Graduate Studies Committee (i.e., DGS), University of Michigan.
2014-5	Member, Search Committee, PPE Search, University of Michigan.
2013, 2017	Member, Search Committee, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan.
2012-3	Chair, Search Committee, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan.
2012, 2017	Graduate Admissions Committee, Philosophy Department, University of Michigan
2009-10	External Speakers Co-Ordinator, Philosophy Department, Rutgers University
2008-10	Appointments and Promotions Committee, Dean's Office, Humanites, Rutgers University
2008-10	Web co-ordinator, Philosophy Department, Rutgers University
2009	Graduate Admissions committee, Philosophy Department, Rutgers University
2008-09	Search committee, Philosophy Department, Rutgers University
2008	Graduate Admissions committee, Philosophy Department, Rutgers University
2006-07	Search committee, Philosophy Department, Cornell University
2004-05	External Speakers Co-Ordinator, Philosophy Department, Cornell University
2004-05	Search committee, Philosophy Department, Cornell University
2004-07	Webmaster, Philosophy Department, Cornell University
2004	Graduate Admissions committee, Philosophy Department, Brown University
2003-04	Logic & Philosophy of Science concentration advisor, Brown University
2003-04	Search committee, Philosophy Department, Brown University
2002	Graduate Admissions committee, Philosophy Department, Brown University