Philosophy

FALL 2016

CHAIR'S LETTER

Elizabeth Anderson

Greetings! I would like to share with you some highlights from the 2015-16 academic year, as well as some exciting news for the future of the Philosophy Department.

DEPARTMENT NEWS

Chandra Sripada was promoted to Associate Professor with tenure this year. He holds a joint appointment with the Department of Psychiatry in the Medical School, and pursues fascinating work in moral psychology and experimental philosophy on free will, willpower, self-control, and moral responsibility.

The Department is undergoing a changing of the guard. Colleagues **Allan Gibbard** and **Louis Loeb** retired at the end of 2015. **Larry Sklar** will retire at the end of 2016. We wish them the very best. Allan will remain engaged with the Department, as he will be our Tanner Lecturer for 2017-18, in conjunction with University of Michigan's Bicentennial celebration.

We also saw the retirement of **Linda Shultes**, our longtime graduate coordinator, at the end of 2015-16. Linda retired after 23 years of dedicated service for us, and 37 years for UM. I worked closely with her in the late 90's and early 00's, when I directed graduate studies in Philosophy. Linda helped hundreds of graduate students navigate their degree programs. No one loved the graduate students more than she. We wish her a happy retirement.

Every year, our colleagues win recognition in various ways. In the past year, **Victor Caston** won a Guggenheim Fellowship *and* an NEH Fellowship. **Derrick Darby** gave a TedXUofM talk, "Doing the Knowledge" to widespread acclaim (you can view his talk on Youtube). **Dan Jacobson** won a Murphy Institute Fellowship at Tulane University. **Sarah Moss** was a Distinguished Faculty Visitor at Purdue University. **Peter Railton** was elected to the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. Congratulations to our distinguished colleagues!

The most important news for the future of the Department is the creation of a new position in Chinese philosophy, joint with Asian Languages and Cultures. This position was made possible by a very generous gift from Professor Emeritus **Donald Munro**, who taught for us from 1964-1996, and who is one of the leading scholars of Chinese philosophy in the world. For decades, University of Michigan was one of a handful of universities that could train scholars in Chinese philosophy. I am thrilled that we will be able to restore our distinction in this field when this position is filled, as soon as next year. Thank you, Don, for your wonderful gift!

SPECIAL EVENTS

As always, the Philosophy Department held many exciting events last academic year. We celebrated **Allan Gibbard**'s career in Gibbardfest, with guest speakers Simon Blackburn (Cambridge & UNC), Paul Boghossian (NYU), **Justin D'Arms** (PhD '95, now at Ohio State), William Harper (Western U), Paul Horwich (NYU), Christine Korsgaard (Harvard), **Joseph Mendola** (PhD '83, Nebraska), Bob Stalnaker (MIT), Sharon Street (NYU), and Seth Yalcin (Berkeley). The Program in Ancient Philosophy brought out Mitzi Lee (Colorado) for a seminar and colloquium. Seana Shiffrin (UCLA) gave the Law and Ethics Lecture, co-sponsored with the Law School. Our Ferrando Family Visiting PPE Lecturer was Eileen Jerrett, a documentarian who screened her film "Blueberry Soup" and engaged with PPE students at two additional events. **Dan Drucker** and **Anna Edmonds** organized our Spring Colloquium on Epistemic vs. Practical Normativity, with guest speakers Nomy Arpaly (Brown), Selim Berker (Harvard), Miriam Schoenfield (UT Austin), and Ralph Wedgwood (USC). We hosted the Princeton/Michigan Graduate Ethics Conference in September. **Chandra** organized a moral psychology workshop on "Imagination and Alternative Possibilities" with many speakers, including Felipe De Brigard (Duke), **John Doris** (PhD '96, now at Washington University), Susan Gelman (UM), Zac Irving (Berkeley), Josh Knobe (Yale), **Victor Kumar** (UM postdoc), Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh), Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State), Jonathan Phillips (Harvard), Nina

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Strohminger (Duke), and Manuel Vargas (U San Francisco). **Sara Aronowitz** and **Boris Babic** organized a Decisions, Games, and Logic Conference with guest speakers Michael Caie (Pittsburgh), Kenny Easwaran (Texas A&M), Joseph Halpern (Cornell), Hannah Rubin (UC Irvine), **Dan Singer** (PhD '12, now at UPenn), Katie Steele (LSE/ANU), and Kevin Zollman (Carnegie Mellon).

Besides these special events, many of our ongoing extracurricular reading groups invited speakers. **Dmitri Gallow** (PhD '14, now at Pittsburgh) returned to speak at our Foundations of Belief and Decision Making Workshop. MAP (Minorities and Philosophy) sponsored talks by Myisha Cherry (UIC) and D. A. Masolo (U Louisville). John Kulvicki (Dartmouth) spoke at the Aesthetics Discussion Group. **Bob Batterman** (PhD '87, now at Pittsburgh) gave our Philosophy of Science Lecture. **Rich Thomason** organized a workshop in Philosophy and Linguistics with guest speakers Ivano Caponigro (UCSD), Max Cresswell (Victoria U), Hans Kamp (U Texas), Barbara Partee (UMass Amherst), Jeff Pelletier (Simon Fraser), and Martin Stokhof (U Amsterdam). Our Mind and Moral Psychology group was particularly active, sponsoring talks by Imogen Dickie (Toronto), Luke Russell (Sydney), David Shoemaker (Tulane), **Justin Tosi**, Brandon Warmke (Bowling Green), and **Robin Zheng** (PhD '15, now at Yale-NUS). Finally, our regular colloquium series included David Enoch (Tel Aviv), Erin Frykholm (Kansas), Jenann Ismael (U Arizona), Daniel Statman (U Haifa), Julia Staffel (Washington U), and James Sterba (Notre Dame).

NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT BY ALUMNI AND FRIENDS

As you can see from our list of events—which are made possible by generous gifts—donations from alumni and friends play a vital role in enriching intellectual life in Philosophy. Your donations enable Department activities in many additional ways. They support Tanner Library, known as one of the best places for undergraduates to study on campus. They fund graduate student editors of *The Philosopher's Annual*. They finance Ethics Bowl—run by our talented graduate students **Mercy Corredor**, **Kevin Craven**, **Zoe Johnson-King**, **Alice Kelley**, **Chris Nicholson**, and **Caroline Perry**—who engage students in ethics discussion in high schools in Ann Arbor, Ypsilanti, Detroit, Berkley and Saginaw. Donations support the growing Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. They fund graduate and undergraduate prizes, and much, much more.

This year I would like to highlight an exciting new opportunity for alumni and friends to support the Department. LSA has just launched its Opportunity Hub, which provides students with career coaching and links them to internships and jobs. Not just a career center, the Opportunity Hub aims to show students how what they learn in the liberal arts, including philosophy—skills such as critical thinking, argumentation, and effective writing—can lead to exciting careers after graduation. When assured of their economic prospects, undergraduates are intellectually liberated to choose courses and programs of study out of personal interest and curiosity, rather than feeling that they must narrow their sights to just a few majors, out of fear that they won't otherwise get a job.

The Philosophy Department would like to use the Opportunity Hub to create an internship/career network linking philosophy students with our alumni and friends. There are three ways that you can help. 1. Do you work at a firm that is interested in offering an internship to any of our very talented students? Please tell us of any internship opportunities and we will advertise them to our students! 2. Are you interested in financially supporting undergraduates during their internships, so that they can afford to take them up even if they lack family resources? LSA and Philosophy are joining forces to make this possible. Philosophy has just funded its first internship, with Eileen Jerrett, who was our Ferrando Family Lecturer in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Using generous donations to the Ilene Goldman Block Fund, we have supported a student intern's travel to help Jerrett film her new documentary on Iceland's constitutional reform movement, and to do background research and media work for her. We are eager to support more exciting internships like this! Our Block Fund, Allan Gibbard Fund, and Philosophy Strategic Fund are particularly good places for donations if you would like to support internships. 3. Do you have information about jobs or career advice for philosophy students who are soon to graduate? We are eager to share such information with our students! For those of you who are only a few years past graduation yourselves, and who may not have much money to spare, providing career information and connections to jobs is a very significant and inexpensive way that you can help philosophy students.

Of course, we also welcome donations to fund all of the traditional academic activities that your gifts have long supported. We are very grateful for the thought and generosity our donors have expressed in giving to the various funds that support the diverse activities of our students and faculty. We acknowledge those who donated to the Department in 2015-16 at the end of this newsletter. If you would like to donate this year, you may do so through our website at lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/. To all who have given or are soon to give, thank you.

cheers,

Elizabeth Anderson
John Dewey Distinguished University Professor
Arthur F. Thurnau Professor
Chair, Philosophy

GRADUATE REPORT

Sarah Moss, Associate Professor
Director of Graduate Studies

The graduate students in Michigan Philosophy are fantastically accomplished, making many significant contributions to the profession even as they are just beginning their careers in it. I am honored to have the opportunity to briefly summarize, in this section of the newsletter, some of their achievements over the past academic year (2015/16).

Beginning with awards, **Chip Sebens** won a ProQuest Distinguished Dissertation Award, one of eight awards given by the Rackham Graduate School in recognition of dissertations of outstanding scholarly quality in any field of study. **Daniel Drucker** won a highly competitive Rackham Pre-Doctoral Fellowship for the current academic year (2016/17). **Josh Hunt** was awarded the 2015 Hanneke Janssen Memorial Prize for his paper "Interpreting the Wigner-Eckart Theorem." **Cat Saint-Croix** has been awarded an IRWG/Rackham Graduate Student Research Award and an IRWG/Rackham Community of Scholars summer fellowship for Social Identity and the Dynamics of Social Concepts. **Paul Boswell** won a Chateaubriand Fellowship, a predoctoral research grant offered by the Embassy of France in the United States, which allowed him to spend February through May of 2016 at the Institut Jean-Nicod in Paris, working primarily with Uriah Kriegel.

Within the Department, **Daniel Drucker** won the Stevenson Prize for outstanding dissertation dossier, as well as the Weinberg Dissertation Award. **Nils-Hennes Stear** won a Rackham Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor Award, and **Nina Windgätter** won the Dewey Prize for outstanding instruction. **Cat Saint-Croix** was awarded the Cornwell Prize, awarded for outstanding intellectual curiosity and exceptional promise of original and creative work. **Kevin Craven**, **Jesse Holloway**, and **Caroline Perry** were also awarded Weinberg Summer Fellowships to aid their research over the past summer.

Our graduate students have been publishing and presenting their work in many venues. **Ian Fishback's** paper "Necessity and Institutions in Self-Defense and War" was a chapter in *The Ethics of Self-Defense*, a recent peer-reviewed volume edited by Christian Coons and Michael Weber. **Nils-Hennes Stear's** paper "Imaginative and Fictionality Failure: A Normative Approach" appeared in *Philosophers' Imprint, Vol. 15(34)* in 2015. **Daniel Drucker's** paper "Neo-Stoicism and What It Can Do" is forthcoming in *Ergo*, an open access philosophy journal available to any and all readers interested in checking out our students' latest work!

In the last year, **Zoë Johnson King** presented her paper "The Trouble With Standards of Proof" at the Harvard Graduate Legal Philosophy Colloquium, as well as "Trying is Good" at the Pitt-CMU Graduate Philosophy Conference and at the Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics conference. **Zoë** also presented "Accidentally Doing the Right Thing" at the Princeton-Michigan Graduate Student Workshop on Metanormativity. **Van Tu** presented a paper titled "Proclus on Henosis" at the 14th Annual International Society for Neoplatonic Studies Conference. **Cat Saint-Croix** presented "Social Roles and the Dimensions of Social Identity" at the 2016 Central Division APA Meeting. **Anna Edmonds** presented "What is the Status of Epistemic Norms?" at Lawrence University. **Annette Bryson** presented "Moralité et Contingence" at the May 2016 congrès de la Société de Philosophie du Québec, and also spoke on "Normative Properties and Concepts of Properties" at the Objectivity in Ethics Conference at the University of Utrecht. **Mara Bollard** presented her paper "Empathy and Moral Agency: Lessons from Psychopathy and Autism" at the Feeling for Another: The Role of Empathy in Moral Theory and Moral Psychology Conference at Oxford University, and presented "Fittingness, Anger, and Disgust, Discussed" at the 4th annual Princeton-Michigan Graduate Student Workshop on Metanormativity. **Jesse Holloway** attended the 4th International Summer School in Philosophy of Physics and gave a presentation called "Understanding Particles in Terms of State Vectors" at that gathering. Finally, **Ian Fishback** has been sharing his work with many audiences: leading a seminar on "The Toll of Policies, Strategies, and Tactics of OEF/OIF" at George Mason University's contribution to the NEH Dialogues on the Experiences of War Project, presenting "The Difficulty of Assessing the Scope of U.S. Torture in Iraq" at the United States Military Academy at West Point, "Debunking the Reciprocity Myth" at Vassar College, "Interrogational Torture and Command Climate after 9/11" at the West Point Workshop on the Costs and Consequences of Torture, and "Necessity and Institutions in Self-Defense and War" at The Future of Just War conference at the Naval Postgraduate School.

In addition to publishing and presenting their own research, our students are organizing many opportunities for other philosophers to share their research with others, as well as opportunities for sharing philosophy with the community at large. **Boris Babic** and **Sara Aronowitz** helped organize the Ninth Decisions, Games, and Logic Workshop at the University of Michigan, with **Daniel Drucker**, **Patrick Shirreff**, and **Zoë Johnson-King** refereeing papers for the event. **Anna Edmonds** and **Daniel Drucker**

organized the annual Spring Colloquium, which this past year focused on the theme of the relationship between epistemic and non-epistemic normativity. **Boris Babic**, **Patrick Shirreff**, and **Mara Bollard** were the graduate student editors for this past year's edition of *The Philosopher's Annual*. **Nina Windgaetter**, **Cat Saint-Croix**, **Sara Aronowitz**, and **Filipa Melo Lopes** were our department's Minorities and Philosophy coordinators over the past year, with all but **Nina** continuing in that position for the coming year. **Jesse Holloway** was also busy organizing the 2016 FOMP workshop on the Foundations of Ordinary Quantum Mechanics. **Zoë Johnson King** served as a mentor at this year's PIKSI Rock Program, the Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute mentoring program for undergraduates thinking about grad school in philosophy who are members of underrepresented groups. And last but not least, we are very proud to report that **Kevin Craven's** High School Ethics team came in first place at the National High School Ethics Bowl.

Congratulations to everyone on their recent accomplishments! For more up-to-date news on department happenings, please keep in touch via our Twitter feed @UMPhilosophy, facilitated by **Eli Lichtenstein**.

UNDERGRADUATE REPORT

Sara Buss, Professor
Director of Undergraduate Studies

As Director of Undergraduate Studies, I spend lots of time talking to undergraduates about their studies and about many other things, too. This is one of the privileges of my job. Every year I get older. But every year our students are just as young, just as bright-eyed and bushy-tailed. They know how lucky they are to be able to spend four years exploring a wide range of ideas and developing valuable analytic and problem-solving skills in the process. They are often a bit anxious about how they are going to accomplish all the tasks they have set themselves. But, for the most part, their enthusiasm and curiosity get the better of their anxiety.

As busy as our students are, they are eager to share what they have learned—and their enthusiasm—with others. Last spring, I sent out a request to some of our majors, asking whether they would be interested in serving as peer advisers, whom other students could contact with questions about which courses to take or how to interpret a difficult passage. The response was inspiring. "I'm really happy to have received this email," one student wrote. "I would definitely like to be put on this list to help out potential majors. Looking back at my own journey, I was very lucky to have had a great GSI [graduate student instructor] for an intro class that really made me excited about this discipline, and I hope I could likewise help others find interest in their Phil courses." Wrote another: "I would absolutely love to do this. Having just committed to the major in philosophy this past semester, I think I would be an excellent resource for younger students who are considering their educational path. In addition, I would also deeply appreciate any chance to discuss and engage in philosophy with anyone working their way through a paper, a reading, or maybe even a finding a stance on a contemporary issue unrelated to a class. Please sign me up right away." And another: "It sounds like the type of resource that I myself would have liked to have had access to thus far as an undergrad. I would be more than happy to do this in whatever capacity I'm able!" As I said, it is a privilege to work with these young people. There are now eleven peer philosophy advisers.

The Department continues to think about ways to relate the questions and methods of philosophy to the world beyond the classroom. New courses explore political speech, global justice, and the role that human psychology plays in ordinary reasoning. Our course in bioethics is helping an increasing number of future medical professionals to work through the sort of issues they will face in their careers. And just this fall, the LSA curriculum committee approved a philosophy course for students interested in exploring the moral issues that arise in the business world. Another new course will provide students the opportunity to share their knowledge and skills with high school students who are studying challenging moral cases in preparation for Ethics Bowl competitions.

At last spring's commencement ceremony, the department awarded the Frankena Prize to Aaron Chuey and Cullen O'Keefe, and the Fall Haller Term Prize to Emma Nagler. We also recognized each of the students who spent the entire year writing an honors thesis. The topics of these theses give a sense of the rich variety of intellectual inquiry in which our students are engaged. One student offered an account of the nature of health. Another grappled with the problem of evil. Still another wrote on the moral obligation to obey the law. There was a fascinating discussion of the moral significance of various sexual practices, and a probing inquiry into the rationale for including a gender on a baby's birth certificate.

As the graduating majors and minors gathered together at the end of April to celebrate their years studying philosophy, I shared with their families the things they plan to be doing in the years to come: "serving as a doctor in an underprivileged community," "learning—and even teaching—cool stuff about language, brains, and computers," "working in healthcare policy, public health, or academic

medicine," "pursuing my love of philosophy," "practicing law in Chicago," "teaching high school," "working at a Financial Services Firm in New York," "teaching philosophy," "aiding in the push for human rights," "working for a Civil Rights Non-profit Organization," "representing Switzerland at the United Nations," and "teaching Law and Political Science at the university level to mentor the next generation of minority scholars." Our students are not only anxious about finishing their papers on time, they worry about what they will do when they "get out." But, as this list of career aspirations makes clear, they are ready for just about anything.

This readiness has multiple causes. Not least among them is the discovery of powers of intellect and imagination they did not know they had. We catch a glimpse of how pleasurable it can be to exercise these powers if we consider the answers they gave when we asked them to mention one of the ideas they found especially intriguing when they encountered it for the first time in a philosophy class. Since I think there is no better way to get a sense of the undergraduate life of our department than by listening to the undergraduates themselves, I will share with you a few of their answers to this question:

> I think that Nietzsche's claims about slave morality and master morality from the 'Genealogy' are the most thought-provoking I've encountered in college—especially the idea that pity, compassion, equality, non-violence, and fairness serve to neuter the strongest members of society and protect the weaker ones. While I disagree strongly with this notion—indeed, while I hope to spend my career working in the spirit of equality and justice—it has nonetheless compelled me (and apparently others, e.g., Foucault) to reflect upon the power dynamics at work in everyday life and society at large.
>
> I will never forget my first experience with philosophy freshman year, however, when Professor Loeb opened 232 by explaining hard determinism. I spent the next semester having to convince myself that Holbach was wrong and we really do have free will!
>
> Thinking about normative judgment [in the way Professor Gibbard does] made me fundamentally reevaluate what I thought about moral discourse and how it should be conducted. This means when someone calls something "moral or "immoral" they're not attributing a property to it, but they are instead expressing a state of mind.

One of the students cited Kant's concise characterization of enlightenment:

> Enlightenment is man's release from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is man's inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! - that is the motto of enlightenment.

The student translated the Latin rather loosely: "Have courage to use your own reason!" (rather than "Dare to know!"). We in the University of Michigan philosophy department could do worse than to take this as our motto. We continue to do all we can to provide the sort of education for our students that will inspire them to make it their motto too.

Two new courses.

Real World Ethics gives students the opportunity to apply ethical theories to real-world ethical problems. It introduces students to these problems and to the theories that will enable them to analyze these problems. It trains them to share what they have learned with high school students who are participating in the Ethics Bowl program.

Students enrolled in *Real World Ethics* will study major moral theories in light of a set of 12 "case studies" that raise the sort of pressing moral issues we confront as individuals or as members of a society. Students will also receive training in how to communicate what they have learned to others. This training will prepare them to spend the second half of the semester coaching high school students who are working on the same case studies as part of an Ethics Bowl program. The student coaches will deepen their understanding of what they have learned by sharing their knowledge and skills with others who are also eager to think about the ethical challenges we all face as friends, neighbors, professionals, citizens, members of a family, and policy makers.

The Rights and Wrongs of Business Practices aims to provide students with a comprehensive view of the ethics of business activity. It will explore the moral issues raised by capitalist economies generally and for-profit corporations specifically. Throughout the semester students will address such questions as: what moral obligations, if any, do corporations have to their employees, consumers, and others? What is the moral significance of the obligation to seek to maximize profit? What's so bad about breaching a contract? What are the moral considerations for and against paying the average CEO hundreds of times more than the average employee? What is the moral significance of race and gender in the workplace? What is the proper relationship between the public and private sectors? In addition to being introduced to moral theory, students will study the political, legal, and economic background of contemporary debates about business practices and regulation.

Research Report

FAMILY SKELETON DANCES FOR JUSTICE

Derrick Darby, Professor

A Philosophy Family Skeleton

A spirit of curiosity animated scientific and philosophical works of the seventeenth century. We see this in Galileo and Newton, who paved the way for modern science, and in Bacon, Locke, and other empiricists, who put scientific discoveries within a philosophical context, drawing out their implications for the scientific method, logic, epistemology, and for how human beings could master the natural world to improve their living, social, and political conditions.

During the Age of Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century, empirical and philosophical curiosity extended to fashioning perspectives on human beings as natural and social animals that could be divided into various races with each displaying different characteristics. For instance, biological taxonomist Carolus Linnaeus in his 1735 *Systema Naturae* identified four such races: white, black, yellow, and red. With his classification of human beings by their physical traits and behavioral dispositions, which he believed to be fixed by nature, he sought to adapt Aristotle's notions of genus and species, and to situate the varieties of mankind within the animal kingdom. According to Linnaeus, Europeans were "white" and "governed by law;" Native Americans were "tanned" and "governed by custom;" Asians were "yellow" and "governed by opinion;" and Africans were "crafty, lazy, careless, black," and governed by the arbitrary will of the master."

Meanwhile, around the same time, Diderot, Rousseau, Hume, Kant, and other philosophers had a hand in shaping and spreading ideas about the races of mankind that have cast long shadows. For instance, in his 1754 essay "Of Natural Characters," Hume, in spite of believing that domestic slavery debased both slaves and their masters, remarked:

> I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation…Not to mention our colonies, there are NEGROE slaves dispersed all over EUROPE, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession.

A decade later, in his "Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and Sublime," Kant expanded upon Hume's viewpoint:

> The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color.

It is, of course, tempting to think that such views are ancient, or in this case, early modern history. Surely no educated person espouses them today. If only this were so! Not long ago, in 2007, Dr. James Watson, a Nobel Prize winning geneticist, made news when he said: "black people are less intelligent than white people," and that "our wanting to reserve equal powers of reason as some universal heritage of humanity will not be enough to make it so."

The denigration of black intellect, character, and conduct, and the general presumption of black inferiority and white supremacy—which are and have always been affronts to black dignity and obstacles to whites and blacks relating to one another as equal persons—have a long and infamous history that haunts us today. This is especially apparent in our current social and political environment where many people, and not just social activists, are asking whether black lives matter.

It is one thing to articulate such views about race; however, of even greater concern is when they are used to inform the structure and operation of the basic institutions of society that distribute vital goods like education. What exactly is the historical relationship between the ideology of race and the institution of schooling in America? And how can understanding this relationship inform efforts to make today's schools more just? These two questions guide my current collaborative research project with University of Kansas historian John Rury.

Making the Family Skeleton Dance for Justice

Although work on race in the history of philosophy remains largely in the shadows of our venerable discipline, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Robert Bernasconi, Thomas McCarthy and others have shined a bright spotlight on the racist legacy of European Enlightenment philosophers. So, this skeleton—the thesis that mankind is divided into different races and that the black race is inferior to the white race in intellect, character, and temperament—has been out of the philosophy family closet for some time. *The Color of Mind*, the title of our forthcoming book supported by generous grants from the Spencer Foundation and the ACLS, is a term that we coin to describe this unsettling, uncomfortable, and uncouth thesis.

That these old bones have been unearthed makes the ideas no less troublesome. We can try to forget the family skeleton, ignore it, or downplay it so that it causes less embarrassment. But one thing is certain: we cannot get rid of it. What, then, should we do with it? Well, as George Bernard Shaw said in his 1931 novel *Immaturity*, "If you cannot get rid of the family skeleton, you may as well make it dance."

Unlike Hume and Kant—mighty dead philosophers that play leading roles in our story—we do not endorse the Color of Mind, and neither did Frederick Douglass, Frances Ellen Watkins Harper, W. E. B. Du Bois and other voices of dissent heard in our book. Instead, we expose this philosophical skeleton, tell the story of how it was institutionalized in the American education system, tacitly constructing a racial achievement gap, and argue that dealing with the lingering legacy of the Color of Mind—its ongoing relationship to contemporary sorting practices such as tracking, disciplinary expulsions, and special education assignments—is indispensable for realizing social justice within integrated K-12 schools.

We find ample evidence of troubling patterns in several areas. A recent report by the UCLA Civil Rights Project found that of nearly 3.5 million public school students suspended in 2011-12, whites were subject to this disciplinary action less frequently than any other racial or ethnic group. At the secondary level, where suspensions are far more frequent, black students were more than twice as likely to be suspended, with nearly one in four (23%) punished this way during the school year. In this same period, African Americans represented 16 percent of the national student body but just 8 percent of enrollments in calculus (Latino figures were 21 and 12 percent). There are, of course, competing explanations for these racialized sorting patterns, including the operation of structural processes behind school doors, but whatever the explanation, the outcomes imply differential status and reinforce longstanding views about purported racial differences between whites and blacks.

These well-documented sorting practices, which are especially endemic in racially integrated schools, along with the racial disparities in achievement associated with them, sustain the Color of Mind today. Racially disproportionate tracking, school discipline, and special education practices inflict an expressive harm on the dignity of black students, sending a clear message that impugns their inner worth as persons. We argue that this constitutes a status injustice, which is distinct from other injustices associated with the adverse material consequences such practices may have on African American educational attainment, job prospects, and wealth accumulation. So, if integration is indeed an imperative of educational justice in America, as some argue, it is far from sufficient for dealing with the complex consequences of centuries of racial injustice. Racial ideologies must be confronted directly.

The Color of Mind makes the philosophy family skeleton dance for educational leaders aiming to make their schools more just. Our historically informed philosophical investigation shows that racial ideologies and schooling practices have worked in tandem to constrain educational opportunities and achievement for blacks in America; moreover, this has created a pernicious mutually reinforcing cycle of denigration that undermines black dignity. Finding the pathway to educational justice requires being more attuned to the historically entrenched relationship between racial ideologies and racial sorting within schools and tackling them together.

Derrick Darby in Amsterdam

FREGE AND KARL SNELL: IDEALISM, ROMANTICISM, AND THE HISTORY OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

By Jamie Tappenden

The last century or so of academic philosophy has been marked by a division into camps thought to be fundamentally opposed. In caricature form: the "analytic" philosophy that dominates in English-speaking circles, grounded in the methodology of natural science and logical study of language stands opposite the "Continental" philosophy that engages with questions of speculative metaphysics. It's often suggested (as I believe myself) that the division is artificial and superficial, but as a fact of practical sociology, the camps do appear to have separated into discrete solitudes with limited interaction. Recently, scholars of the history of analytic philosophy have begun to look back critically to the time at which this division was just emerging and have discovered that some of the classics of analytic philosophy are not so easy to fit into these neat pigeonholes.

One candidate for re-examination from this point of view is Gottlob Frege (1848 - 1925), the founder of modern logic and one of the co-founders of contemporary analytic philosophy of language. Frege is a challenge to the historian because there is remarkably little documentary material available on his life. He was a mathematician with no formal training in philosophy, just a couple of university courses. What he learned he would have mostly learned on his own and in conversation with friends. Given his influence on the twentieth century, it is remarkable how little he wrote. Much, perhaps most, of his correspondence and unpublished writing was lost in a WWII bombing. Facts about his life can be rooted out from archives, but only with considerable digging and the inevitable dry wells. This has left Frege vulnerable to becoming a passive screen for contemporary presuppositions projected into the past. The 1973 classic *Frege: Philosophy of Language* by Micheal Dummett contains a particularly striking illustration. Dummett characterizes Frege as a committed member of "the realist revolt against Hegelian idealism." Nowhere in his published or unpublished writing does Frege actually criticize Hegelian idealism, nor the related idealisms of Fichte or Schelling, but in Dummett's hands this just confirms the depth of Frege's scorn: "Frege barely troubled to attack idealism at all: he merely passed it by." I'm sure I need not point out that the absence of such attacks could also— even more naturally— be taken to indicate an absence of hostility. Only assumptions about what a logically disciplined, mathematically inclined philosopher *must surely* have thought would suggest otherwise.

My recent research on Frege aims to fill the information vacuum on Frege's environment, to get a better sense of the background presuppositions that can be taken to be shared by Frege and his audience. It turns out that his local environment was astonishingly rich, and that unexpected attitudes to idealism prevailed there. Of course, this kind of context-setting is most valuable for a scholar if it can shape an informed interpretation of a philosopher's writings, bringing out unexpected meaning in what might previously have seemed to be idle remarks and disclosing hidden connections among what had appeared to be scattered asides. So before exploring some of Frege's background, I'll note one aspect of his writing that becomes especially vivid and rich when seen against this background.

One of Frege's masterpieces is the slender 1884 book *Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (trans. *Foundations of Arithmetic*) in which he argues for what we now call the logicist thesis: that all the truths of arithmetic can be derived from logical principles and definitions. In *Grundlagen*, Frege acknowledges one towering point of opposition: Kant's theory of knowledge, in particular Kant's fundamental thesis that logic alone can't extend knowledge. Since, as Kant and Frege agree, arithmetic does extend knowledge, Kant maintained that arithmetic could not be purely logical. Frege's response on this core issue is strikingly cursory, taking up just one brief section (§88) of *Grundlagen*: Frege argues that Kant generalized from overly simple examples "which are of all the inferences in mathematics, the least fruitful," but that the "truly fruitful" concepts definable in Frege's logical system (*Begriffsschrift*) actually do support logical inferences that extend knowledge. But when Frege turns to explain just what it is about his system that gives it this power, he seems to rest his case just on some foggy metaphors: each component of a "more fruitful definition" in Frege's system has a "more intimate, I might say more organic connection (*organischere Verbindung*) with [the other components]," so that conclusions are contained in definitions "as plants are contained in their seeds, not as beams in a house." Generations of Frege readers have asked: how in heaven's name is this supposed to tell us anything? How could Frege have expected his readers to be satisfied with such a sketchy response to Kant's fundamental epistemological thesis? Indeed, how could he have expected his readers to understand him at all?

In recent decades, Frege scholars have managed to clarify some of Frege's intentions. The division of concepts into fruitful and not corresponds to the difference between Frege's logic and Boole's, or roughly to the difference between quantificational and propositional logic as studied in introductory logic courses today. Many of the central mathematical concepts described as "fruitful" in math textbooks of Frege's time can indeed only be represented in Frege's logic, not Boole's. But mysteries remain. One is internal to Frege's texts: in connection with the contrast with Boole, Frege states that Boole's logic can be treated "mechanically" while his logic cannot. Frege's insistence that thinking in mathematics is not mechanical is repeated in other connections as well. Is this connected to his picture of the "organic" connections in which conclusions are contained like "plants in their seeds?" Another has to do with the idea of fruitfulness itself: to call a concept "fruitful" is not just to suggest that it has a certain structure; it is to claim that the concept supports novel discovery and intellectual innovation, even creativity. How, if at all, is this supposed to fit into Frege's picture of "gaining new knowledge" through logic? One approach to such questions is to adopt this working hypothesis: if Frege says so little on topics that clearly demand more substance, perhaps he was assuming that his audience could fill in the white spots by drawing on a shared, and subsequently forgotten, background of "common knowledge." So, let's see what we can learn from Frege's context.

Frege was part of an exceptionally rich intellectual circle, especially in his early decades of the 1870s and 80s. This has been overlooked by historians of philosophy in part because the brightest lights of the group were not philosophers, nor were they concentrated in any one discipline. With the advantage of hindsight, we can find among the younger members of Frege's immediate circle, figures who would be recognized as essential, and in some cases revolutionary, contributors to optics, historical linguistics, philology of Germanic languages, marine biology, physiology, embryology and anatomy. There was also an older generation in the circle that provided historical memory of Jena's legendary philosophical past, of Schelling, Hegel and Goethe.

In this short presentation I'll limit myself to just one of these colleagues: The Jena Professor of Mathematics and Physics, Karl Snell, the man who hosted in his home, and whose intellectual spirit defined, a weekly salon at which Frege and the rest of this circle gathered. Frege almost never had anything good to say about anyone, but he wrote of the now-forgotten Snell as his "revered teacher" and elsewhere as "a man deeply revered by me." Snell was not himself a profound thinker, but he was by all accounts a charismatic person who drew people to him. He made no research contributions to mathematics or physics but he was influential in the theory of mathematics education, and in what we would now call the philosophy of science, especially the philosophy of biology. Snell was a philosophical Romantic (in the mold of Goethe) and embraced the *Naturphilosophie* of the idealist Friedrich Schelling. His weekly salon was also viewed in a later memoir by one of the attendees as animated by the spirit of "Schelling and the Romantics."

Here's a nutshell presentation of key features of a complicated topic. Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* was in part a reaction to Kant's epistemology, arguing that Kant's model of scientific knowledge was inadequate to account for knowledge of living nature. The suggestion was that knowledge of "the organic" was not reducible to mechanical knowledge and that biology involved knowledge of processes that went beyond those studied in Newtonian physics. The idea that "the organic" and "the mechanical" were distinct domains of knowledge was, in early and mid-nineteenth century Germany close to a cliché, but the Schellingite treatment had distinctive features. First of all, the approach was anchored in Kant's work, but in a way that opposed the epistemology of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* with the study of teleology and aesthetics in Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. In the latter, Kant argued that reasoning in biology cannot be reduced to mechanical reasoning because it involves an ineliminable appeal to ideas of *purpose*. The positive account of teleological thinking in biology drew from an antecedent analysis of "purposiveness without purpose" in judgements of natural beauty. Kant further linked this to intellectual creativity and "genius" in a way that Snell himself summed up as follows, in an 1847 essay:

> [Mechanical philosophy of the last century was confronted by] Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, a work that is especially significant in its combination of two ideas, the idea of natural organism and the idea of products of fantasy or of artistic beauty. Thereby, the productiveness of the creative imagination and the creative nature of activity have been assigned a common idea-sphere . . . Later German philosophy of nature has recognized this work as the cornerstone of their speculations.

The reference to the common "idea-sphere" alludes to Schelling's "identity- philosophy" thesis that nature and thoughts about nature were in certain profound ways identical. It will suffice for us to avoid the baroque metaphysics this involved and just note that this view posited a kind of mirroring between the organic developments in nature and the structure and potential "organic" development of concepts.

In Snell's hands, this picture was extended to mathematical reasoning, in both research and in connection with mathematics education. Snell's approach to pedagogy involves an explicit opposition to Euclid's *Elements* as a teaching tool. (This position is not unique to Snell; it has a long history, dating back at least to Petrus Ramus in the 16th century and Antoine Arnauld's *Nouveaux Élémens de Géométrie* in the 17th.) Euclid, in Snell's view, is structured artificially rather than "organically" in a way that reflects the genesis of ideas. Snell asserts that *his* approach (in Snell's textbooks on geometry and calculus) produces a system with "organic structuring" (*organische Gliederung*), and hence it introduces the topic in a way that facilitates active learning through discovery. The phrase "*organische Gliederung*" was picked up and repeated in the pedagogical literature, in essays lauding Snell's approach.

The precise phrase "organic connection" that appears in Frege's *Grundlagen* section §88 shows up in Snell's discussions of mathematical research, along with an explicit contrast to "mechanical connection." The best brief illustration of this way of talking about mathematics comes from the writing of Adolf Peters, Snell's longtime close friend and intellectual kindred spirit, who introduced what we now call intrinsic or natural coordinates for curves in space. Peters considers the Cartesian coordinates—representing a figure in space with three numbers x, y, z corresponding to positions on three orthogonal lines—and rejects them on the grounds that the choice of axes is arbitrary. Choosing different axes would not affect the curve in any way, but would give you different coordinates because this technique only reflects what Peters calls "mechanical connections." Peters replaces the Cartesian technique with coordinates defined in terms of intrinsic properties of the curve—the distance along the curve, and its degree of curvature—which supply what Peters calls "organic connections." For both Peters and Snell, the "organic connections" of concepts are seen as bound up with creative potential.

There was a practical, and one might even say broadly, political reason for emphasizing that at least some mathematical reasoning occupied the "organic," and therefore creative side of the "organic"/"mechanical" divide. Throughout the nineteenth century, the German-speaking world engaged in an extensive reform of the education system, centered around the idea of *Bildung*, a self-cultivation of both character and the intellect. Certain topics—notably classical languages and literatures—were seen as evidently contributing to *Bildung*, but mathematics was in many cases viewed as insufficiently morally and intellectually elevated for inclusion in the curricula of the highest level of education in the *Gymnasien*. (As late as the 1840's, the faculty of arts at Jena opposed the teaching of any mathematics in the nearby Weimar

Gymnasium, on these grounds.) Snell and Peters wrote many polemics supporting the inclusion of mathematics in *Gymnasium* curricula, emphasizing among other things the creative dimension of mathematical reasoning. Since most German mathematics PhD's who found teaching work did so in secondary schools, this was a debate with real-world ramifications. Thus, when Frege, in *Grundlagen* crankily dismisses the thesis of the Jena philosopher Kuno Fischer that calculation is just "aggregative mechanical thought," it isn't just theoretical play of ideas.

Snell's presentation of the contrast between organic and mechanical connections was accompanied by a biological image of creative thought as involving development from basic concepts and principles that functioned as variously "seeds," "germs" or "kernels." Indeed, Snell characterized the condensation of multiple phenomena into a small basic kernel as the "final and highest goal of empirical science." Snell connects the idea of *potential* with that of developing out of a germ. For example, in an 1858 book on debates over materialism, in which Snell argues *inter alia* that the organic is not reducible to the mechanical, he writes of "productive thinking" as developing "out of a few axioms as a simple germ [*Keim*]" holding the "*potentia*" of the entire "tree of knowledge."

Outside of his work on mathematics education, Snell is now remembered as a dissenter from Darwin's theory of evolution. Here too, Snell invoked a parallel between the development of thoughts from conceptual "seeds" and biological development. A distinctive feature of his view was the thesis that the evolution of man should be seen not as the end of a (broadly) mechanical process, but rather as a process whereby a primitive species containing within it the properties of human beings in *potentia* sat at the beginning of a process of development in which the potential present in the first organisms was more and more adequately realized over the centuries. The view was remarkably popular, especially among theologians looking for a non-Darwinian picture of development that could be reconciled with Divine creation, and among scientists who were broadly accepting of Darwinism, but who rejected the appeal to "external" causation and randomness of the theory of natural selection. As one admiring description of Snell's view put it, the development of species unfolds "by inner development—causes, not external mechanical influences." Here too, Snell and those discussing him often appeal to the picture of organic development out of a germ or kernel (*Keim/Kern*). For example, the view was retrospectively, and admiringly summed up in an 1890 review in an idealist journal: "…Snell's hypothesis is highly significant for the forceful revival of the dynamic concept of development; its distinctive feature is that it locates the evolution of organisms in the germs (*Keime*)…."

Say we revisit *Grundlagen* §88 with this in mind. The suggestion won't be that Frege must have believed something because people he respected in his environment believed those things. Frege was far too independent-minded to make any such inference secure. Rather the suggestion is the more modest one that we can better understand what Frege meant by his words and claims by learning how people around him understood such words and claims. What we've learned is that Frege's discussion, however terse, was packed with "magic words": "organic" (with a tacit contrast to "mechanical"), conceptual fruitfulness arising from this organic structure, organic development of ideas like "plants from seeds," rather than external clusters like beams of a house. Frege could be confident that his readers would recognize the extensive philosophical background theory he was alluding to, freeing him of the need to clutter a brief monograph with an extended digression.

But the lessons go beyond just textual questions about Frege. Though there is much more to say, even this thin slice of the story gives us a better sense of the diverse philosophical background that informed the emergence of analytic philosophy—more "Continental" than expected—and a richer sense of the breadth of the considerations that can bind questions of formal logic to broader intellectual currents.

COURSE REPORT: CRITICAL THINKING

David Manley

In winter 2016, for the first time in the history of our department (I think!), we offered a course entirely about critical thinking (PHIL 183: *Critical Thinking*). In teaching the course, I drew from disciplines all over the university to bring together what we know about good reasoning, and tried to impart the most helpful tips and tricks to 'hack' our minds to think more clearly. (Some of the most important work in this area is due to Prof. Richard Nisbett over in Psychology, whose book *Mindhacking* was incorporated into the syllabus.)

Colleges and universities invariably mention critical thinking skills when they tout the benefits of a liberal arts education. And well they should! But for the most part, a liberal arts education imparts the skill of critical thinking by demonstrating how it applies in all the varied sub-disciplines that are represented in the university. In classes all over campus, students think critically about novels and mathematical functions and historical documents and social structures and quantum phenomena. By engaging rigorously in all of



these domains, it is hoped that they will pick up a more general habit of mind that makes us better people and better citizens.

But—in addition to "getting the hang of it" in this way—we should also reflect explicitly on the nature of good reasoning itself in order to better understand how it works and how we tend to fall short. Thinking about thinking itself can help us catch ourselves when we are subconsciously taking shortcuts or making well-known errors. (Studies by Prof. Nisbett have shown that at least some very general tools of thought can be explicitly taught in such a way that they improve thinking even years later.)

For all these reasons, I decided to offer PHIL 183 in our department, and I liked the experience so much that I hope to teach it often. (The course title had officially been added to our list of courses decades ago—but for reasons lost to posterity it appears never to have been taught and was "mothballed." Judith Beck, our undergraduate coordinator, rediscovered it after I wrote up a proposal for just such a course!) Not that all of the material is new, of course: much of it has been taught in bits and pieces all over campus—in cognitive science, psychology, statistics, economics, and even in some of our own classes, especially PHIL 180: *Introduction to Logic*. Indeed, I included some of that material myself when I taught 180, and every time I taught that course I tried to include a little more.

Intro to Logic is a great course, but it didn't quite suit my purposes. It's primarily an introduction to formal deduction, taught using a symbolic language and a proof system. The level of technical detail involved is critical for those who would go on to use formal systems in mathematics, computer science, or higher logic. But this leaves little time in the schedule for the kind of interdisciplinary material that a course on critical thinking should contain. And anyway, the key points about deduction that are useful in everyday life can be grasped without all that apparatus.

If most of what a student learns about reasoning has to do with deduction, it can tempt them to treat all lines of reasoning as deductive in nature. ("If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.") Suppose, for example, someone claims that John is angry on the grounds that (i) Whenever John is angry, his face is red, and (ii) John's face is red. The tendency for those of us trained in deductive logic is to pounce on this reasoning and declare it fallacious: "It commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent!" And it's true that the conclusion does not follow with certainty: even if John's face is red whenever he is angry, it might also be red whenever he is happy but has had too much to drink. So it is consistent with both premises that he is not angry. But if we stop there, we may be missing something important. Maybe the argument was not being presented as logically deductive argument at all. Maybe instead it has the form of an inference to the best explanation. To interpret the argument in this way we must charitably grant a hidden premise—something like "There is no other likely explanation"— and take the conclusion to be presented as merely reasonable, rather than certain. And if that is what is going on, the argument may actually be quite strong. Sometimes, of course, the speaker may actually be muddled about what kind of argument he or she is providing, and whether the conclusion follows with certainty. But in order to think clearly about how reasons support a conclusion, it is critical to understand the logic of abductive—as well as deductive—reasoning.

Every line of reasoning (or "argument") has its own internal structure (or "logic"). But what is usually called "logic" in textbooks or course descriptions involves just one particular way to formalize one particular kind of reasoning—namely, deductive inference represented in an artificial first-order predicate language. The ability to use deductive logic in a reflective way is only one tool among many that critical thinkers should know how to use, and arguably not the most important. I would argue that most of our reasoning is not deductive but probabilistic and decision theoretic—aimed at assessing the likelihood of propositions or outcomes, and also at incorporating those probabilities with our preferences and goals in order to arrive at the best course of action. We can refine all these thought processes by understanding their internal structure and keeping an eye out for common biases and errors.

At the beginning of the course, I asked the students some deceptively simple questions that illustrate how poorly our brains are wired for certain kinds of reasoning. Many of the students had taken advanced math classes both in high school and at Michigan. But several of these questions stumped nearly all 180 students. For example, suppose you are a detective looking for a suspect. You know that at this time of the day and this day of the week your suspect is 80% likely to be at Joe's Diner. You drive up to the place and can see the whole left half of the diner through the window. He's not there. You figure that if he was in the diner, there'd be a 50% chance that he's in the left half. So what's the probability that he's in the right half?

Many students tried "40%" as an answer—meaning that you should now think the suspect is more likely not to be in the diner at all. Some tried "80%"—but if that were right it would mean you shouldn't be any less confident than you were before that the subject is in the diner. The correct answer, which someone eventually called out, is ⅔ or ~67%. This answer that can be arrived at with a formula that is crucial to any discipline that involves integrating new evidence with background information. But it can also be arrived at with a spatial heuristic that I use to teach probability. Think of the initial degrees of confidence as occupying an area or region of "possibility space"—80% of it is taken up by situations in which the suspect is at Joe's diner, and 20% is taken up by situations in which he's not. And in half of the situations in which he's in Joe's diner— 40%—he's in the left half. When you see that none of those situations are true, you discard them, and you are left with only the 40% in which he's in the right half, and the 20% in which he's not in the diner at all. But these now make up 2/3 and 1/3 of your remaining possibility space, so they are no longer 40% and 20%, but ~67% and ~33%.

The general idea illustrated with this example applies in a very wide range of cases where we must reason from evidence. We start with some background knowledge, which gives us a certain level of confidence in a proposition, and then we get new evidence which we must integrate with our background knowledge. For example, suppose I know that a certain disease has a very low background rate, but most people with this disease have a certain symptom that I also have, and only a very small proportion of people without the disease have that symptom. This requires me to integrate the background rate with the probability of my new evidence given that I do (and do not) have the disease. The evidence from cognitive psychology indicates that in cases like this even experienced physicians tend to overestimate the importance of the new evidence— so-called "base-rate neglect." And this corresponds structurally to the mistake of thinking that there's only a 40% chance that Joe is in the diner.

Thinking about how to update on evidence using probabilities is just one of many skills we focus on in the new course. But it illustrates quite nicely that just because we are not reasoning deductively does not mean there is no rigorous methodology that can be applied. Applying the probability calculus is just as precise a method as applying the rules of first-order natural deduction—it just applies to a different kind of reasoning.

Finally, more than a third of my course is spent on cognitive biases that have been uncovered by cognitive psychologists. These are specific and predictable ways in which human beings tend to reason badly—whether because our brains are lazy and like to take short-cuts, or because our evidence is skewed, or because we are subject to wishful thinking. There is a good deal of interdisciplinary research showing the existence and importance of many such biases. (In fact, the pioneering work of the psychologist Daniel Kahneman on this topic earned him a Nobel Prize in Economics). One particularly worrying fact is the degree to which we tend to employ our conscious reasoning abilities not to discover the truth, but rather to defend our subconscious 'gut' reactions— a specific type of rationalization. These beliefs may not be triggered by any reliable process, but instead by things we feel emotionally connected to, or that we have heard repeated over and over again (even without evidence). As Steven Kaas put it, "You are not the king of your brain. You are the creepy guy standing next to the king going, 'a most judicious choice, sire'."

Unfortunately, while cognitive science has uncovered plenty of predictable errors in reasoning, there has been much less research into methods for overcoming these biases. In my class, students learn certain techniques that can be effective when one is in a situation that one recognizes as often producing bias—such as deliberately taking the "outside view;" but usually we don't pay attention even to the fact that we might be biased. A more general approach is to cultivate habits of mind that could be called "cognitive virtues"—in our class we focus on (cognitive) patience, humility, fairness, and vigilance. Unsurprisingly, the small amount of research that exists suggests that these habits of mind are more important for all kinds of life outcomes than so-called "algorithmic intelligence" (measured in part by IQ). A high IQ, of course, can simply be used as a very effective tool by a mental lawyer to justify beliefs arrived at through unreliable methods. The habit of really questioning one's own reasoning process and noticing mental patterns that might indicate systematic failures of reasoning is arguably the most important cognitive virtue that a person can acquire. And that is what I hope to inculcate in 183. I have certainly noticed that teaching it has made me a more effective reasoner!

GIBBARD RETIREMENT SONG

by Sarah Buss, Professor

Song for Allan Gibbard, sung at his retirement party

To the tune of "Down in the Valley"

This song is for some'-one,
A really cool guy.
A jolly good fellow --
No one can deny.
No one can deny, dear.
No one can deny.
Great tea'cher and co-lleague,
A really great guy.

He loves foreign words, and
He has a great store.
He spoke Twi in Ghana
When in the Peace Corps.
"Osay, yay, yay, yay"* dear.
"Yay ah bah gah' fo"*
He'll sing it for you, dear,
With greatest gus-to.

His speech it is mea' . . . –sured.
And so are his pa-ces.
But when his mind's mo-ving,
It's off to the races!
Off to the race, dear!
Off to the races!
When his' mind is mo-ving,
It's off to the races!

He has his own theo'-rem
On stra-te-gic vo-ting.
He wrote some great books that
We all are still quoting.
Great books we are quoting,
On meaning and morals.
For ex-press-i-vi'-sm
He's won many laurels.

According to A'-llan,
Special properties are not'
What we are dis-cus'sing
When we say "you ought."
When we say "you ought," dear.
When we say "you ought."
No non-natural pro'-perties!
When we say "you ought."

We know of a plan that
We all do endorse:
Expressing a tri'-bute
To Allan, of course!
Expressing affect'-tion.
And other pro-attitudes
To our friend and co'-lleague,
We sing of our gratitude.

We all sing to A'-llan,
A really cool guy!
To know is to love him.
This is not "goodbye."
This is not "goodbye" ---- NO!
This is not "goodbye."
Al-lan'! We sal-ute you!
"Three Cheers!" -- NOT "Goodbye!"

*Achimota School Yell
O see-yie!
E eee- yie!
Hee apagyafo!
Se yen ko oo!
Se ye rebe ko oo!!
Ye reko sa so oo
Hine! Hine! Hine!
Aboa bi resu oo gyata bi resu oo oo
Hine! Hine! Hine!
Abbabi resu oo
Gyata bi resu
Oko e e e hine!
Aboa e e e hine
Aboa bi reba o o o
Gyata bi reba o o o Hine!

PERIPATETIC PHILOSOPHY

Jeremy Lent

Can I be a philosopher outside of a philosophy department? I never seriously considered that question until I was sitting in the offices of the Federal Trade Commission in Washington, D.C. last summer. I had spent the previous several months in D.C. as a visiting student at Georgetown University's Kennedy Institute of Ethics, a group of scholars and students working on both theoretical and applied questions in bioethics. (Bioethicists ask questions about the moral status of actions that affect our own and others' bodies and health.)

It was serendipity that landed me at Georgetown: I was assigned to teach two sections of Professor Sarah Buss's Bioethics course at Michigan in the fall of 2013, my third year in the philosophy PhD program. I had no prior extensive experience with bioethics, but I was quickly intrigued (as I hope my students were, too!) by ongoing scholarly debates over the appropriate role for doctors in advising courses of treatment, the moral permissibility of abortion and assisted suicide, and concerns about genetic and physical enhancement, among other policy-relevant topics. It was that pervasive policy relevance that really jolted me: the entire field of bioethics was filled with serious philosophical work that had direct upshots for ongoing political debates, as well as for health care leaders and individual doctors and patients.

Since most of my students were planning to enter health professions, I felt a particularly defined purpose going into the classroom each day. I was helping these students think through problems they might well face, and questions they would need to answer, on a regular basis throughout their careers. I found this sort of pedagogy deeply satisfying: more coach than gadfly, as I prepared my charges for specific future challenges. Although, of course, I also gently challenged their intuitive responses to controversial issues (whatever those responses happened to be), in proper Socratic fashion.

Once I finished teaching bioethics, I dove back into my dissertation research in epistemology. But now that I had a glimpse of doing philosophical work that I could talk about with non-philosophers (and from which they might even benefit!), I wanted to pursue bioethics further. Sarah Buss kindly helped me reach out to her colleagues at the Kennedy Institute, where I spent the winter and spring of 2015: bioethics by day, epistemology by night.

In April, vocational serendipity struck again, when I went to volunteer for a day at a non-profit just outside D.C. that organizes and distributes furniture and clothing donations for low-income area residents. One of my fellow volunteers that day had recently begun working as an attorney-advisor at the Federal Trade Commission. When I told him about my work in bioethics, he told me about the FTC's role in regulating marketing and advertising for pharmaceuticals—and the difficult decisions the agency faces in balancing its concern for consumers with our country's legal and constitutional protections for businesses. I had hardly heard of the FTC before then—let alone understood anything about its work—but I rushed home after our volunteer work to do some follow-up Google research.

Sure enough, I discovered, the FTC and other regulatory agencies have the tremendously interesting task of shaping and applying laws designed to protect consumers from the imperfections of our free-market system: negative externalities, monopolization, and in the case of marketing, information asymmetries and cognitive biases. Of course, any regulation comes with costs: for businesses (and so ultimately for consumers) and for government (and so ultimately for taxpayers). This means that regulatory work is an intricate and fascinating exercise in cost-benefit analysis. But I also realized that any defensible analysis requires considered ethical judgments about what counts as a cost or benefit, and how to weigh these various considerations for and against a given regulation.

On a hunch that a philosophical mindset might be quite useful in regulatory work, I got in touch with my contact at the FTC to ask if the agency might have use for a philosopher-in-residence over the summer. I was soon assigned to the Division of Advertising Practices as a volunteer consultant, tasked with researching the market in over-the-counter homeopathic drugs. Homeopathics are defined as genuine drugs by a 1938 federal law, yet have never been shown to have genuine therapeutic benefits beyond a placebo effect. These products are increasingly common in drug stores, sold at considerable expense but with little indication of scientists' doubts about their effectiveness. The FTC attorneys asked me to brainstorm regulatory remedies that would address this problem, and evaluate their legal and practical feasibility.

This work was far different in content from my dissertation, but I was in fact very well-suited to it. Our work as philosophers, after all, is to devise and assess a variety of language-based (as opposed to directly physical) solutions to salient problems. The homeopathic drug problem happens to be less universal and eternal than the problems that philosophers typically take on, but the fundamental thought process felt very familiar. And it was an exhilarating honor to use my philosophical skills in the public interest.

By the end of my two months at the FTC, I felt confident and excited about my emerging goal to become a "roving" philosopher, in the tradition of the ancient Greek peripatetics: taking my skills in language-based problem solving beyond the Academy and into government, or the non-profit world, or think tanks, or other areas of academia. There are surely many alternative routes for a peripatetic. Given my thrilling experience at the FTC, I decided to begin on a legal path, and I've now started at Yale Law School to pursue a JD. (Let me assure you that I defended my dissertation in the spring—and I'm as passionate as ever about epistemology!)

In the meantime, I've recently been appointed to the American Philosophical Association's Committee on Non-Academic Careers, along with **Eleni Manis**, a Michigan philosophy PhD who now works in local government in New York. I'm thrilled at this opportunity to help other philosophers like me who have considered carrying their skillsets with them into new environments. Of course, I don't have any definitive answers, either for myself or others, about how to pursue a philosophical life and career outside of the wonderful departments that have trained us. But I'm well-prepared and eager to have plenty of probing discussions about our discipline's future and potential.

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