# Michigan Philosophy News

Fall 2007
for friends, alumni, alumnae of the Department of Philosophy,
The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Dear Friends of the Department,

Greetings from Ann Arbor! It has been a busy and exciting year here in the Philosophy Department and I would like to bring you up to date on some noteworthy developments.

Faculty news. Our faculty remains among the most accomplished and productive in the world. This year's list of faculty achievements is particularly striking. **Ken Walton**'s contributions to the philosophy of art were the subject of no less than *three* international conferences this year: at the Universities of Leeds, Nottingham, and Kent. Ken was also nominated (along with **Liz Anderson**!) for the presidency of the American Philosophical Association Central Division, a very high honor – we still await the results. Be on the lookout for the two volumes of Ken's essays that are forthcoming from Oxford University Press. The first, *Marvelous Images: Values and the Arts,* is due out in early 2008, while the second, *In Other Shoes: Music, Metaphor, Empathy, Existence*, should appear in 2009. **Ed Curley**'s long and distinguished career as a historian of modern philosophy of was honored at a major conference on Spinoza, held here in Ann Arbor. The international cast of speakers included Steven Nadler (Wisconsin), Michael Griffin (Central European University), Michael Della Rocca (Yale), Don Garrett (NYU), Dan Garber (Princeton), Charlie Huenemann (Utah State), Michael Rosenthal (Washington), and Susan James (London) – a virtual who's who of Spinoza experts. Ed finished the conference by commenting on all the talks, and by suggesting new lines of research for scholars in the area. **Louis Loeb** was awarded the American Philosophical Association's prestigious Patrick Romanell Prize for work on philosophical naturalism. Louis gave the Romanell lecture at the Pacific Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in San Francisco. An edited version of his lecture, originally published in the *APA Proceedings*, is included in this newsletter. In recognition of his seminal contributions to moral philosophy and to the history of philosophy, **Steve Darwall** was elevated to the rank of Distinguished University Professor. This is the most significant honor that the University bestows on members of its faculty, going only to those who have achieved an uncommonly high level of distinction and influence in their fields. Steve joins **Allan Gibbard** and **Larry Sklar** at this rank. Larry, who is currently serving as President of the Philosophy of Science Association, won a *LSA Humanities Award*. Allan was honored as the Erskine Visiting Fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. **Ian Proops** received an *LSA Excellence in Education* award, thus continuing the Department's tradition of commitment to its Undergraduate Program.

The Department saw two changes this year. As mentioned in last year's newsletter, we welcome **Sarah Buss**, a distinguished moral philosopher and action theorist, who began as an Associate Professor with Tenure this fall. We also bid a fond farewell to **Peter Ludlow**, who accepted a position at the University of Toronto. During his five years here Peter, a specialist in philosophy of language and linguistics, served as our mainstay in semantics while also making a name for himself as a public intellectual through his work on philosophy and the internet. We wish him all the best in his new position.

Undergraduate News. Our undergraduate program remains vibrant and popular. As of July 2007 we had one-hundred and thirty six majors and sixty three minors enrolled in our program. The high number of students choosing a minor in philosophy reflects both the intrinsic appeal of the subject and the ease of combining it with majors or minors in other academic areas. Pre-law students, for example, often opt for our popular minor in "Moral and Political Philosophy" as a way of preparing themselves for the complex ethical and political questions they will face in their careers as attorneys. This year we add a new minor in "Epistemology and Philosophy of Science"; so students now have a choice of five different ways of completing a minor.

This year's William K. Frankena Prize for excellence in the undergraduate concentration went to two exceptionally talented recipients: Jennifer Ford and Adam Rigoni. Jennifer is currently working at the Ann Arbor Learning Community, but will be soon be moving to Japan to teach for English as a foreign language. Adam is enrolled in Michigan's law school. The Haller prize, which is awarded for exceptional papers written in an upper-level philosophy course, was awarded to Joseph Uppal for his essay "Just Three Simple Concepts: the Noumenon, Transcendental Object, and Thing in Itself in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason."

Five students completed honors theses in philosophy: Marie Handfield earned High Honors for her thesis entitled "Collectives and Moral Responsibility," which I supervised. Blake Heller earned High Honors for his thesis "What Have We Got With *A Theory of Justice*: Understanding Intertemporal Justice and the Importance of Ideal Theory Through the Rawlsian Tradition," which was supervised by Dan Jacobson and myself. Cale Johnson's thesis "Justifying Our Use of Modus Ponens and Basic Logical Rules" was supervised by Eric Lormand. Everett Kremer wrote a thesis under Steve Darwall's supervision entitled "Love, Irrationality and Meaning," for which he earned High Honors. Adam Rigoni earned High Honors for "Anchors in a Sea of Names: Supplementing Hans Kamp's account of anchors in DRT," which he wrote for Rich Thomason.

Graduate News. Our graduate students continue to win awards and to develop their professional reputations. Aaron Bronfman won a Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship. Vanessa Carbonell was awarded a Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship as well as Fellowship in the Sweetland Fellows Seminar. David Dick received a Rackham Teaching Award, a great and rare honor that goes only to the most effective graduate student instructors. Dave Wiens won a Canadian SSHRC Doctoral Fellowship for 2007–2010. Wendy Tng received an International Institute Individual Fellowship.

Our Ph.D. students also gave numerous presentations this year. Rob Gressis gave talks at the North American Kant Society, the New England Colloquium in Early Modern Studies, and the Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy. Dustin Locke presented papers at the NYU/Columbia Graduate Student Conference and the Southeast Graduate Philosophy Conference. Ivan Mayerhofer spoke at the University of Western Ontario. Jon Shaheen presented a paper, with co-author Valerie Kivelson, at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Tim Sundell spoke at the Linguistics and Epistemology conference in Aberdeen, Scotland.

This year's Charles Stevenson Prize for Outstanding Candidacy Dossier went to Dustin Locke for his excellent essay on David Lewis's final paper "Ramseyian Humility." Dustin's paper will appear next year in volume that will contain the first published version of "Ramseyian Humility"! The John Dewey Prize for outstanding performance as a Graduate Student Instructor was awarded to Soraya Gollop. Both of these prizes, as well as the Frankena Prize, are funded by a generous gift from Marshall M. Weinberg (B.A., 1950). The Cornwell Fellowship for outstanding intellectual curiosity and scholarly promise was awarded to Lina Jansson.

The Department saw five of its Ph.D. students complete dissertations during the 2006/2007 academic year. Soraya

Gollop wrote a dissertation, for which I was the supervisor, entitled *The Challenge of Temptation: Desire, Emotion and Stability*. She has accepted a position as an Assistant Professor at Southern Methodist University. Rob Gressis wrote a dissertation under Steve Darwall entitled *Kant's Theory of Radical Evil: An Interpretation and Defense*. Rob will hold a Post-Doctoral appointment at Notre Dame's Center for the Philosophy of Religion for the next two years. Pat Lewtas wrote a dissertation under Eric Lormand and Jessica Wilson entitled *Panpsychism: An Exploration and Defense*. He has accepted an appointment at the American University of Beirut. Alex Hughes wrote a dissertation under Eric Lormand and Peter Ludlow entitled *Seeing and Experiencing: the Revelation of Particulars in Visual Experience*. Next year he will be a Visiting Assistant Professor at Illinois Wesleyan University. Chris Dodsworth wrote a dissertation under Liz Anderson entitled *A Theory of Moral Obligation*. He is currently a visiting scholar at the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion.

Events. As usual, we had a busy schedule of events this past year. Liz Anderson delivered her inaugural lecture as the John Rawls Collegiate Professor in Philosophy and Women's Studies. Her talk "The Imperative of Integration: Race and Education" was a fascinating, empirically informed, and surprising discussion of what white elites have to gain from racial integration.

This year's Tanner Lecture on Human Values was delivered by Samantha Power, author of the Pulitzer prize-winning *"A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide,"* and Professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Power's lecture "Human Rights: The Risk of Politics" provided an absorbing examination of the capacity for ordinary Americans to exert political pressure on their government to protect international human rights. The ensuing Tanner Symposium featured comments from the philosopher Allen Buchanan (Duke), the political scientist Michael Barnett (Minnesota) and the lawyer Steve Ratner (Michigan). University President, Mary Sue Coleman, attended all the events and took an active part in the festivities.

Myles Burnyeat, the distinguished classical philosopher from Oxford, was our Nelson Philosopher-in-Residence for 2006/07. Professor Burnyeat delivered three fascinating lectures on aspects of ancient philosophy entitled: "Weakness of Belief," "Other Minds, Other Faces," and "Aristotle's Divine Intellect."

For the twenty-eighth year, our graduate students organized a spectacular Spring Colloquium. The theme was "National and International Distributive Justice". The featured speakers were Debra Satz (Stanford), Jennifer Rubenstein (Princeton), and Thomas Pogge (Columbia). Three of our Ph.D. students working in ethics and political philosophy—Eleni Manis, David Wiens and Wendy Tng—provided insightful criticism and commentary. We are especially grateful to Eleni for her efforts in organizing this stimulating and successful event.

The Department also hosted talks by Anthony Appiah (Princeton), Rachel Barney (Toronto), Karen Bennett (Princeton), Bernard Berofsky (Columbia), Michael Della Rocca (Yale), Thomas Kelly (Princeton), Jill North (Yale), Mathias Risse (Harvard), Keiran Setiya (Pittsburgh), Russ Shafer–Landau (Wisconsin), Kyle Stanford (University of California, Irvine).

I encourage you to read Louis Loeb's lucid and captivating essay "The Naturalisms of Hume and Reid," which follows this letter. While reading it, many of you will surely be reminded of the great clarity and insight that Louis always brings to his lectures, and of the intellectual flair that makes him one of the University's most popular and successful teachers. You will also be able to see the fine qualities of mind that have made Louis one of the most influential of contemporary historians of philosophy.

I wish you the best for the coming year!

Sincerely,

James M. Joyce,
Chair

THE NATURALISMS OF HUME AND REID*

1. SOME PUZZLES

Consider the following picture in the rough. Some beliefs arise from our very constitution, from instinct; these beliefs, often irresistible, are justified even in the absence of arguments or reasons in their behalf. I think it fair to say that Thomas Reid, on the received view of his philosophy, held a position of this sort; when Reid defended the legitimacy of the beliefs of "common sense," he had in view beliefs resulting from unavoidable and universal instinctive mechanisms, the faculties associated with his "first principles." I think it also fair to say that David Hume, on what is today the received interpretation of his philosophy, held a position of this sort. In his 1905 articles "The Naturalism of Hume," Norman Kemp Smith introduced the term 'natural beliefs' as a label for irresistible, instinctive beliefs, arising from "the particular fabric and constitution of the human species," in Hume's system. Kemp Smith consolidated his account in his 1941 book; his naturalistic interpretation has been the dominant force in the Hume literature ever since.

But wait. Reid was one of Hume's severest critics, and advanced his theory of common sense beliefs as a constructive response to Hume's skepticism. If the received interpretations of Hume and Reid, respectively, are so much as on the right track, Hume himself had proposed a constructive alternative to skepticism, one that downgrades the role of argument, emphasizing in its place the irresistibility of instinctive beliefs that originate in human nature. Common sense in Reid and natural belief in Hume seem very much of a piece. If so, what are we to make of Reid's own conception of his relationship to Hume? It might seem that Reid

either was deeply confused in this regard, or badly misread Hume, or both.

Is it at all plausible that Reid could have misread Hume? The *Treatise* presents severe difficulties for any interpreter. A work of apparently conflicting strands – at once empiricist, skeptical, and naturalistic –, there is the problem of seeing how they fit together. Add to this that Hume scatters his most suggestive epistemological remarks, which are often incidental to one or another associationist or psychological discussion. Beyond these factors, the interpretation Kemp Smith attacked, the *Reid-Beattie* interpretation, originated in Hume's own time. Hume parades reductive metaphysical doctrines – about body, the mind, personal identity, and necessary connection. He denies the necessity of the principle that every new existent or modification of existence has a cause. Late eighteenth century figures regarded these positions as "skeptical." Hume seeks to demolish the argument from design and the possibility of testimonial evidence for miracles. Whereas twentieth century positivist readers welcomed Hume's attacks on metaphysics, a substantial self or soul, and arguments for God, Hume's applications of his doctrines to religion were a call to arms for his contemporaries.

What is more, Reid's arsenal included a large-scale historical theory, of which Hume was but a part. In Reid's figure-by-figure survey of "the way of ideas" and related views, the chapter on Hume is shorter than those on Arnauld and Leibniz, and far shorter than those on Malebranche, Descartes, Locke, and especially Berkeley, who receives the longest discussion by a good margin. Although he reads stretches of Hume with care, Reid was not engaged in sympathetic interpretation. His investment in the story of the Cartesian or common way of ideas could easily have led him to distort Hume's views, if not by misconstruing particular passages, by reading Hume selectively. As a general rule, commentators on Reid have found it convenient to adopt his conception of Hume's philosophy. This is understandable, where the project is to

consider Reid's historical position through his own eyes. Yet, an investigation of how Reid could misinterpret Hume might yield additional insight.

2. INDUCTION AND MEMORY

One entrée into Reid's affinity with Hume is by way of their treatments of induction. Reid, unlike Hume, frequently uses 'induction' and 'inductive', and appeals to an "inductive principle" (IHM 198, 199, 200). Hume writes of inference or reasoning about causes and effects, and tends to assimilate inductive inference to causal inference. This opened the door to one of Reid's criticisms of Hume on causation, that night following day, though inductively supported, is not genuinely causal (EIP 87). There is another difference: Reid conceives regularities as a language of nature, where the conjoined objects are signs of one another (IHM 190, 196, 200). It remains that both figures discuss a principle of the uniformity of nature, variously described, with Reid at times adopting Hume's first *Enquiry* formulation (EHU 37) in terms of the future resembling the past (IHM 196). Both are sensitive to a distinction between accidental and nonaccidental regularities (THN 4, 104-5, 146-50, 175; and IHM 41, 199-200; EIP 350, 374, 561). Both investigate the epistemology of induction. I distinguish three prongs in Reid's views on this topic.

First, Reid takes it that the inductive principle, the belief in "the continuance of the present course of nature" (IHM 196), cannot be founded in argument or derived from antecedent reasoning (IHM 196, 198; EIP 490). This claim is basic Humean doctrine. In section IV of the first *Enquiry*, and in *Treatise* I.iii.6, Hume famously advances a "negative argument" (EHU 34), that inductive inference cannot be founded either on demonstrative or probable argument. Reid thus credited Hume with showing that induction "is not grounded upon any antecedent reasoning" (EIP 490), not "founded either upon knowledge or probability" (IHM 197).

Second, Reid attributes inductive beliefs to human nature – "the principle [that the future will be like the past] . . . is made a part of our constitution" (EIP 489); "It is an instinctive prescience of the operations of nature" (IHM 198). This instinctive principle is "universal among mankind" (EIP 490). Of course, we do not believe that fire will be followed by smoke, absent relevant experience. Particular inductive beliefs are "the result of experience and habit" (IHM 38). Presumably, some applications of the inductive principle, as with other common sense beliefs (cf. IHM 172 and EIP 42, 96, 99, 264, 514-15, 551), are irresistible. Similarly, "we are under a necessity of assenting to [first principles]" (IHM 71), which are "necessary for our subsistence and preservation" (EIP 375).

These positive claims, as applied to induction, are also Humean doctrine. Inductive inference is due to custom or habit, an instinctive principle. Hume declares in the *Treatise*, with inference based on custom in view, that "reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (THN 179). This passage and related texts lie at the core of Kemp Smith interpretation. Further, in *Treatise* I.iii.13, the operation of custom "cannot be prevented by [reflection]" (THN 147). In I.iv.4, causal inference founded in custom is Hume's example of "principles which are permanent, irresistable, and universal," "unavoidable to mankind" (THN 225). These principles "are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin"; they are, as with Reid, "necessary . . . in the conduct of life" (THN 225 – cf. EHU 108). The emphasis on such features as irresistibility, taken to be the effects of a universal, unavoidable instinct, the constitution of human nature, are to be found in Reid and Hume alike.

It is worth pausing to consider whether Reid was aware of these common, constructive doctrines. It is surprisingly difficult to show that he was. One might think that Reid could hardly have missed these points in Hume. The arrangement of the *Treatise* is relevant here. Hume's explicit state-

ments that causal inference is instinctive and irresistible appear in I.iii.16 (THN 179) and I.iv.4 (THN 225). Reid never cites these sections, which are far removed from the negative argument of I.iii.6. I do not find passages where Reid recognizes the irresistibility of inductive beliefs in Hume. Beginning with the discussion of custom and repetition in I.iii.8, Hume implicitly develops an associationist explanation of the irresistibility of those causal inferences that amount to proofs, because based on perfect habits. The sections on probability – I.iii.11-13 – consolidate Hume's position. (See, for example, THN 124, 130-31, 134-35, 142-143, 147, 153-54.) Reid does not refer to Hume's views in this stretch of Part iii. Since Reid had no patience for Hume's associationism, he might not have tracked this line of argument. (In § 5, I revisit the question of Reid's recognition of irresistibility in Hume.)

I turn to the third element in Reid's views on induction. When Reid writes that the belief in the continuance of nature is a "first principle, in the sense in which I use that word" (EIP 490), he is making the epistemic claim that inductive beliefs are evident and at least probable. We "distinguish evidence into different kinds" (EIP 229) corresponding to the different first principles, though the evidence they provide is a matter of degree (cf. EIP 228, 456, 481). Inductive inference provides evidence, but cannot be founded in argument; its justification must be traced to the fact that it results from a universal, unavoidable, instinctive principle. For Reid, the negative claim that the inductive principle is not founded in argument does not impugn the epistemic credentials of inductive belief.

Does Reid *diverge* from Hume at this juncture? He does, if the skeptical interpretation of Hume on induction is correct. This interpretation locates skepticism in the negative argument of *Treatise* I.iii.6 and first *Enquiry* IV: Hume maintains that inductive inference is *not* justified *because* it cannot be supported by (non-question-begging) argument. On the opposing Kemp Smith interpretation, custom is a source of approved, "natural" beliefs. Much Hume scholarship since the 1940's has been given over to a struggle be-

tween skeptical and naturalistic interpretations, with Hume's position on induction a main front. Literature in the 1970's and 80's established the non-skeptical reading as decisively as possible in the face of complex textual data.

Consider the *Treatise*, beginning with the context for the negative argument in I.iii.6. As early as I.iii.2 and I.iii.4, Hume advances a causal theory of reasoning about the unobserved: "the mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers" (THN 82 – cf. EHU 26, 146). In I.iii.6, Hume examines "the nature of [the] inference" (THN 88 – cf. EHU 32) from what we sense or remember to an unobserved cause or effect. Hume writes within the course of the negative argument itself: "cause and effect . . . 'tis the only [connexion or relation of objects], on which we can found a just inference from one object to another" (THN 89). Though Hume finds that the inference is not founded in argument, his commitment to causal inference survives unscathed. Early in I.iii.8, he attributes causal inference to custom (THN 102-3 – cf. EHU 43). Later in the section, a person who stops his journey at a riverbank "foresees the consequences of his proceeding forward; and his *knowledge* of these consequences is convey'd to him by past experience" (THN 103, emphasis added). In I.iii.9, the discussion of the two systems of beliefs or "*realities*" (THN 108, Hume's emphasis) constitutes an extended restatement of the causal theory of knowledge. Hume writes that "The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses" (THN 108). The second system of beliefs is "connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect" (THN 108); "'Tis this latter principle, which peoples the world, and *brings us acquainted* with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory" (THN 108, emphasis added – cf. EHU 55).

In addition, the skeptical problem of induction implies that all inductive inferences are on a par, equally without justification. Even so, in I.iii.11, some causal inferences, for example inference to the belief that the sun will rise, constitute "proofs"

(THN 124). In I.iii.12, Hume provides an inventory of "degree[s] of evidence" (THN 153 – cf. 130-31 and EHU 110, 117) that includes proofs and also probability, good inductive arguments that fall short of proofs (THN 130-31, 142 – cf. EHU 56-59). In I.iii.13, Hume contrasts "unphiloso-phical probability" (THN 143) with beliefs legitimately based on the senses, memory, and causal inference; within this section, some causal inferences are "just and conclusive" (THN 144). In I.iii.15, Hume provides eight "Rules by which to judge of causes and effects," "all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning" (THN 175). There is no accounting for this extensive textual data on the hypothesis that Hume is a skeptic about induction.

Reid quotes the *Treatise* in some two dozen contexts in the *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* – but never any section of Part iii later than I.iii.7. Reid does not discuss or allude to the foreknowledge in the riverbank passage in I.iii.8, the two systems of realities in I.iii.9, the admission of inductive proofs in I.iii.11, the degrees of inductive evidence in I.iii.12, the distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical probability in I.iii.13, or the rules to judge of causes and effects in I.iii.15. (Reid endorses Newtonian, methodological rules – without mentioning *Hume's* rules – as "maxims of commons sense" at IHM 12.) Nor does Reid take up a now famous passage in I.iv.4: "One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho' that conclusion be deriv'd from nothing but custom" (THN 225). This in the paragraph that cites causal inference as an example of the "permanent, irresistable, and universal" principles of the imagination.

How could it be that Hume's epistemic endorsements of causal inference withstand his negative claim that induction is not founded in argument? In the first *Enquiry* as well as the *Treatise*, Hume's approval of causal inference is in place prior to the negative argument. In both works, Hume interposes the claim that causal inference is due to custom, to instinct, *after* the negative argument and *before* numerous expressions of his continuing commitment to the positive epistemic status

of causal inference. The obvious interpretive hypothesis is that Hume's view is akin to Reid's: causal inference, albeit not founded on argument, *is* justified, with its justification tracing to features of custom's operation or origin in human nature. Kemp Smith's work identified the irresistible and instinctual character of custom as a salient candidate for playing this role in Hume's epistemology.

It is instructive to consider Reid's treatment of Hume on memory against this background. Reid is confident that the way of ideas leads to skepticism about the past: "For since ideas are things present, how can we, from our having a certain idea presently in our mind, conclude that an event really happened ten or twenty years ago corresponding to it?" (EIP 290). Reid attributes this worry to Hume: "It does not appear to have occurred either to Locke or to Berkeley, that their system has the same tendency to overturn the testimony of memory as the testimony of the senses. Mr. Hume saw further than both" (EIP 290). In another passage, Reid is more circumspect: "Mr. Hume has not, as far as I remember, directly called in question the testimony of memory; but he has laid down the premises by which its authority is overturned, leaving it to his reader to draw the conclusion" (EIP 475). Hume never does call memory into question, though Reid does not pause to ask why not. The question is pressing, given Reid's contention that Hume proceeds with the "aim of establishing universal skepticism" (EIP 290).

Hume writes in *Treatise* I.iii.5: "it be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas" (THN 85) – hardly skeptical in tone. This should be unsurprising. The causal theory of knowledge of the unobserved emerges in I.iii.2 and I.iii.4. Causal inference could not *extend* our knowledge beyond the observed unless the senses and memory are sources of knowledge. Hume's causal theory of knowledge *presupposes* the positive epistemic standing of memory.

Reid suggests that the way of ideas saddles Hume with the view that the evidence of memory must be supported by argument (EIP 289-90, 475-76). In fact, Hume, like Reid, gives an infinite re-

gress argument for basic beliefs, and for noninfer-
ential memory knowledge in particular (EIP 455):

> When we infer effects from causes, we must estab-
> lish the existence of these causes; which we have
> only two ways of doing, either by an immediate per-
> ception of our memory or senses, or by an inference
> from other causes . . . till we arrive at some object,
> which we see or remember. 'Tis impossible for us to
> carry on our inferences in infinitum; and the only
> thing, that can stop them, is an impression of the
> memory or senses, beyond which there is no room
> for doubt or inquiry. (THN 83)

There is no room for doubt about the existence of
the object we remember *because* memory, "recent
and fresh" memory not yet subject to decay (THN
143-44), is irresistible. Reid also restricts the high-
est degree of "certainty and evidence" to cases
where memory is "recent . . . and fresh" (EIP 42).
Hume writes that demonstration is "irresistible"
early in the *Treatise* (THN 31). In the I.iii.13 sur-
vey of degrees of evidence, "[F]orce and . . . vivac-
ity are most conspicuous in the memory; and there-
fore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is
the greatest imaginable, and equals in many re-
spects the assurance of a demonstration" (THN
153). Causal inference constitutes "the next degree
of these qualities" (THN 153), and is thus "irresisti-
ble" at I.iv.4.

The irresistibility of memory is essential to
Hume's psychological explanation of the irresisti-
bility of causal inference – this because the strength
of a belief in an unobserved object is transmitted
from the strength of the belief of the senses or
memory from which it is inferred. When causal
inference proceeds from a *perfect* habit – frequent
observation of a constant conjunction – the strength
of an initial belief in an observed object is trans-
ferred nearly in its entirety to the idea of the unob-
served. The resulting belief can be irresistible only
if the initial belief based on the senses or memory
is irresistible. These doctrines are set out in asso-
ciationist terms – where "vivacity" and "force" are
identified with degree of confidence and assurance
– in sections 5, 6, 8, and 12 of Part iii of Book I.
(Reid of course rejects Hume's associationist ac-
count of memory – at IHM 28-29, 197-98 –, but the
claim that memory is irresistible can be detached
from the associationism.) For Hume as well as for

Reid, belief based on memory is often irresistible,
and is a source of evidence and knowledge, even
absent supporting argument.

3. THE PROPER OBJECT OF EPISTEMOLOGY

The similarity of Reid's and Hume's views
about memory and induction are symptomatic of a
deeper agreement about epistemology as an enter-
prise – less anachronistically, about one objective
of a theory of the human mind. Reid's criteria for
discerning first principles include "the consent . . .
of the learned and unlearned" (EIP 464); beliefs
about the unobserved held by both the "simple rus-
tic" and the philosopher "are built on the very same
ground" (EIP 561). It is also a mark of first princi-
ples that beliefs "appear so early in the minds of
men, that they cannot be the effect of education, or
of false reasoning" (EIP 467). Thus, "children and
idiots have [the] belief [that the future will be like
the past] as soon as they know that fire will burn
them. It must therefore be the effect of instinct, not
of reason" (IHM 196). So too with animals; induc-
tive inference "is the effect of a principle of our
nature, common to us with the brutes" (IHM 50).
Reid collates these points: "The language of nature
is the universal study; and the students are of dif-
ferent classes. Brutes, idiots, and children, employ
themselves in this study" (IHM 200). Similarly,
"Perception . . . implies no exercise of reason; and
is common to men, children, idiots, and brutes"
(IHM 173). With respect to first princples, "There
is no searching for evidence, no weighing of argu-
ments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred
from another" (EIP 452) – not if we are to account
for the knowledge of children and animals.

All these themes appear in Hume. In I.iv.2,
Hume notes that "whatever convincing arguments
philosophers may fancy they can produce to estab-
lish the belief of objects independent of the mind,
'tis obvious these arguments are known but to very
few, and that 'tis not by them, that children, peas-
ants, and the greatest part of mankind are induc'd"
(THN 193) to believe in body. He writes in *Trea-
tise* I.iii.16, "Of the reason of animals":

> Beasts . . . can never by any arguments form a gen-
> eral conclusion, that those objects, of which they
> have had no experience, resemble those of which
> they have. 'Tis therefore by means of custom alone,
> that experience operates upon them. All this was
> sufficiently evident with respect to man. But with
> respect to beasts there cannot be the least suspicion
> of mistake. (THN 178)

It was evident with respect to man, on two counts.
First, in I.iii.6, belief in uniformity cannot be
founded on argument. Second, in I.iii.6 and I.iii.8,
"custom operates before we have time for reflex-
ion," without "a moment's delay," "without reflect-
ing on it" (THN 104); "the imagination of itself
supplies the place of . . . reflection" (THN 93).
Hume observes:

> When any hypothesis . . . is advanc'd to explain a
> mental operation, which is common to men and
> beasts, we must apply the same hypothesis to both.
> The common defect of those systems, which phi-
> losophers have employ'd to account for the actions
> of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtility and
> refinement of thought, as not only exceeds the ca-
> pacity of mere animals, but even of children and the
> common people in our own species. (THN 177)

Hume, like Reid, insists on the continuity in human
and animal understanding.

This theme is prominent in three of the twelve
sections of the first *Enquiry*, even though it is a
much truncated work. (In the *Treatise*, Hume with-
holds discussion of the understanding of animals
until I.iii.16.) Hume writes in the final paragraph
of section IV: "It is certain that the most ignorant
and stupid peasants – nay infants, nay even brute
beasts . . . expect a similar effect from a cause,
which is similar in its sensible qualities and appear-
ances"; "this conclusion" does not arise "by any
process of argument" (EHU 39). In the final para-
graph of section V: "reason . . . appears not, in any
degree, during the first years of infancy"; causal
inference results from "an instinct" that "nature"
has "implanted in us" (EHU 55). Section IX, "Of
the reason of animals," reiterates and consolidates
these points:

> It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can
> be founded on any process of argument or reason-
> ing . . . For if there be in reality any arguments of
> this nature, they surely lie too abstruse for the obser-
> vation of such imperfect understandings . . . Ani-
> mals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by

> reasoning: Neither are children: neither are the gen-
> erality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and con-
> clusions. (EHU 106)

Then, in the final paragraph of the section: "experi-
mental reasoning itself, which we possess in com-
mon with beasts, and on which the whole conduct
of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct"
(EHU 108).

Reid does not cite or allude to either of
Hume's sections on the reason of animals. Hume
and Reid nonetheless agree that an explanation of
the knowledge of reflective adults must also ex-
plain that of nonreflective adults, children, and
brutes. A number of basic cognitive processes –
memory and inductive inference among them – are
common to humans and animals. This constraint
exerts pressure in the direction of broadly external-
ist theories of knowledge. Reid and Hume do not
merely maintain that we can have knowledge even
though no argument is available; were argument or
reflection required, they both insist, we could not
explain the knowledge of more humble creatures.
Theories of empirical knowledge that demand even
the capacity to produce arguments, to elaborate rea-
sons, are non-starters. Classical foundationalist
theories are ruled out of court. (Hume had targeted
foundationalism, though Reid went about the cri-
tique more self-consciously and systematically.)
The most obvious alternative is the class of exter-
nalist theories in which knowledge is the result of
the operation of belief-forming mechanisms that
are suitably instinctual, or adaptive and properly
functioning, or reliable, and so forth. Reid shows
no recognition of this anti-foundationalist align-
ment with Hume.

4. EPISTEMIC REDUCTION AND PSYCHO-LOGICAL EXPLANATION

Let me turn to some differences between the
naturalisms of Reid and Hume, of interest in them-
selves, and that might have contributed to Reid's
blind spot. I have mentioned Hume's reductionism
(§ 1). Reid faults this tendency in Hume's meta-
physics, where "bodies . . . are nothing but ideas in

the mind," and "what we call a mind is nothing but a train of ideas" (EIP 173). Hume's metaphysics is an offense to substance, but also to dualism. In psychology, there is Hume's reduction of mental processes to association. In epistemology, there is the reduction of knowledge, beyond the senses and memory, to causal inference: "By means of [the] relation [of cause and effect] alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" (EHU 26 – cf. THN 73-74).

Hume pursues the epistemic reduction in a variety of contexts. For example, "our faith [in human testimony] arises from the very same origin as our inferences from causes to effects, and from effects to causes" (THN 113). For Reid, "a disposition . . . to believe what [others] tell us" is an "original principle" (IHM 194). Or consider other minds. In the *Treatise*, sympathy converts a belief that another percson is experiencing a specific feeling into the feeling itself (THN 316-20, 385-86). How do we acquire the initial belief? Hume writes that it is "the relation of cause and effect, by which we are convinc'd of the reality of the passion, with which we sympathize" (THN 320). Causal inferences about the experiences of others, based on observed conjunctions in one's own case, are a precondition for the operation of sympathy. (This is another juncture where Hume is no skeptic about causal inference.) For Reid, knowledge of the conscious states of others depends upon "another first principle . . . , That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind" (EIP 484). Similarly, the burden of Section XI of the first *Enquiry* is that any cogent argument from the order in nature for the existence of God must be based on causal inference (EHU 135-36). For Reid, belief in a designing author of the universe relies neither on a general inductive principle, nor on the first principles of contingent truths that apply to other minds. He invokes an additional, "metaphysical" (EIP 503) first principle, a "necessary truth" (EIP 507): "effects which have all the marks and tokens of design must proceed from a designing cause" (EIP 507). Though Reid

grants that "we ought not to multiply [original principles] without necessity," he maintains that the first principles "are more in number than is commonly thought" (EIP 349). Reid does not find his reliance on a good dozen first principles troubling (EIP 493).

In Reid's view, "The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the necessary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence, equally grounded on our constitution; none of them depends upon, or can be resolved into, another" (IHM 32). This generalizes: "I am not able to find any common nature to which [the different kinds of evidence] may all be reduced" – except that "they are all fitted by Nature to produce belief in the human mind" (EIP 229). This is a stipulative claim about what is to count as a first principle. Reid is open to the possibility that "we find some more general principle into which" a putative first principle "may be resolved" (IHM 61). Descartes' and Locke's attempts to identify a common nature – clear and distinct perception, the perception of the agreement and disagreement of ideas – are nevertheless wrongheaded (EIP 229). Reid might have added to his list Hume's reduction of knowledge, beyond the senses and memory, to causal inference, had he recognized this aspect of Hume's program.

First principles cannot be resolved into one another epistemically. Nor can they be explained psychologically. According to Reid, Hume is "far from conceiving [our belief in continuance] to be an original principle of the mind" (IHM 197). Reid's ground for this claim is that Hume "endeavours to account for [continuance] from his favourite hypothesis" (IHM 197); "by [Hume's] system, three laws of association, joined to a few original feelings, explain the whole mechanism of sense, imagination, memory, belief" (IHM 22). Reid is not merely objecting to associationism; he insists that "sensation and memory . . . are simple, original, and perfectly distinct operations of the mind" (IHM 29). Since such basic mental operations as memory and belief are simple, they do not admit of definition or analysis (IHM 31). Further, "no phi-

losopher can give a shadow of reason" why sensation and memory should compel belief, "but that such is the nature of these operations" (IHM 28). Here we encounter Reid's theme, emphasized by Nicholas Wolterstorff, of the darkness or mystery of the mind. "In all our original faculties, the fabric and manner of operation is . . . beyond our comprehension" (EIP 394). In calling a principle "original," Reid often means not only that it is innate, but also "unaccountable" (IHM 41). This perhaps got in the way of his acknowledging that custom in Hume functions as a first principle in virtue of being instinctive and innate.

In claiming that psychological mechanisms are beyond our grasp, Reid might be calling attention to the gulf between human and Divine understanding, or, as Wolterstorff suggests, to the need for practical trust in our faculties. My concern is with the claim's importance to Reid in supporting his proliferation of first principles. In Book I, Hume applies a test of reflective approval to the understanding. Consider the belief in a substantial self or soul. For Reid, this belief, arising from a first principle, is unaccountable (EIP 472-74). For Hume, the belief results from a multi-stage psychological process. We attribute strict identity to perceptions that, though variable and interrupted, are resembling; this is a "confusion and mistake" (THN 254), rooted in a propensity to confound resembling ideas and resembling mental dispositions (THN 253-54). When we notice the variation and interruption in the impressions, and thus recognize that they cannot be strictly the same, we suppose or feign an unobservable soul as the locus of the strict identity that we had been inclined to attribute to observable perceptions. The supposition of a soul is a "fiction" that functions to "disguise" the variation (THN 254). Hume lays bare the operative psychological mechanism and regards it as debunking.

Reid agrees that it would be disquieting, were Hume's explanation of belief in the existence of the mind correct. Reid disparages the possibility that "those inferences which we draw from our sensations, namely, the existence of a mind, and of pow-

ers or faculties belonging to it, are . . . mere fictions of the mind, which a wise man should throw off as he does the belief of fairies" (IHM 37). In the opening chapter of the *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, Reid complains:

> If [the mind] is indeed what [Hume] makes it, I find I have been only in an inchanted castle, imposed upon by spectres and apparitions. I blush inwardly to think how I have been deluded; I am ashamed of my frame . . . O Nature, to put such tricks upon a silly creature, and then to take off the mask, and shew him how he hath been befooled. (IHM 22)

Reid finds Hume's account of the principles of the mind wanting; they fail to win reflective approval. Reid's resistance, however hard and fast, to the psychological investigation of first principles forestalls subjecting his own account of the mind and its faculties to a similar test. To the extent that psychological mechanisms are opaque, they cannot be unmasked. Reid forecloses any appeal to empirical psychology to call the epistemic status of any of his first principles into question. This is a breach in his naturalism.

There is a second way in which the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of the mind shelters Reid's multiplication of first principles. Reid individuates first principles in terms of their inputs and/or outputs – for example, perception of the countenance, voice, and gestures "in," beliefs about other minds "out." If the operative mechanisms are for us a black box, empirical psychology is powerless to support a reduction by resolving one first principle into another. Nor can we compare mechanisms in order to spot ones that might strike us as outliers.

As it happens, Hume relaxes his reductionism in the *Enquiries*. The *Treatise*'s associationist explanation of sympathy gives way to humanity and fellow-feeling; "It is not probable, that these principles can be resolved into principles more simple and universal" (EPM 220n.1). The *Treatise*'s multpage associationist explanation of probabilistic inference (THN 127-30, 133-38) gives way to beliefs that arise "immediately, by an inexplicable contrivance of nature" (EHU 57). The *Treatise*'s fifteen page explanation of why we believe in objects that

have a continued and independent existence (THN 194-210) – the discussion of coherence and constancy – also collapses into a primitive instinct: "It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception" (EHU 151).

This stunning turnaround sweeps away Hume's attempt to ground the belief in body in causal inference. In explaining the belief in the *Treatise*, the only resources Hume allows himself are beliefs about *impressions*. He interprets the Part iii formula that all knowledge is based on "the senses" (THN 73, 74, 108), memory, and causal inference, to mean that all knowledge is based on sense impressions, memory, and causal inference (THU 191, 193). The inputs to causal inference are beliefs, based on introspection or consciousness, about internal impressions, together with beliefs based on memory about past impressions. In cases of coherence – as in viewing a fire burning down – impressions "have a regular dependence on each other" (THN 195); the belief in body "arises . . . from custom in an indirect and oblique manner" (THN 197), and hence is due to "a kind of reasoning from causation" (THN 195). Hume's epistemic reductionism is at work in his treatment of coherence. In the first *Enquiry*, where there is no explanation of the belief in body, constancy and coherence alike drop out of the picture. The belief in body is an original, unaccountable instinct, coordinate with – in no way reducible to – custom or causal inference. This could be Reid (cf. EIP 476-77). Hume falls back, in Reid's terminology, on first principles for consciousness, memory, causal inference, *and perception* of body – thus taking a step in the direction of Reid's tolerance of multiple first principles.

Hume's uncompromising reductionism in the *Treatise* might have contributed to Reid's failure to appreciate their common ground. Taking the inputs to causal inference to be beliefs about impressions, conscious states, has a classical foundationalist flavor. If one follows this interpretive lead,

and further observes that Hume has no arguments on offer to ground memory or causal inference, the skeptical reading is inevitable; Hume is a foundationalist who fails to secure knowledge on his own terms. As we have seen (§ 2), however, Hume admits causal inference and memory as sources of evidence and knowledge on externalist grounds. The *Treatise*'s insistence on impressions as a starting point, to the exclusion of perception, is less a product of foundationalism than of Hume's aspiration to reduce perceptual knowledge itself to causal inference. This is a special case of an epistemic reductionism that extends to other minds, testimony, and so forth – an imperialism of causal inference, not foundationalism.

Does the increased reliance on primitive instincts in the *Enquiries* reflect a desire to prune the psychological and philosophical complexity of the *Treatise*, or changes in Hume's view? And if changes in view, were they forced upon him? Difficult questions. There is no question that the first *Enquiry*, taken as a self-contained work, treats perception of body as primitive, thus taking a step in the direction of Reid's proliferation of first principles. Perhaps these were among the features of the work Hume had in view when, late in life, he declared the *Enquiries* "a compleat Answer to Dr. Reid and to that bigoted silly Fellow, Beattie" (LDH II, 301). Reid himself would quote approvingly the entire paragraph of the first *Enquiry* where Hume attributes belief in body to natural instinct (EIP 173).

5. CONFLICTS WITHIN THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES

I turn to another dimension of comparison – beyond their attitudes toward reductionism and psychological explanation – along which it is instructive to compare the naturalisms of Hume and Reid. Reid maintains that the intellectual faculties, when used properly, do not conflict: "Common sense and reason have both one author; that Almighty author, in all whose other works we observe a consistency, uniformity, and beauty . . . : there

must therefore be some order and consistency in the human faculties, as well as in other parts of his workmanship" (IHM 68). Though this is a juncture where Reid's providentialism guides his epistemological construction, as with other claims about the epistemic status of first principles, he need not rely on premises about God. The argument can be understood as inductive: because consistency and uniformity are observed in other parts of nature, they are to be expected in the human faculties.

The claim that the intellectual faculties do not conflict has a corollary: that the faculties, when properly used, are co-equal or coordinate: "The first principles of every kind of reasoning are given us by nature, and are of equal authority with the faculty of reason itself, which is also the gift of Nature" (IHM 172). Reid asks, again applying the consistency of the faculties to reason: "Why . . . should I believe the faculty of reason more than that of perception; they came both out of the same shop, and were made by the same artist. . . ?" (IHM 169). Thus, "When Reason is properly employed, she will confirm the documents of Nature" (IHM 202).

The claim that the faculties are consistent is of considerable importance to Reid, and in marked contrast to Hume. Consider the belief in secondary qualities. Hume held that we instinctively believe that bodies possess properties that resemble sensory experiences of color and other secondary qualities (EHU 78n.1 – cf. THN 167, 238-39), and that this belief conflicts with reflection (THN 226-27) – in violation of Reid's strictures in regard to the consistency of the faculties. Hume has no doubt that reflection has things right. Similarly, for Descartes, a spontaneous impulse or inclination to believe in resembling secondary qualities conflicts with clear and distinct perception. Descartes of course gives the verdict to clear and distinct perception.

The problem for Reid is to show that the conflict does not arise. He agrees that there is no resemblance between color experiences and the properties of objects (EIP 85-95). Were the unlearned

more or less universally, and at a young age, to believe there is a resemblance, a conflict among faculties would be in the offing. Reid's solution is to attribute to the common person a causal or dispositional account of color: "By the constitution of our nature, we are led to . . . the conception and belief of some unknown quality in the body, which occasions the idea"; "it is to this quality, . . . that we give the name of *colour*" (IHM 86). Because the color appearance and its unknown cause "go together in the imagination, and are . . . closely united," they "are apt to be mistaken for one and the same thing" (IHM 86-87). The belief that color experiences resemble properties of objects is a confused accretion to an instinctive belief. By the lights of Descartes and Hume, Reid needs to redescribe – to distort – the content of the common belief in color. In a 1762 letter, Hume puts this disagreement on the record (CTR 18-19).

The case of the belief in secondary qualities is pallid compared to other conflicts between reason and instinct Hume claims to expose. In the first *Enquiry*, Hume writes not only that the belief in external body is instinctive (EHU 151), but that it carries with it the supposition that "the very images, presented by the senses, . . . be the external objects" (EHU 151). Instinctively, we are not only realists, but direct realists. Reid welcomed these acknowledgments (EIP 173-74), but not the developments to follow. Hume argues that direct realism "is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy" (EHU 152) – the "diminishing table" argument – so that there is a conflict between instinct and "the obvious dictates of reason" (EHU 152). This conflict is distinctive to the first *Enquiry*; in the *Treatise*, the vulgar do not distinguish impressions and external objects (THN 193, 202). In both the first *Enquiry* and the *Treatise*, realism in any form succumbs to a Berkelian argument. Color and other secondary qualities exist only in the mind; we cannot conceive of an object possessing extension and shape separate or abstracted from all sensible secondary qualities; material objects are therefore impossible (THN 226-31; EHU 154-55). Realism

is "contrary to reason" (EHU 155); there is "a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses" (THN 231).

Though Hume nonchalantly refers to these arguments as "sceptical topic[s]" (EHU 154), they are not "skeptical" in the way of Cartesian hypotheses: *perhaps* there is a deceiver; *perhaps* sense-perception, or reason, is unreliable. To the thought that our faculties *might* be unreliable, Reid has his reply that "if we are deceived . . . , there is no remedy" (IHM 72). The arguments about realism and direct realism purport to locate conflicts – antinomies – that undermine our faculties. One need not subscribe to a distinctive philosophical theory to want to resist these arguments. Still, they are at odds with Reid's *doctrine* that the faculties are consistent and cannot harbor genuine conflict.

Let us turn to an argument distinctive to the *Treatise*. In I.iv.1, "Of scepticism with regard to reason," Hume contends that all demonstration reduces to probability, and that all probability reduces "to nothing, . . . utterly subvert[ing] all belief and opinion" (THN 184). (The argument here is distinct from the Russellian problem of induction often attributed to Hume in I.iii.6.) Drawing on this material, Hume announces "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another" (THN 268-69) – this, provocatively, in I.iv.7, the conclusion of Book I. This is an undermining argument of another sort, purporting to show that a single faculty contains the seeds of its own destruction. Presumably, the consistency, uniformity, and beauty of nature applies to the internal workings of a single faculty. Accordingly, Reid maintains that "first principles . . . will always, from the constitution of human nature, support themselves, and gain rather than lose ground among mankind" (EIP 463). If the faculties support themselves, reason cannot self-destruct. The consistency of the faculties leaves no space either for the subversion of reason or for the Humean antinomies.

Unsurprisingly, Reid is quite exercised by Hume's arguments for conflict and subversion. He bemoans "the ignoble attempts of our modern sceptics to depreciate the human understanding, and to dispirit men in the search of truth, by representing the human faculties as fit for nothing, but to lead us into absurdities and contradictions" (IHM 77). Reid frequently alludes to the reduction of probability to zero in I.iv.1 and I.iv.7, where Hume professes readiness to look upon all opinions as equally probable (IHM 3-4, 94; EIP 63, 165, 187, 450, 566). Whereas he devotes a scant four pages to Hume in his survey of the history of the way of ideas, much later in the *Intellectual Powers* he devotes a ten page chapter to criticism of Hume's argument that reason subverts itself. (The first *Enquiry* reduces the line of development from I.iv.1 to I.iv.7 to an allusion to the "natural weakness of human understanding" — at EHU 158. This provides an additional sense in which this work is an answer to Reid. See § 4.) Reid found the undermining arguments disfiguring, so much so as to obscure the project he has in common with Hume – to provide a naturalistic account of the knowledge of all animals, however reflective.

Let me offer a subsidiary speculation in regard to the import of Reid's antipathy for the undermining arguments. Reid quotes Hume's comment in I.iv.1 (THN 183) that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel" (EIP 571). Similarly, he quotes the paragraph (THN 269) that follows Hume's I.iv.7 announcement that he is "ready to reject all belief and reasoning": "since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium" (EIP 562). Reid comments: "This was surely a very kind and friendly interposition of Nature . . . But what pity is it, that Nature . . . so kind in curing this delirium, should be so cruel as to cause it. Doth the same fountain send forth sweet waters and bitter?" (EIP 563). Reid is quick to latch on to Hume's claims of irresistibility and unavoidability

in the aftermath of the undermining argument for the subversion of belief. Yet, there is little evidence that Reid takes note of the numerous passages that commit Hume to the irresistibility of demonstration, memory, and causal inference. (See § 2.) Bear in mind that, apart from one explicit passage in Part iv of Book I, these claims need to be extracted from an assortment of sections in Part iii. There is room for the suggestion that Reid has some tendency to regard the role of irresistibility and unavoidability in Hume as little more than an expedient to extricate us from absurdities and contradictions, not as a component in an independently motivated naturalistic epistemology.

6. CONFLICT AND STABILITY

Reid is also aware that Hume does not always portray instinct as a savior. For Hume, he notes, we are "born under a necessity of believing contradictions" (EIP 562). Hume does construe the Berkelian argument against realism as giving rise to a "direct and total opposition," a "manifest contradiction," specifically between perceptual belief in body and causal inference (THN 231, 266). These "two operations," moreover, are "equally natural and necessary in the human mind" (THN 266). Since there is no way to "adjust those principles together," philosophers "successively assent to both" (THN 266). In this context, instinctive mechanisms are a source of seemingly ineliminable instability – part of the problem, not the solution. This is a difficulty for the picture of the role of irresistibility in Hume I have attributed to Reid, and also for the Kemp Smith interpretation, in which Hume approves irresistible beliefs. Reid writes that Hume "has shewn that [principles commonly received] overturn all knowledge, and at last overturn themselves, and leave the mind in perfect suspense" (EIP 462). This is well off the mark. For Hume, reflection on the antinomies and the subversion of the understanding generates instability in belief – psychological crises, not Pyrrhonian tran-

quility. (Non-human animals are immune to reflection's conundrums, and achieve stability on the cheap.) The crises and their repercussions are part of the subject matter of the science of human nature, as in the closing pages of I.iv.7.

In the *Treatise*, instability in our doxastic lives is one of Hume's major preoccupations, quite apart from the contexts where the undermining arguments are in play. In Book I, reflection on some belief-forming mechanisms undermines their use (§ 4). In an important strand in Part iii of Book I, Hume takes belief to be an infixed and hence a steady disposition (cf. THU 86, 109, 118-119, 225, 453, 624, 626, 629). In I.iii.9, association by relations other than cause and effect is "fluctuating and uncertain," and "'tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy" (THN 109). In I.iv.2, conflicts with regard to the belief in body involve "combat" (THN 205) and "struggle" between opposing principles "attack'd" by "enemies" which seek to "destroy" (THN 215) one another. In Book II, "Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind . . . is incessantly tost from one [side] to another . . . The imagination or understanding . . . fluctuates betwixt the opposite views" (THN 440). In Book III, "continual fluctuation" in judgments of characters and persons gives way to "*steady* and *general* points of view," so that we might "arrive at a more *stable* judgment" (THN 581-82, Hume's emphases). Also in Book III, the mere fact of encountering disagreement with others "disturb[s] the easy course of my thought," causing "commotion" and "conflict" (THN 592, 593). Such texts vindicate an observation of John Passmore's in 1952: "Associationism comes to be a special example . . . only, of a much more general principle, . . . that the mind moves in whatever direction will bring it most ease."

Picking up a thread in D. G. C. MacNabb, writing one year earlier, Hume assigns epistemic pride of place to mechanisms that set us at ease and thus promote stability. Suppose Hume attracted to a theory of justification in this general region.

on steadiness and stability. Hume would have thought this step necessary to address problems Reid raises, but leaves unresolved. For Reid, the love of simplicity and preference for familiar analogies are "bias[es]" or "prejudice[s]" (EIP 529) that infect the *intellectual* powers, distinctively human faculties. How are these frailties to be contained?

Consider the attention Reid gives to "The bias of human nature . . . to judge from too slight analogies" (EIP 529). This bias accounts for our drawing inferences "rashly" on the basis of accidental conjunctions (IHM 41). But which generalizations are rash? What degrees and kinds of similarity are admissible? Reid's guidance consists in admonishing Newtonian caution and directing his readers to Bacon's and Newton's methodological rules (IHM 12; EIP 47-52, 76-87) – though, as I have noted (§ 2), not to Hume's version of these rules in I.iii.15. This section contributes to a broader, albeit sketchy, theory of "general rules" (THN 149 – cf. 110, 146, 173, 631-32). In I.iii.13, Hume addresses the question of how to avoid generalizations "we rashly form to ourselves" (THN 146), generalizations based upon "accidental" conjunctions (THN 149). Hume's thought is that when analogy is too slight, or based on irrelevant similarities, we are prone to conflicting beliefs based upon different analogical arguments. The conflicting beliefs motivate us to form generalizations about the extent to which various kinds of analogical argument lead to conflict. The rash generalizations are "of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings" (THN 150); the second-order generalizations are "more extensive and constant" (THN 149), and regulate and control cognitive biases. Conflicts within inductive inference thus lead to greater stability and to improved cognitive performance.

In the final sections of the *Treatise* and the first *Enquiry*, Hume ups the ante: could we confront the undermining arguments – and the pervasive and fundamental conflicts that attend them –, and come out on the other side, with justification

intact? In his arguments for the antinomies and subversion of reason, Hume grossly exaggerates the conflicts to which reflection gives rise. Reid's patient, detailed diagnoses of where these arguments go astray are often on target (e.g., EIP 179-83, 563-72). Even so, Reid's distaste for conflicts within the faculties would deprive Hume one of his staple styles of argument. Hume's project is to show that justification is tied to stability, and that in many cases conflict generates uneasiness that motivates the identification and adoption of salient stabilizing devices. The extreme problem Hume sets himself is to explain how we might reclaim stability and justification even in the face of the undermining arguments.

One set of interpretive options, especially well-suited to the *Treatise*, exploits Hume's insistence that intense reflection cannot be sustained (THN 183, 187, 218, 269). Reid notices these sorts of passages and construes them as ad hoc, an admission of epistemological failure (§ 5). We may suppose instead that, for Hume, justification is relative to stability within a time frame; justification collapses during the short periods of intense reflection, but is otherwise preserved. Alternatively, perhaps mechanisms are justifying if they are conducive to sufficient average stability in belief over time. Intense reflection lowers the overall average, but not below the threshold of stability required for justification. Either way, the intense reflection that generates the undermining arguments, though an epistemic negative, leaves sufficient stability in place to sustain the science of man.

A second approach emerges most clearly in the first *Enquiry*, and is of special interest in the context of Reid. Michael Williams has developed the reading, which derives from Passmore, in an especially compelling form. The interpretation takes its cue from Hume's suggestion that skepticism serves a stabilizing function insofar as it tempers or moderates the excesses of superstition (EHU 161-62). Exposure to the "skeptical topic[s]" is thus a net epistemic plus. Reid agrees that the love of simplicity and familiar analogies are "apt to

lead us wrong" (EIP 528) – often taking us in the direction of extravagant "hypotheses and systems" (IHM 41). He and Hume share the Newtonian objective of reigning in judgments that do not adhere closely to "daily . . . experience" (EHU 162; cf. IHM 125 and EIP 49, 535). How can we achieve the "proper regulation and restraint" (EIP 528) in our reasoning? Hume offers a prescription: though intense reflection gives rise to crises that are temporarily destabilizing, in the longer term "a small tincture of skepticism" (EHU 161) restrains the imagination from "running, without control" (EHU 162). Our faculties lead us into contradictions, but are not "fit for nothing"; the undermining arguments Reid abhors serve a virtuous psychological and epistemic function. That Hume would offer this speculation is another symptom of the centrality of stability in his philosophy. ‡

Louis E. Loeb

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ABBREVIATIONS

CTR: *The Correspondence of Thomas Reid*, ed. Paul Wood (Pennsylvania State, 2002)

EHU: *An Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding*, in L. A. Selby Bigge, ed., *Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, third edition by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975)

EIP: *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, ed. Derek R. Brookes (Pennsylvania State, 2002)

EPM: *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, in Selby-Bigge and Nidditch, above

IHM: *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*, ed. Derek R. Broackes (Pennsylvania State, 1997)

LDH: *Letters of David Hume*, 2 volumes, ed. J. Y. T. Grieg (Clarendon, 1923)

THN: L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, second edition, with text revised and variant readings, by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978)

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READING

For a collection of abridged works of Reid, see Ronald Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer, eds., *Thomas Reid: Inquiry and Essays* (Hackett). For collections of articles on Hume, see David Norton, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, 1993, and Elizabeth Radcliffe, ed., *A Companion to Hume*, forthcoming; for Reid, Terence Cuneo and René van Woudenberg eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid*, 2004.

Section 1. For the Kemp Smith interpretation, see "The Naturalism of Hume (I and II)," *Mind*, 1905, and *The Philosophy of David Hume*, 1941 – reprinted 2005, with an introduction by Don Garrett. For some previous accounts of Reid's relationship to Hume, see David Norton, "Hume and his Scottish Critics," in Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, and Wade Robison, eds., *Studies in Hume and Scottish Philosophy*, 1979, and H. O. Mounce, *Hume's Naturalism*, 1999.

Section 2. Important discussions of Reid's epistemology include William Alston, "Thomas Reid on Epistemic Principles," *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 1995, and James van Cleve, "Reid on the First Principles of Contingent Truths," *Reid Studies*, 1999. For a sampling of early literature advancing a non-skeptical interpretation of Hume on induction, see Tom Beauchamp and Thomas Mappes, "Is Hume Really a Sceptic about Induction?", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1975, and Janet Broughton, "Hume's Skepticism about Causal Inferences," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 1983. For a dissenter, see Kenneth Winkler, "Hume's Inductive Skepticism," in Margaret Atherton, ed., *The Empiricists: Critical Essays on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume*, 1999. My most recent views on this topic may be found in "Psychology, Epistemology, and Skepticism in Hume's Argument about Induction," *Synthese*, 2006. For the viability of Reid's thesis that the way of ideas culminates in skepticism, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Reid and Hume," *The Monist*, 1987, and John Greco, "Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What's the Big Idea?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1995.

Section 3. For Reid's opposition to classical foundationalism, see Wolterstorff, "Reid and Hume." For a reliabilist interpre-

tation of Hume, see Frederick Schmitt, *Knowledge and Belief*, 1992, and "Loeb on Stability and Justification in Hume's *Treatise*," *Hume Studies*, 2004; for a reliabilist interpretation of Reid, Philip de Bary, *Thomas Reid and Scepticism*, 2002.

Section 4. Hume's causal theory anticipates that of Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1967. For the darkness of the mind, see Wolterstorff, *Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology*, 2001. For the test of reflective approval, also prominent in the concluding section of Book III of the *Treatise*, see Annette Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments*, 1991, and Christine Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*, Onora O'Neill, ed., 2006. The relationship between the *Treatise* and the first *Enquiry* is contested. For an interesting discussion, see John Immerwahr, "A Skeptic's Progress, Hume's Preference for the first *Inquiry*," in *Studies in Hume and Scottish Philosophy*; for a discussion focused on sympathy and associationism, see Remy Debes, "Has Anything Changed? Hume's Theory of Association and Sympathy after the *Treatise*," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 2007.

Section 5. In addition to de Bary, *Reid and Scepticism*, there is a useful discussion of Reid's account of the relationship of the faculties in Greco, "Reid's Reply to the Skeptic," in *The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid*. For a discussion of Descartes' opposing, hierarchical view of the cognitive faculties, see my "The Priority of Reason in Descartes," *The Philosophical Review*, 1990.

Section 6. I develop the stability interpretation in my *Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise*, 2002, and "Stability and Justification in Hume's *Treatise*, Another Look," *Hume Studies*, 2004. Williams' version may be found in "The Unity of Hume's Philosophical Project," *Hume Studies*, 2004. For antecedents of the interpretation, see MacNabb, *David Hume*, 1951. Passmore's classic study is *Hume's Intentions*, 1952.

Louis Loeb, a member of the Michigan Philosophy Department since 1974, ranks as one of the most distinguished historians of modern philosophy working today. His research has explored such topics as dissimulation in Descartes, the Cartesian circle, Descartes' theory of mind-body interaction, and Hume's views on necessary connection and personal identity. His best known articles include "Causal Theories and Causal Overdetermination," which appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy* (1974); "The Priority of Reason in Descartes," *The Philosophical Review* (1990); "Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic States," *Noûs* (1998); "Hume's Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs," *Philosophical Quarterly* (2001); and "Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (2001), as well as papers in major historical journals. His first book, *From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development of Modern Philosophy* (Cornell University Press, 1981) disputed the received distinction between British empiricism and continental rationalism in the history of early modern philosophy.

In his landmark second book, *Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise* (Oxford University Press, 2002), Louis argues that the pervasive focus of historians of philosophy on Hume's skepticism has obscured the more constructive aspects of his thought – an epistemology that links justification with settled belief. Though philosophical reflection can unsettle belief, the stable beliefs of relatively unreflective persons *can* be justified, despite the fact that they would not survive reflection. This novel interpretation has been the subject of a number of symposia in the United States and abroad. In addition to being a world class historian of philosophy, Louis has long been one of the Department's most effective teachers. He has taught our large introduction to philosophy, Philosophy 232 (Problems of Philosophy), many more times than any other member of the faculty, always to rave reviews.

The APA's selection of Louis as the Romanell Lecturer is a reflection of his high standing in the philosophical profession. Oxford University Press is publishing a collection of his essays on Descartes and Hume, a further recognition of the importance of Louis' work. His current research focuses on the role of sentiment and feeling in Books I and III of the *Treatise*, and the implications of Hume's account of normativity for his sentimentalist ethical theory.

SPOTLIGHT ON RECENT GRADUATES

In July, **Chris Dodsworth** defended his dissertation, "A Theory of Moral Obligation", chaired by Liz Anderson, with Steve Darwall, Ed Curley, and Mika LaVaque-Manty (Political Science) on the committee. Chris advances a novel theory of the normativity of moral obligations in which obligations are grounded, not in rational agency or some other attribute of persons, but rather in the intimate personal relationships one has with others. Chris argues that an important subset of obligations are grounded in a person's relationship with God. Unlike many Christians, he eschews a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation, arguing instead that these obligations are fundamentally grounded in the relationship of love between God and human beings. Next year Chris will be a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame.

In October, **Matthew Silverstein** defended his dissertation "Normative Authority and the Foundations of Ethics", which was written under the supervision of Peter Railton, Steve Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Mika LaVaque-Manty. Matthew's work is centered around the project of halting the seemingly endless regress of ethical justification. After rejecting various traditional internalist and externalist strategies, Matthew defends a reductive account of reasons for action based in part on David Velleman's theory of action. This constitutivist account forestalls open-question worries by construing reasons in terms of their practical force. Matthew is thrilled to have returned to Amherst College (his alma mater) this fall as a visiting assistant professor and postdoctoral fellow.

In July, **Soraya Gollop** defended her dissertation "The Challenge of Temptation: Desire, Emotion, and Stability" with Jim Joyce as chair and Liz Anderson, Peter Railton, and Mika LaVaque-Manty as members of the committee. Soraya argued that desires contribute to rational choice and deliberation not only via their strength, but also by way of their stability and emotional components. Desires are often presented as simple states whose contribution to action, choice, and deliberation are understood simply in terms of their motivational strengths and their objects. However, such a view has no resources for explaining how it can be rational to resist temptation. Taking the stability and emotional aspects of desires seriously allows us to explain why it can be irrational to give in to temptation, an explanation which is not available to the widespread group of views that treat desires as mere motivating forces. Soraya is delighted to be joining Southern Methodist University as an Assistant Professor.

In August, **Pat Lewtas** defended his dissertation, "Panpsychism: An Exploration and Defense," written under the supervision of Eric Lormand and Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto), with Victor Caston, and Bob Pachella (Psychology) filling out the committee. Pat, who specializes in the philosophy of mind, investigated and defended a solution to the mind-body problem according to which people are conscious because some of their most basic physical constituents have some degree of consciousness. Pat is delighted to be joining the American University of Beirut as an Assistant Professor.

In July, **Robert Gressis** defended his dissertation, "Kant's Theory of Evil: An Interpretation and Defense", under the supervision of Stephen Darwall, Ian Proops, Michelle Kosch (Cornell University) and Mika LaVaque-Manty. Rob contends that Kant's theory of evil has been fundamentally misinterpreted as committing Kant to outrageous claims about the extent of evil (e.g., that everyone is evil) as well as its nature (viz., that evil consists merely in subordinating one's moral obligations to personal pleasure). Robert shows that other scholars have missed the main goal of Kant's theory, which is to argue for the possibility of willfully immoral actions (as opposed to immoral actions resulting either from ignorance or weakness). Moreover, instead of offering a simple-minded account of evil action as amounting merely to the unbridled pursuit of pleasure, Robert demonstrates that Kant had a sophisticated account of evil action as stemming from the entertaining of fantasies about one's moral status in relation to others or in relation to the moral law itself. In the upcoming year, Robert will be enjoy a Fellowship at Notre Dame's Center for the Philosophy of Religion.

Alex Hughes' dissertation, written under the supervision of Eric Lormand, with Peter Ludlow and Ken Walton as committee members, was defended in August. The thesis offers a defense and extension of Grice's causal account of the seeing relation. It extends the Gricean account by arguing that seeing is constituted by a process-relative counterfactual dependence of visual experiences on seen objects. A process-relative counterfactual theory of perception has the virtue preserving what is attractive about counterfactual theories, while avoiding the many counterexamples that have been given against accounts that extend Grice's account by invoking counterfactual dependence. The thesis defends the basis of the Gricean account by defending the possibility of veridical hallucination. Alex argues that if veridical hallucination is possible, then a certain kind of externalism must be true of visual experience. In particular, which content a visual experience possesses must depend on whether or not it is part of an episode of perception. Alex begins a two-year visiting assistant professorship at Illinois Wesleyan University this fall.

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