Michigan Philosophy News

The GRUE



Challenging the Intellect Since 1843

Fall 2022



Dear Friends of Michigan Philosophy,

I write to you having finished my third year as Chair of Michigan Philosophy. Though COVID-19 has not left us completely, we are beginning to emerge from the pandemic. Last year we resumed in-person instruction (though with required masks) as well as in-person graduation ceremonies for our Philosophy and PPE (Philosophy, Politics and Economics) majors. This year we again have in-person instruction (with masks optional) and look forward to regular in-person events.

As it has in the past, this newsletter will include reports on various facets of our research and our graduate and undergraduate programs, activities, and awards. This newsletter also includes the traditional research report (from **Brian Weatherson**, on the history of submissions to philosophy journals in the twentieth century) and course report (from **Anna Edmonds**, on her new introductory course on ethics). In addition, **Angela Sun**, a former graduate student and current Washington and Lee Assistant Professor of Philosophy, contributes her research article, "Counterfactual Reasoning in Art Criticism," and an update on the Tanner Library by our student library manager, **Summer Mengarelli**. There is a fun report on the new book *Kids and Philosophy*, authored by one of our affiliated members, **Scott Hershowitz**. Finally, there are reports on the Ferrando Lecture and the Wilhartz Lecture this past year, and an announcement of the upcoming Tanner Lecture.

In the last issue of this newsletter, we reported the passing of **Frithjof Bergmann**, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy. In this issue, we include a remembrance of Prof. Bergmann by his former student and Michigan alum, Richard Perloff (AB '72), Professor of Communications, Psychology, and Political Science at Cleveland State University. We also remember two people affiliated with Michigan Philosophy who passed away last year: **Ian Fishback** (PhD '20), who is known for having courageously brought to light incidents of torture in the United States military, and **Kenneth Tiews** (JD '73, PhD '77), who had a very accomplished career as a lawyer for the Wheeler & Upham Law Firm in Grand Rapids, MI.

Regarding news and events in the Department during this past year, there are several items to report:

Faculty News

This past year **Chandra Sripada** received promotion to Full Professor, and his appointment in Philosophy was increased from 25% to 50% (split with Psychiatry in the Medical School). Chandra has always been an active member of our department, and we are thrilled with his promotion and this shift in his appointment.

Several other Philosophy faculty members have received special recognition this past year. **Sarah Moss** presented her inaugural lecture, *Knowing What's at Stake: Epistemology and Criminal Justice Reform*, as the new William Wilhartz Professor of Philosophy. In addition, Sarah was awarded the APA (American Philosophical Association) Article Prize for 2022. **Emmalon Davis** was awarded an ACLS (American Council of Learned Societies) fellowship for 2022-23, and will be spending the year as a Faculty Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at the University of Notre Dame. In 2021, **Gordon Belot** was elected as a fellow at the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of Science), one of 20 Michigan faculty members elected that year.

Finally, **Ishani Maitra** has been appointed Professor in the Honors Program at Michigan.
Congratulations to all!

Two new members of the Law School recently became affiliated members of Philosophy: **Daniel Fryer** (Assistant Professor) and **Ekow Yankah** (Thomas M. Cooley Professor). They join a strong group from the Law School who are affiliated with Philosophy: **Scott Hershowitz** (Professor), **Gabe Mendlow** (Professor), **Nicolas Cornell** (Professor) and **Donald Regan** (William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor). We are pleased to have such a robust connection to the Law School. In addition, we have added as an affiliate member **Kyle Whyte** (George Willis Pack Professor) from the School for the Environment and Sustainability (SEAS).
Welcome to all our new affiliated members!

Special Events

As reported last year, we were able to hold our annual Tanner Lecture on Human Values during September 2021 after having to cancel the event the previous academic year due to the pandemic. Our Tanner Lecturer was the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah (NYU), who spoke on the timely topic of the status of work in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. A symposium on the lecture included contributions from Juliana Bidadanure (Stanford), Joshua Cohen (Apple University), and Andrea Veltman (James Madison). You can view this fascinating lecture on YouTube and also read more about it in our Fall 2021 *The Grue*. We are on schedule to hold our 2022-23 Tanner Lecture on March 29-30, 2023. Our upcoming Tanner Lecturer, Sally Haslanger (MIT), will speak on the topic *Intersecting Social Systems and the Reproduction of Injustice*.

The Department held a series of mostly virtual events during 2021-22. Our regular colloquium series featured talks by Adam Elga (Princeton), Murat Aydede (UBC), José Jorge Mendoza (Washington), Tamer Nawar (Groningen), and Briana Toole (Claremont McKenna). A loosening of pandemic restrictions allowed for some in-person events during Winter 2022. Thus Yancey Strickler (co-founder of Kickstarter) delivered in-person his Ferrando Lecture, *Self-Interest and the Post-Individual*. Moreover, our graduate students organized an in-person Spring Colloquium on the topic *Political Epistemology*. Speakers included Alex Guerrero (Rutgers), Helen Nissenbaum (Cornell Tech), Michael Hannon (Nottingham), and Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern).

The strictures of the pandemic did not prevent the Department from sponsoring virtual events for its various reading groups. In particular, the Race, Gender, and Feminist Philosophy group (RGFP) invited Perry Zurn (American University) and Dee Payton (Virginia); the Minorities and Philosophy group (MAP) invited Monon Gale (Yale); and the Mind and Moral Psychology group (MMP) invited Wade Munroe (Michigan), Wayne Wu (Carnegie Mellon), and Sara Aronowitz (Arizona, now Toronto).

Appreciation

As in the past, the Department has continued to benefit from the extraordinary generosity of its alumni and friends. Donors have helped us recruit, train and support outstanding faculty, through such funds as the Malcolm M. Denise Endowment, in honor of Theodore Denise (which funds research), the Nathaniel Marrs Fund (for faculty retention), the Weinberg Professorship (held by **Brian Weatherson**), the Max Mendel Shaye Professorship of Public Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (held by **Liz Anderson**), and the previously mentioned Wilhartz Professorship (held by **Sarah Moss**). Interdisciplinary initiatives have been supported by the Weinberg Fund for Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, the Hough Fellowship in Psychology and Ethics, and the PPE Strategic Fund, the latter of which supports our thriving interdisciplinary Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Last, but certainly not least, donors have helped us to sustain and improve our undergraduate and graduate programs, through support from the Weinberg Endowment for Philosophy (which funds our Frankena and Stevenson graduate student prizes and graduate summer support, among many other things), and the Ilene Goldman Block Memorial Fund (which funds internships for our undergraduate Philosophy and PPE majors, among many other things).

We acknowledge those who have donated to the Department in 2021-22 at the end of this newsletter. There is a description of our several endowments on our website at https://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/alumni-friends/endowments.html. The Department also has an Annual Fund that provides essential support for various undergraduate and graduate activities and programs. If you would like to donate to the Fund, you can find information on how to do so at https://lsa.umich.edu/philosophy/alumni-friends/annual-fund-giving.html. We are grateful to *all* our contributors, past, present, and future: Thanks for your support of a truly outstanding Department.

I wish you and yours health and safety as we continue to emerge from the pandemic. And as always, Go Blue! (or as we like to say in Michigan Philosophy, Go Grue!*).

Best,

Tad

Tad M. Schmaltz
Professor of Philosophy
James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow
Philosophy Chair

*: 'grue': a predicate introduced by the philosopher Nelson Goodman in his *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (1st edition, 1954). A grue object is green before some future time *t* and blue thereafter. Goodman uses the predicate to introduce "the new riddle of induction," which is illustrated by the fact that past evidence that an emerald, for instance, is green seems equally to confirm that it is grue.

Inside the Fall 2022 Issue



PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE NEWS

By Professor Ishani Maitra, Director of Graduate Studies and
Carson Maynard, Graduate Studies Coordinator

Dear Friends of Michigan Philosophy and Alumni:

As the new Director of Graduate Studies, I am delighted to report that our graduate program is thriving! A record number of our students successfully defended their dissertations over the past several months, and have gone on to a variety of post-doctoral and faculty positions, as well as judicial clerkships. Those continuing in the program are producing excellent work on a broad spectrum of philosophical topics. As you will see below, many of our students have been actively presenting their work in conferences and workshops around the world, in-person and virtually; many of these conferences focus on traditional philosophical topics, while others are located in cognate disciplines, or are inter-disciplinary in approach. Our students have also been publishing the results of their research in prestigious venues. And they have also organized and hosted several events, both here at Michigan and at peer institutions. Beyond that, they are continuing to engage in a broad range of outreach activities within the discipline and beyond.

Like the rest of the university, the department is continuing to grapple with the effects of the pandemic. In many ways, this semester feels closer to our pre-pandemic 'normal' than any time in the past two years. Most departmental events – including reading groups and workshops – are now back in-person; and the departmental spaces feel as busy and active as ever. It's a pleasure to step back into Angell Hall and hear the buzz of conversation about research, teaching, conferencing, outreach, and everything else that goes into the graduate student experience. Our next big challenge will be to keep what we gained during the pandemic – especially the ability to interact and collaborate with philosophers from all around the world – while also restoring those aspects of departmental life that suffered. From what I have seen so far, our students are more than up to the challenge.

<u>In the last year, these publications have included:</u>

· **Jason Byas**, "Rectification & Historic Injustice", *Routledge Companion to Libertarianism* by Matt Zwolinski and Benjamin Ferguson (eds), Abingdon, UK: Routledge (2022).

· **Francisco Calderón**, "Uncertainties in quantum measurements: a quantum tomography", co-authored with Aiyalam P. Balachandran, V. Parameswaran Nair, Aleksandr Pinzul, Andrés F. Reyes-Lega, and Sachindeo Vaidya, *Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical* 55 (22): 225–309, (2022). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1088/1751-8121/ac6a2c.

· —, co-translator (with Sergio Ariza, Emperatriz Chinchilla, Santiago Eslava, Brian Marrin, Juan David Navarro, and Felipe Zárate) of Thucydides' 'Melian Dialogue' ('History of the Peloponnesian War' V.84-116) for *Tucídides: Diálogo de Melos* (Sergio Ariza, Felipe Castañeda, and Brian Marrin, eds), Ediciones Uniandes (2022). DOI: https://doi.org/10.30778/2022.62

· **Lingxi Chenyang**, "Farming With Trees: Reforming U.S. Farm Policy to Expand Agroforestry and Mitigate Climate Change," co-authored with Andrew Currie, Hannah Darrin, and Nathan Rosenberg, *Ecology Law Quarterly* 48 (1) (2021). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3717877.

· —, co-editor (with Janet G. McCabe, Gabriel M. Filippelli, Kimberly A. Novick, James Shanahan, and Eva Sanders Allen), *Climate Change and Resilience in Indiana and Beyond*, Indiana University Press (2022).

· **Sean Costello**, "Aristotle on Light and Vision: An 'Ecological' Interpretation," *Apeiron* (2022). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2019-0063.

· **Aaron Glasser**, "Will-Powered: Synchronic Regulation is the Difference Maker for Self-Control," co-authored with Zachary C Irving, Jordan Bridges, Juan Pablo Bermúdez, and Chandra Sripada, *Cognition* 225 (2022). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105154.

· **Malte Hendrickx**, "Who knows what Mary knew? An experimental study," co-authored with Daniel Gregory and Cameron Turner, *Philosophical Psychology* 35 (4): 522–545 (2022). DOI: <u>https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2021.2001448</u>.

· **Josh Hunt (PhD '22)**, "Understanding and Equivalent Reformulations," *Philosophy of Science*, 88 (5): 810–823 (2021). DOI: <u>https://doi.org/10.1086/715216</u>.

· **Elise Woodard (PhD '22**), "The Ignorance Norm and Paradoxical Assertions," *Philosophical Topics* 49 (2): 321–332 (2021). DOI: <u>https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149227</u>.

<u>And the papers accepted for publication include:</u>

· **Aaron Glasser**, "The Catch-22 Of Forgetfulness: Responsibility for Mental Mistakes," co-authored with Zachary C Irving, Samuel Murray, and Kristina Krasich, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (forthcoming).

· **Josh Hunt (Phd '22)**, "Epistemic Dependence & Understanding: Reformulating through Symmetry," *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (forthcoming).

· —, "Expressivism about Explanatory Relevance," *Philosophical Studies* (forthcoming).

Ishani Maitra, Director of Graduate Studies
and Carson Maynard, Graduate Studies Coordinator

· **Calum McNamara**, "Scientific Theories as Bayesian Nets: Structure and Sensitivity," co-authored with Patrick Grim, Frank Seidl, Hinton Rago, Isabell N Astor, Caroline Diaso, and Peter Ryner, *Philosophy of Science* 89 (1), 42–69 (forthcoming 2022).

· —, "The Punctuated Equilibrium of Scientific Change," co-authored with Patrick Grim, Frank Seidl, Isabell N Astor, and Caroline Diaso, *Synthese* 200, 297 (forthcoming 2022).

· **Sherice Ngaserin Ng Jing Ya**, in an as-yet-untitled volume (Amber Carpenter and Pierre Julien-Harter, eds.), Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2023).

· **Elise Woodard (PhD '22)**, "Why Double-Check?" *Episteme* (forthcoming).

· —, "Epistemic Norms on Evidence-Gathering," co-authored with Carolina Flores, special issue of *Philosophical Studies* (forthcoming).

· **Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou**, "Descartes on the Source of Error: The Fourth Meditation and the Correspondence with Elisabeth," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* (forthcoming).

Our students have presented their research at a staggering range of events around the world:

· **Abdul Ansari**, "Why Taste Doesn't Matter," presented at the Syracuse University Graduate Philosophy Conference, Syracuse NY, March 2022.

· —, "Shame and Value," Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· —, "Goodness Lost", What's in a Good Life? Interdisciplinary Conference, Ansgar University College, Kristiansand, Norway, June 2022.

· **Jason Byas**, "Stolen Bikes & Broken Bones: Restitution as Defense," PPE Society, New Orleans LA, February 2022.

· —, "Property, Interpretation & Contestation," Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· **Francisco Calderón**, "The Causal Axioms of Algebraic Quantum Field Theory: A Diagnostic," presented at the Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Physics (LMP) Graduate Conference, Western University, London ON, June 2022 (virtual); and at the BSPS 2022: British Society for the Philosophy of Science Annual Conference, University of Exeter, Exeter UK, July 2022 (virtual).

· —, "The Brightness of the Moon and Presocratic Science," HOPOS 2022: The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Biennial Meeting, University of California, Irvine CA, June 2022 (virtual).

· **Lingxi Chenyang**, "Lockean Property, Science, and Takings," Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Environmental Law and Natural Resources & Energy Law Annual Meeting Works-in-Progress, January 2022 (virtual).

· —, "Resilient Carbon," presented at the Second Annual Workshop for Asian American Pacific Islander (AAPI) and Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) Women in the Legal Academy, UC Davis School of Law, Davis CA, September 2022; and at the Thirteenth Annual Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship, Vermont Law and Graduate School, South Royalton VT, September 2022.

· **Mercy Corredor (PhD '22)**, "How Should Feminists Respond to Suspect (Hyper-) Femininity?" presented at Virginia Tech, October 2021; and at California State University, Los Angeles CA, February 2022.

· —, "Transitional Moral Contexts," presented at the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (APPE) International Conference, Cincinnati OH, February 2022; and at the DePauw University Philosophy Department Colloquium, Greencastle IN, April 2022.

· —, "Vindictive Anger," Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference (VSPC), Vancouver BC, July 2022.

· **Sean Costello**, "Disambiguating Anaxagoras's notions of ψυχή and νοῦς, and their relation to σπέρματα, in Fragments B4a and B12," the second meeting of VOID: Early Greek Philosophy Workshop, University of Kent, UK, September 2021.

· —, "Anne Conway on Memory," the New Voices on Women in the History of Philosophy Virtual Conference, Centre for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists, Universität Paderborn, Paderborn, Germany, February 2022.

· **Kevin Craven**, "Public-Facing Ethical Pedagogy: High School Ethics Bowl as a Case Study," Philosophy Learning and Teaching Organization Conference, University of Seattle, June 2022.

· **Paul de Font-Reaulx**, "Communication, Omission, and Sexual Consent," Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· —, "Penelope and the Drinks," presented at Filosofidagarna ('The Philosophy Days') 2022, Lund, Sweden, June 2022; and at the Second Lake Como Summer School on Economic Behaviours, Como, Italy, June-July 2022.

· **Guus Duindam (PhD '22**), "On Moral Worth, Permissibility, and the Formula of Universal Law," Slippery Slope Normativity Summit, Lillehammer, Norway, March 2022.

· —, "The Formula of Universal Law and Kant's Virtue Ethics," South Carolina Society for Philosophy Annual Meeting, Spartanburg SC, March 2022.

· —, "Maxims and Phantom Puzzles," Freedom, Action and Control: Conceptions of Rational Agency in Kant and the German Enlightenment, University of Bucharest, Romania, June 2022 (virtual).

· **Aaron Glasser**, "Affect in Action," Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP) / European Society of Philosophy and Psychology (ESPP) joint conference, Milan, Italy, July 2022.

· **Gillian Gray**, "Misgendering as an Oppressive Barrier to Meaningful Social Interactions," What is Gender? Manchester Center for Political Theory (MANCEPT) Workshop, Manchester UK, September 2022.

· **Emma Hardy**, "Leaning into a Social and Process-Constituted Account of Food", Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· —, "Becoming, and Remaining, Food," International Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality Conference, Vienna, Austria, August 2022.

· **Rebecca Harrison**, "How to Unintentionally Do Things with Words," Philosophy of Language Association Conference, June 2022 (virtual).

· **Malte Hendrickx**, "What is Difficulty?" presented at the Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT) Conference, University of Austin, Austin TX, December 2021; and at the Effort and Self-Control Workshop, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, June 2022.

· —, "Against Capacity Views of Control and Action," presented at the Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2022; and at the Southern Society for Psychology and Philosophy, Mobile AL, March-April 2022.

· —, "Supererogation," Summer School with Roger Crisp, University of Freiburg, Germany, June 2022.

· —, "Effort, Difficulty and Agential Self-Control," The Value of Effort Workshop, University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, August 2022.

· **Josh Hunt (PhD '22)**, "Norms to Explain By," presented at the Young Scholars Pragmatism Conference, Cambridge University, UK, October 2021; and at the Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2022.

· —, "Understanding & Equivalent Reformulations," Philosophy of Science Association, Baltimore MD, November 2021.

· —, "Making it Manifest," Philosophy of High Energy Physics Workshop, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh PA, March 2022.

· —, "A Unified Account of Comparative Understanding," SURe 4 Workshop on Scientific Understanding and Representation, Fordham University, New York NY, April 2022.

· —, "Reformulations of Perturbative QFT," invited talk at Approximations to Second Order: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives, Max Planck Institute of the History of Science, Berlin, Germany, July 2022.

· **Gabrielle Kerbel**, "Configuration Space Realism and Fundamentality," presented at The Nature of Quantum Objects Conference, University of Geneva, Switzerland, November 2021 (virtual); at the Annual Conference of the German Physical Society, Philosophy of Physics Group, March 2022 (virtual); and as a symposium paper at the Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division, Vancouver BC, April 2022.

· **Cameron McCulloch**, "Wronging by Knowing and the Right to Privacy", Australasian Association of Philosophy, June 2022 (virtual).

· —, "Privacy, Intimacy, and the State", Manchester Center for Political Theory (MANCEPT) Immigration Conference, Manchester UK, September 2022.

· —, "Contextual Integrity and Propertarian Privacy", 4th Annual Symposium on Applications of Contextual Integrity, Cornell Tech, New York NY, September 2022.

· **Calum McNamara**, "Causation, determinism, and decision-making," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2022.

· —, "Humean causation", Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT) Conference, April 2022.

· **Sherice Ngaserin Ng Jing Ya**, "Becoming, Intrinsic Nature, and the Road to Relativism", invited talk for the Vasubandhu panel at the International Association of Buddhist Studies' conference in South Korea, August 2022.

· **Lindy Ortiz**, "Imagining Beyond Credibility," presented at Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022; and at the Society for Philosophy in Contemporary World Annual Conference, YMCA of the Rockies, Estes Park CO, July 2022.

· **Sumeet Patwardhan**, "What I See with My Eyes: Tarabai Shinde on Men Blaming Women", University of Michigan COMPASS Workshop, Ann Arbor MI, October 2021.

· —, "Nonconsensual Sex without Public Sanctions", University of Michigan Philosophy Graduate Student Working Group, Ann Arbor MI, March 2022.

· —, "Peremptory Blame", University of Michigan Philosophy Graduate Student Working Group, Ann Arbor MI, March 2022.

· —, " 'Do I Have To?': Moral Ignorance and Sexual Consent", presented at the Great Lakes Philosophy Conference, Siena Heights University, Adrian MI, April 2022; at the Southeastern Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Florida, Gainesville FL, April 2022; at the Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022; at the Georgia Philosophical Society Spring Conference, University of Georgia, Athens GA, June 2022; and at the Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy Graduate Conference on 'Knowledge, Ignorance, and Moral Responsibility', University of Vienna, Austria, July 2022.

· **Caroline Perry**, “Love and Sympathetic Engagement Across Evaluative Perspectives,” Northwestern Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NU-STEP) Conference, Northwestern University, Evanston IL, June 2022.

· **Ariana Peruzzi**, “Do Communities have Occupancy Rights?”, Ethics in Uncertain Times conference, University of Tennessee, Knoxville TN, March 2022.

· —, “When We Decide: Voluntariness, Collective Agency, and Migrant Choice,” Manchester Center for Political Theory (MANCEPT) Immigration Conference, Manchester UK, September 2022.

· —, “Do Communities have Rights to Remain?” Philosophy and Borders Workshop, September 2022 (virtual).

· **Josh Petersen**, “Ignorance and Dissent,” UNC Charlotte Graduate Conference on Ethics, Charlotte NC, April 2022 (virtual).

· —, “Epistemic Justice and Restorative Justice,” Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· —, “Professionalization as Domination,” Legitimacy of International Law and International Institutions, Pluri-Courts Center at the University of Oslo, Norway, June 2022.

· **Laura Soter (PhD ’22)**, “Acceptance as Doxastic Response Modulation,” presented at the Michigan-Princeton Meta-Normativity Conference, August 2021 (virtual); the Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks (AGENT) Conference, University of Austin, Austin TX, December 2021; the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), Mobile AL, March-April 2022; and the Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division, Vancouver BC, April 2022.

· —, “Universalism versus Partiality in Responding to Others’ Moral Transgressions,” poster at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) Annual Convention, San Francisco CA, February 2022.

· **Angela Sun (PhD ’22)**, "Resolutions as Promises to Oneself," What We Owe to Ourselves: A Conference on Duties to Oneself, Central European University, Vienna, Austria, October 2021.

· **Adam Waggoner**, “Why Feel Fittingly?” Michigan-Princeton Meta-Normativity Conference, August 2021 (virtual).

· **Margot Witte**, “Concept-Use and Hermeneutical Justice”, presented at the University of Waterloo Graduate Conference, Waterloo ON, March 2022.

· —, “Simplicity and Inclusion: Theoretical Virtues in Tension,” Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· —, “Theoretical Virtues in Tension: Towards Non-Unified Gender Phenomena?” presented at the Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022; and at the Toronto IHPST Graduate Conference, Toronto ON, May 2022.

· **Katie Wong**, “Actions, Slurs, and Ideology”, Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference, November 2021 (virtual).

· —, “Love and Unselfing,” presented at Sympatheia / Einfühlung / Empathy: Understanding and Feeling Otherness, University of Lisbon, Portugal, January 2022; at the Annual Southwest Graduate Conference, Arizona State University, Tempe AZ, March 2022; at the Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado Boulder, April 2022; at the Great Lakes Conference, Siena Heights University, Adrian MI, April 2022; and at the Interpersonal Relations Workshop, University of Birmingham, Birmingham UK, June 2022.

· —, “Reasons for Love and the Beloved’s Irreplaceability”, Australasian Association of Philosophy conference, June-July 2022 (virtual).

· **Elise Woodard (PhD ’22)**, “Epistemic Atonement”, presented at the Michigan-Princeton Meta-Normativity Conference, August 2021 (virtual); at the Madison Metaethics Workshop (MadMeta), Madison WI, September 2021; at the COGITO Epistemology Workshop, University of Glasgow, UK, December 2021; at the University of Denver, January 2022; at Syracuse University, January 2022; at Wake Forest University, February 2022; at Clemson University, February 2022; at King’s College London, Dickson Poon School of Law, February 2022; at UC Santa Cruz, March 2022; and at the Epistemic Blame Workshop: Theory and Practice, University of Johannesburg, South Africa, March 2022 (virtual).

· —, “Epistemic Norms on Evidence-Gathering” with Carolina Flores, presented at the COGITO Epistemology Workshop, University of Glasgow, UK, December 2021; at the Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill NC, April 2022; and at Inquiry and Its Norms, UNED Madrid, Spain, June 2022.

· —, “Why Double-Check?” presented at King’s College London, October 2021; and at Indiana University Bloomington, January 2022.

· —, “On Subtweeting” with Eleonore Neufeld, presented at Words Workshop, University of Pittsburgh, November 2021 (virtual); at the Applied Ethics Forum, California State University, Long Beach CA, November 2021; and at the Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Pacific Division Colloquium, Vancouver BC, April 2022.

· **Yixuan Wu**, “Gender as Property vs. Gender as Structure,” Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop, Cambridge MA, April 2022.

· —, “Does Gender Change across Contexts?” Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality Conference, Vienna, Austria, August 2022.

· **Sophia Wushanley**, “Artificial Corporations: Machine learning systems as models of collective moral agency”, IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, Philadelphia PA, May 2022.

· **Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou**, “The Stoics on Nonrational Impulsive Representation” (colloquium), Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2022.

· —, “Aristotle on the Stopping and Starting Problem,” Ruhr-Universität Bochum Workshop on Now, Exaiphnês, and the Present Moment in Ancient Philosophy, Bochum, Germany, March 2022.

· —, “Aristotle’s *De Insomniis* 462a8-31,” Yale Ancient Philosophy Workshop on *De Somno/De Insomniis*, New Haven CT, June 2022.

· —, “The Equanimity Approach to Sagehood in the *Zhuangzi*”, International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Shanghai, China, June 2022 (virtual).

· —, “Aristotle’s *De Generatione et Corruptione* 336a15-337a33”, Cornell Ancient Philosophy Workshop on *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2.6-11, Ithaca NY, August 2022.

Several students have presented commentaries over the past year, and also chaired and moderated conference sessions:

- **Jason Byas** commented on Matthew C. Altman's book *Justifying Punishment: Deterrence, Retribution & the Aims of the State* for Author-Meets-Critics panel, Northwest Philosophy Conference, Portland OR, November 2021.
- **Francisco Calderón** commented on Gabriel Shapiro's "Meaning and Metaphysical Explanation in Plato's Sophist," 3rd Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, May 2022.
- **Aaron Glasser** commented on Aaron Henry's "Distriction and the Constitutive Aim of Attention", Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), Mobile AL, March-April 2022.
- — commented on Jocelyn Wang's "Mind Wandering as Diffuse Attention", Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SSPP), Mobile AL, March-April 2022.
- **Gillian Gray** commented on Megan Hyska's "What is Social Organizing?", 3rd Annual Duke Social Metaphysics Workshop, Durham NC, June 2022.
- **Emma Hardy** chaired "New Philosophical Work on Food Consumption," The Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society Annual Conference, Athens GA, May 2022.
- — chaired "New Philosophical Work on Food Justice," The Agriculture, Food, and Human Values Society Annual Conference, Athens GA, May 2022.
- **Gabrielle Kerbel** commented on Shimin Zhao's "Old Evidence and a Causal Analysis of Confirmation," Athena in Action, Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ, June 2022.
- **Sumeet Patwardhan** commented on Alisabeth Ayars' "Attraction, Aversion, and Meaning in Life," Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, July 2022.
- **Ariana Peruzzi** commented on "The Orphan Left and the Limits of Chavez's Mutual Protagonism," the 6th Latinx Philosophy Conference, Temple University, Philadelphia PA, March 2022.
- **Josh Petersen** commented on Alex Guerrero's "The Ethics and Politics of Radical Political Change," Spring Colloquium, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, March 2022.
- **Julian Rome** commented on Mark Jonas and Yoshiaka Nakazawa's *A Platonic Theory of Moral Education* (Routledge 2021), North American Association for Philosophy and Education Annual Conference (Author-Meets-Critics Session), Mundelein IL, October 2021.
- — commented on Songyao Ren's "Dispassion and the Good Life: A Comparison of Stoicism and Zhuangism," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division, Baltimore MD, January 2022.
- — commented on Kyle Scott's "The Importance of Aristotle's Distinction Between Praxis and Poeisis," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2022.
- — commented on Jonathan Fine's "What is it to act for the sake of the *kalon*? Or: beauty and the appearance of virtue in Plato," 3rd Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, May 2022.
- **Laura Soter (PhD '22)** commented on Anna Brinkerhoff's "Prejudiced Beliefs Based on the Evidence," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division, Baltimore MD, January 2022.
- — commented on Emma McClure's "Microaggressions Are Not (Merely) a Collective Harm Problem," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division, Baltimore MD, January 2022.
- **Alvaro Sottil** commented on Kenneth Pike's "Contractualism and Sufficientarianism," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Eastern Division, Baltimore MD, January 2022.
- **Margot Witte** commented on Ellie Anderson's "Hermeneutic Labor: The Gendered Burden of Interpretation in Intimate Relationships Between Women and Men," Meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA) Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2022.
- **Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou** commented on Vikram Kumar's "The Stoics on Preconceptual Ambiguity," 3rd Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor MI, May 2022.

In addition to attending lots of interesting conferences, several of our students attended summer institutes in the US and internationally:

- **Francisco Calderón** attended the International Spring School on the Philosophy, History, and Sociology of Particle Physics, Wuppertal, Germany, March 2022. This year's topic was The History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Large Physics Experiments.
- **Paul de Font-Reaulx** attended and presented at the Second Lake Como Summer School on Economic Behaviours: Models, Measurements, and Policies in June–July 2022, where he discussed philosophy of economics with faculty and other graduate students.
- **Gabrielle Kerbel** attended two sequential summer schools: The History and Philosophy of the Concepts of Scientific Law and Probability, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, July 2022; and The Nature of Entropy – Arrow of Time, Georg-von-Vollmer Academy, Kochel am See, Germany, August 2022.
- **Calum McNamara** attended the European Summer School in Logic, Language, and Information (ESSLLI) in August 2022, at the National University of Ireland in Galway, where he took courses on higher-order metaphysics (with Cian Dorr and Jeremy Goodman) and conditionals (with David Boylan and Matt Mandelkern).
- **Josh Petersen** attended two summer schools in June 2002: the Legitimacy of International Law and International Institutions summer school/conference at the PluriCourts Center at the University of Oslo, and the North American Summer School on Logic, Language, and Information at the University of Southern California.
- **Julian Rome** attended the "Fiction Writing for Philosophers" workshop at St. Louis University in July 2022.
- **Laura Soter (PhD '22)** attended the Summer Seminar in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP) at Duke University in June 2022.
- **Alison Weinberger** attended the Carnegie Mellon Summer School in Formal Epistemology in summer 2021.

Our students organized two conferences here at Michigan, and one elsewhere.

- In March 2022, the University of Michigan Spring Colloquium, titled "Political Epistemology: Knowledge, Information, and Society", was co-organized by **Cameron McCulloch, Josh Petersen, Elise Woodard (PhD '22),** and **Sophia Wushanley.** This year's invited speakers were Alex Guerrero (Rutgers), Michael Hannon (Nottingham), Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern), and Helen Nissenbaum (Cornell Tech). Attendance was phenomenal; both Friday and Saturday's events were, at times, "standing room only." One speaker reported that the Spring Colloquium was "one of [his] favorite philosophy events" he's ever attended, while another speaker noted that few of the very many philosophy departments they've visited have the collegial, supportive, and thoughtful community that Michigan does, and we should be proud of the department we've built here.
- In April 2022, the Michigan-MIT Social Philosophy Workshop — co-organized, on the UM side, by **Abdul Ansari** and **Jason Byas** — was held at MIT, with a keynote talk by Candice Delmas (Northeastern).
- In May 2022, the 3rd Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy was organized by **Sean Costello** and MA student Andrew Mayo, featuring talks by Alan Code (Stanford), Jonathan Fine (Hawai'i Manoa), Vikram Kumar (Cornell), Ethan Russo (NYU), Gabriel Shapiro (Princeton), and Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt University Berlin).

This year's reading and working groups included a new Critical Theory reading group, organized by **Ariana Peruzzi** and **Valerie Trudel**; the Epistemology Work-In-Progress (E-WIP) group, organized by **Elise Woodard (PhD '22)**; the Ethics Discussion Group (EDGe) organized by **Abdul Ansari, Jason Byas, Mica Rapstine,** and **Joe Shin (PhD '22)**; the inaugural Non-Western Philosophy reading group organized by **Sherice Ngaserin Ng Jing Ya** and **Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou**, which (with **Aaron Glasser**) arranged to have Sonam Kachru (UVA) join the final discussion session of his book *Other Lives: Mind and World in Indian Buddhism*; reading groups centered on Wayne Wu's *Movements of the Mind* (organized by **Aaron Glasser** and **Malte Hendrickx**), which Wu (Carnegie Mellon) joined for three sessions, and Amia Srinivasan's *The Right to Sex* (organized by **Gabrielle Kerbel, Margot Witte,** and **Elise Woodard (PhD '22)**); and summer reading groups on Artificial Intelligence (organized by **Sophia Wushanley**), Science Fiction and Philosophy (organized by **Ariana Peruzzi**), and Statistical Evidence and Legal Epistemology (organized by **Josh Petersen**).

Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshops (RIWs) are graduate student oriented groups that meet regularly throughout the year to discuss readings on a particular interdisciplinary topic, workshop one another's papers, and sponsor a public lecture or facilitate a workshop with an outside speaker. The RIWs for 2021-22 were:

- Ancient Philosophy (APWG) – organized by **Sean Costello** and MA student Andrew Mayo – coordinated the 3rd Annual Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop in Ancient Philosophy, as well as a work-in-progress workshop.
- Knowledge, Information, and Society (KIS) – organized by **Cameron McCulloch, Josh Petersen,** and **Sophia Wushanley** – a new RIW for 2021-22, which addresses issues at the intersection of epistemology, social/political philosophy, law, and technology. KIS co-hosted the Spring Colloquium and organized a related reading group focused mainly on privacy.
- Race, Gender, and Feminist Philosophy (RGFP) – organized by **Gillian Gray** and **Sumeet Patwardhan** – hosted virtual talks by Perry Zurn (American University) on October 22, and a pre-read discussion with Dee Payton (Howard) on April 22, as well as graduate student flash talks and a reading group.
- Mind and Moral Psychology (MMP) – organized by **Malte Hendrickx, Laura Soter (PhD '22),** and **Adam Waggoner** – hosted talks by Wade Munroe (U-M Cognitive Science) on October 28, Wayne Wu (Carnegie Mellon) on December 2, alum Sara Aronowitz '18 (Arizona) on March 15, and Robyn Waller (Iona College) on April 5, as well as a talk by Zach Barnett (National University of Singapore) on May 9 co-organized with the Epistemology Working Group, and two work-in-progress talks.

Our students are increasingly engaged in efforts to bring philosophy to non-academic audiences, both here in Ann Arbor and elsewhere. **Josh Petersen** was the lead author on a policy publication documenting a situation of environmental injustice in Louisiana. That paper, "They Didn't Pay Us for Our Memories," was covered extensively in international media, including The Guardian, ProPublica, and Vice News. He also presented his work on environmental advocacy to students of the human rights program at Wesleyan University by Zoom, in March and April 2022. **Julian Rome** was a judge for the University of Michigan's Undergraduate Research Symposium, and a reviewer for The Thoreau Institute's annual "Live Deliberately" essay contest, which "invites youth around the world, ages 14-18, to consider a selected Henry David Thoreau quotation and accompanying prompt. Contestants are asked to write a thoughtful essay that uses personal experience and observation to demonstrate how that year's quotation and prompt relate to their own lives and to the world around them."



Our students continue their work at making academic philosophy a more inclusive place. **Gabrielle Kerbel, Josh Petersen,** and **Margot Witte** co-organized the Michigan Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) chapter, with events including a talk on linguistic justice by April Baker-Bell (MSU) as part of the 2022 U-M Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Symposium, a speaker series on the philosophy of gender, a screening and discussion of two short films for Indigenous Peoples' Day, and a CRLT workshop on inclusive equity-focused pedagogy. Starting in January, **Sophia Wushanley** worked as an organizer for MAP International.

As we reported last year, our sixth annual Michigan COMPASS workshop in October 2021, for students from underrepresented groups considering graduate school in Philosophy, was co-organized and facilitated by **Paul de Font-Reaulx, Gillian Gray, Ariana Peruzzi,** and **Julian Rome**, with 15 of our grad students serving as mentors. Kristie Dotson gave opening remarks, while Ishani Maitra, Laura Ruetsche, and Janum Sethi joined a Q&A panel on applying to grad school. This year's seventh annual Michigan COMPASS workshop, co-organized by **Julian Rome, Gabrielle Kerbel, Lindy Ortiz,** and **Valerie Trudel**, was held in October 2022. (see page 36 for the COMPASS report).

In winter 2022, **Abdul Ansari, Laura Soter (PhD '22),** and **Adam Waggoner** organized our ninth annual Michigan High School Ethics Bowl. Coaches included **Francisco Calderón, Sarah Colquhoun, Lindy Ortiz**, and MA student Ben Ordiway; **Sumeet Patwardhan** served as a judge for the preliminary and elimination rounds. Several Ethics Bowl alumni wrote cases that were used in the bowl, one of which — about the ethics of DNA testing — was written by two college students who met after finding out, via DNA testing, that they were related. Adam also guested on a *Life is Better with Ethics* podcast along with Jeanine DeLay, the president of A2Ethics, which coordinates the Ethics Bowl.

2022 marked the final year of founding members **Josh Hunt (PhD '22)** and **Laura Soter's (PhD '22)** involvement in the Philosophy with Kids! program. They had a successful fifth year running, visiting Lincoln Middle School in Ypsilanti over 6 weeks, with Maria Waggoner and **Yixuan Wu**, to do philosophy with Alex Chang's 8th graders. This year, supported by a grant from the Philosophy Learning and Teaching Association, the members worked with Alex to prepare a curriculum that was specifically designed for students who were having a harder time in school. Everyone was so happy to be back in person in the classroom, especially for Laura and Josh's last year with the program!

Our students won a number of prizes from the department and the university. **Rebecca Harrison** won the John Dewey Prize for her outstanding teaching, and **Calum McNamara** won the Faculty Prize for Excellence in Teaching. 2022 graduates **Angela Sun (PhD '22)** and **Laura Soter (PhD '22)** won the Charles L. Stevenson Prize (for excellence in a dissertation dossier) and our Special Prize for Leadership in Cocurricular Enrichment (SPLICE), respectively. Our Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Prize was shared by **Sumeet Patwardhan** and **Ariana Peruzzi**. **Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou** was awarded the Cornwell Fellowship in recognition of his excellent (original and creative) philosophical work. **Rebecca Harrison** won a Rackham Pre-Doctoral Fellowship. Weinberg Summer Fellowships, honoring students who have shown distinction during their second year of study, were awarded to **Elizabeth Beckman, Malte Hendrickx,** and **Julian Rome**; Weinberg Dissertation Fellowships, honoring students who have shown distinction during their first five years of study, were awarded to fifth-year students **Rebecca Harrison** and **Sumeet Patwardhan**. Beyond Philosophy, **Mercy Corredor (PhD '22)** won the student-nominated "Honored Instructor Award", in recognition for having made a significant impact on the educational experience of one or more students living in Michigan Housing. **Julian Rome** received a Rackham Pre-Candidacy Research Grant to attend the Fiction Writing for Philosophers workshop. **Sarah Sculco** was awarded the prestigious Darrow Scholarship at Michigan Law, a merit award presented to select recipients chosen for their outstanding scholastic achievements and proven capacity for leadership.

The excellence of our graduate students has also been recognized beyond UM. **Jason Byas** was awarded the Adam Smith Fellowship with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. **Paul de Font-Reaulx** was chosen as a 2022 Global Priorities Fellow with the Forethought Foundation. **Malte Hendrickx** and **Cameron McCulloch** each received a $5000 Frédéric Bastiat Fellowship in Political Economy for 2022-2023. **Gabrielle Kerbel** received the LACSI (Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative) conference travel fellowship to attend a conference on laws of nature in September. **Sumeet Patwardhan** was an affiliated graduate fellow with the USC-based Conceptual Foundations of Conflict Project (CFCP) from winter 2021 through summer 2022; CFCP aims to theorize about interpersonal conflict through the lens of philosophy, involving philosophers and interdisciplinary scholars in regular pre-read workshops, public talks, and conferences. **Josh Petersen** received a study grant to attend the North American Summer School on Logic, Language, and Information at the University of Southern California. **Laura Soter (PhD '22)** received the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology's Griffith Memorial Award for her paper "Acceptance and the Ethics of Belief", plus an honorable mention for the American Sociological Association Culture Section's Geertz Award for Best Article, for her co-authored paper with Andrei Boutyline, "Cultural Schemas: What they are, how to find them, and what to do once you've caught one". **Elise Woodard (PhD '22)** received the Sanders Graduate Student Award at the Eastern APA conference for her paper "The Ignorance Norm and Paradoxical Assertions", which was selected as one of the three best papers submitted in mind, metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics.

While our students have faced *significant* challenges over the past few years, this report documents *many* of the ways they have shown themselves to be up to meeting those challenges. As our campus returns to something like what it was before the pandemic, we look forward to seeing what new projects they will come up with in the coming year. Whether that's new research, new outreach projects, new ideas and methods for teaching, or something different again, we're confident that our students will keep doing work that we can all be proud of, and that make Michigan a wonderful place to do philosophy.



2022 Weinberg Award Recipients

Malte Hendrickx (Weinberg Summer Fellowship recipient): I am proud and grateful to be receiving your generous summer stipend. It has had a considerable impact, both personal and academic in nature, on my plans for this summer. Your funding allows me to spend the summer on a research stay in Europe, rather than teaching in Michigan. I will primarily be working with the Philosophy of Neuroscience Group (PONS) at the University of Tübingen. I am deeply grateful for your generous support of my studies and research. Thank you for enabling me to spend a productive and insightful summer focusing on my research, surrounded by my loved ones.

Rebecca Harrison (Weinberg Summer Dissertation Prize recipient): I am deeply grateful to Marshall Weinberg and his family for their support for my research this summer and for the work they do to support research and education in philosophy more broadly. Thank you! This summer, my research priority will be working on two chapters of my dissertation.
My dissertation research is in the philosophy of language. I work primarily in the philosophy of language, social philosophy, feminist philosophy, ethics, and epistemology. Outside of philosophy, I love reading science fiction and fantasy novels, playing with my cats, and taking long walks in the woods. (Rebecca is also this year's departmental Dewey Prize recipient. And she was awarded a Rackham Pre-doctoral Fellowship for 2022/2023.)

Sumeet Patwardhan (Weinberg Summer Dissertation Prize recipient): I am currently entering my 6th year of UM's PhD program in Philosophy. I have many plans for the awards, sorted roughly into three intersecting categories. First, I will continue work on my dissertation. Second, I will continue various research projects stemming from, but not strictly included within, my dissertation. Third, I will prepare for the academic job market. I will also be attending at least three, but perhaps more, conferences over the summer. Doing so will allow me to further hone my ideas and arguments before interviews and job talks. Thank you again for your financial support! (Sumeet was also the departmental co-recipient of the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Prize.)

Julian Rome (Weinberg Summer Fellowship recipient): This summer fellowship will make a major difference in my research progress by allowing me the time and resources that I need in order to complete several major projects. The first of these is a paper which I plan to submit to conferences by the middle of the summer. The second project I'm working on this summer consists of revisions to a set of three short public philosophy essays where I apply philosophical ideas to contemporary issues, aimed at a general audience. This is an incredible and much-needed opportunity as a graduate student to go beyond the requirements of my coursework and take the time to work towards my dissertation and develop further as a professional. Thank you again!

Elizabeth Beckman (Weinberg Summer Fellowship recipient and Weinberg CogSci Grant for 2024): I am thankful for your continued support of my education. I will use my funding to brush up on my interdisciplinary interests as I continue to study psychology more closely as it aids in answering the cognitive science questions I am interested in. I will spend time reading assorted papers on emotion perception/processing, empathy, and moral cognition. I have not yet participated in any conferences or workshops since starting at Michigan and want to use this downtime (from coursework and teaching) to do some research and organize my materials. Thank you again for your support!

Graduate Awards

Jason Byas was awarded the Adam Smith Fellowship with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His research interests include rights theory, punishment (and its alternatives), and moral repair, along with other topics in ethics, political philosophy and philosophy of law. Jason also received the Adam Smith Fellowship during 18/19, 19/20, and 20/21.

Paul de Font-Reaulx was chosen as a 2022 Global Priorities Fellow with the Forethought Foundation. He mostly works on ethics, cognitive science, and decision theory. His research is focused on how humans model the world, and in particular the normative aspects of their lives.

Malte Hendrickx and Cameron McCulloch each received a $5000 Frédéric Bastiat Fellowship in Political Economy for 2022-2023. This one-year competitive fellowship program is awarded to grad students in the fields of economics, law, political science, and public policy.

Gabrielle Kerbel received the LACSI (Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative) conference travel fellowship to attend a conference on laws of nature in September. Her areas of interests include science, logic, and mathematics. She is also both a MAP and COMPASS coordinator.

Calum McNamara won the Faculty Prize for Excellence in Teaching this year for teaching PHIL 303 - Intro to Symbol Logic. He works mostly on decision theory, epistemology, and metaphysics as well as ethics, logic, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science. He has published many articles with several under review; included in these is "The Punctuated Equilibrium of Scientific Change: A Bayesian Network Model" (w/ P. Grim, F. Seidl, H. Rago, I. Astor, C. Diaso, & P. Ryner), forthcoming in *Synthese* (early online).

Ariana Peruzzi was this year's co-recipient of the departmental Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Prize. Her research is in political philosophy. She is currently writing a disseration on migration justice, territorial rights, and rights of non-displacement. Some of the questions she is investigating include: 1. do economic migrants have special claim to admission?, 2. what kinds of rights do communities have against economic displacement?, and 3. when is economic migration involuntary? She is also pursuing a graduate certificate in Latin American studies at U-M and is interested in issues of movement and displacement from a Latin American lens.

Josh Petersen received a study grant to attend the North American Summer School on Logic, Language, and Information at the University of Southern California. His interests lie in the union of legal and political philosophy, epistemology, and feminist + queer philosophy.

Julian Rome received a Rackham Pre-Candidacy Research Grant to attend the Fiction Writing for Philosophers workshop. His primary interests are Plato and contemporary philosophy of literature. Additionally, philosophy of language, especially where it intersects with philosophy of gender.

Laura Soter (PhD 2022) was awarded (along with Alexandra Chang from Lincoln Middle School, Ypsilanti, MI) a PLATO grant for the development of a curriculum for middle schoolers that focuses on using philosophical skills to cultivate social-emotional learning. This curriculum was targeted to students who are struggling in school due to academic or personal difficulties, with a particular focus on trauma-informed pedagogy. Laura and Alex ran this program (entitled "Fostering Philosophy: Pursuing a Philosophical Pedagogy for Students Impacted by Trauma") at Lincoln Middle School during the 21/22 academic year.

Glenn Zhou was awarded the department's Cornwell Prize for his paper *The Stoics on Non-Rational Impulsive Representation*. In it, he argues that while Stoics take representation to be impulsive, capable of motivating the subject to act by eliciting impulse, there is a fundamental difficulty for representation's being impulsive, as representation and impulse seem to involve different directions of fit. He offers an interpretation of the Stoic account of nonrational impulsive representation that can help to resolve this difficulty and further shows that the Stoics offer an elegant and coherent theory of impulsive representation in general, which provides a firm basis for their theory of action and should be of interest to cognitive science.

Welcome 2022 Cohort

Alison Weinberger: "I completed my undergraduate work at the University of Colorado at Boulder in 2020, where I graduated summa cum laude with Bachelor's degrees in Mathematics and Philosophy. I'm looking forward to being in Ann Arbor and on campus this Fall and meeting everyone in person!" Alison was the 2020 UC Boulder recipient of the Undergraduate History and Philosophy Essay Prize for her thesis *Correlation is not Causation: Understanding the Scope of Aristotle's Teleology in Light of Physics II.8*.

Welcome, Alison!!

And welcome to Visiting Grad Students

Gonzalo Gamarra Jordán is visiting from Notre Dame during Fall, 2022. He will be assisting Professor Victor Caston with his *Platonic Metaphysics* project. His interests include Latin American Philosophy, Classical Chinese Philosophy, and Buddhist Philosophy.

Jinglin Zhou is visiting from the University of Munich during the academic year 22/23. He will be assisting Professors David Manley and Dan Lowe on the project *How Should We Study Moral Progress Judgments*. He is currently focusing on the evolutionary debunking arguments put forward by philosophers such as Sharon Street, Richard Joyce and Phillip Kitcher. He adds what a really joyful journey it has been from Munich University to another M University!

2022 Cohort Updates

Francisco Calderón: Coming to a new place while resuming in-person activities has not come without its challenges, but it has been an incredibly enriching experience thanks to some of the wonderful people I've met and from whom I've already learned so much. As for my interests, I keep trying—and I'm glad the department encourages me to—bend disciplinary boundaries as much as possible by constantly finding new physics to explore and old history to dig into.

Sarah Colquhoun: My first year, I took seminars in a wide variety of areas to help me decide what subfield I'd like to focus on. I've since grown skeptical that there is any meaningful difference at all between problems in different areas of philosophy. As a result, I've started leaning towards metaphilosophy. I've been working on a small taxonomy of philosophical problems that unites questions from disparate areas. This is based on a materialist theory of mental content intended to improve on Kant's transcendental idealism.

Aaron Glasser: My first year at Michigan was better than expected: it has been a joy to meet and find friends within this department. Being able to spend most of my time on philosophy with these people has been an incredible privilege. Last year, I organized several reading groups, was able to present my work in Italy, and became excited about a few new projects. I am looking forward to continuing this work next year, in addition to co-organizing Spring Colloquium, the Mind and Moral Psychology Group, and the department's much needed weekly tea.

Gabrielle Kerbel: When we began the school year, I didn't anticipate that we would still be watching out for covid and wearing masks in class. It made for a strange start to graduate school, but I'm glad that it didn't get in the way of the incoming cohorts getting to know each other. I'm currently spending my summer away from Michigan to attend two summer schools (one about laws of nature and the other about entropy/time). I'm looking forward to returning to Ann Arbor, being a GSI for foundations of rational choice theory, and getting back to coursework in the fall.

Lindy Ortiz: In just a few words I would describe my first year as exciting, challenging, and fascinating. I have learned so much from course work and from spending time with people in the department. I am grateful for the resources and the encouragement to participate in the department events and service work along with participating in conferences and reading groups. I am not the biggest fan of Michigan weather and I do miss the ocean and my family very much. However, I have enjoyed my time here and I am looking forward to seeing what future years have to offer.

Josh Petersen: I had a fantastic first year at U-M! Between classes, departmental events, and impromptu coffee chats, it was so nice to be doing philosophy in person again! I've loved getting to work closely with my fellow PhD students to organize our local MAP chapter and last year's Spring Colloquium. Outside the department, I had a great time visiting (almost) every Ann Arbor coffee shop, playing in a local piano trio, and exploring the city's many parks. I've also been able to continue my environmental advocacy - in Fall '21, I co-authored the report: *They Didn't Pay Us For Our Memories,* which documented environmental racism and corporate abuse in Louisiana and received coverage in *The Guardian*, *The New Yorker*, and *Vice*.

Valerie Trudel: I had a great first year at Michigan; both the coursework and the opportunity to engage with my peers in reading groups and other forms of extracurricular discussion have greatly expanded my philosophical interests and skill-set. I'm excited to be involved in more activities around the department in the coming year (such as co-organizing COMPASS and the Race, Gender, and Feminist Philosophy reading group) and am looking forward to learning about the new ideas and approaches I'm sure to encounter.

Margot Witte: When I think back on this year, I'm struck by how absurdly grateful I am that we could all meet, philosophize, and do our general merry-making in person! After two-ish years of Zoom meetings and isolation, I feel very fortunate to have started my PhD here in Ann Arbor. The Philosophy Department is full of such excellent people, and it's been wonderful to develop both productive working relationships and deep friendships. I even survived my first Michigan winter, thanks to Yaktrax, polar plunges in Barton Pond, and an obscene amount of hot chocolate.

Sophia Wushanley: I was a co-organizer of the 2022 Spring Colloquium and a founding organizer of the Knowledge, Information, and Society (KIS) RIW. I also had the pleasure of organizing the department's Women and Gender Minorities' (WGM) Coffee. Outside the department, I joined MAP International as an organizer. Over the summer, I ran a reading group on the subject of artificial intelligence. This year, in addition to KIS and WGM Coffee, I have taken up the role of Co-Director of MAP International.

Yixuan Wu: I'm grateful that I was able to start the program in person last fall. Through taking classes and interacting with people in the philosophy community, my philosophy interests are further developed and broadened. I really enjoyed living in Ann Arbor, especially because of the summer outdoor activities here. I look forward to starting to teach next semester! My current interests lie in philosophy of social science and epistemology.

Recent Graduate News

Elise Woodard (PhD 2022) defended her dissertation, *Inquiring Further: Essays on Epistemic Normativity*, under the supervision of Sarah Moss and Brian Weatherson. Her dissertation defends the importance of epistemic norms and what she calls 'inquiring further' which is a familiar practice we all engage in when we redeliberate, gather more evidence, or double-check our beliefs. Elise will be the Stalnaker Postdoc Associate at MIT during 22/23, and will begin a TT position at Syracuse University in Fall 2023. Elise was also a recipient of the 2022 Sanders Graduate Award from the APA.

Angela Sun (PhD 2022) defended her dissertation, *Essays on Integrated Agency*, under the supervision of Sarah Buss. Her dissertation offers an account of the role of integrity in our agency. She argues that the unification of the various facets of our agency into a coherent whole is essential for our self-governance: our ability to be the authors of our own lives and to act in ways that reflect what we stand for. Angela will begin a TT position at Washington and Lee University in Fall 2022. Angela was also this year's recipient of the departmental Charles L. Stevenson Prize (for excellence in a dissertation dossier).

Guus Duindam (PhD 2022) defended his dissertation, *An Interpretation and Defense of the Supreme Principle of Morality*, under the supervision of Sarah Buss. His dissertation offers a full defense of Kant's FUL - Formula of Universal Law, which few philosophers believe that it succeeds but few have understood what it means. Guus (JD '21 U-M Law) currently works as a judicial law clerk for the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals.

Josh Hunt (PhD 2022) defended his dissertation, *Symmetry and Reformulation: On Intellectual Progress in Science and Math*, under the supervision of Laura Ruetsche and Gordon Belot. His dissertation defends an account of the nature and value of compatible formulations. He argues that reformulations often provide a kind of objective, non-practical, epistemic value (which he calls "intellectual significance"). Meeting the constitutive aims of science and mathematics requires reformulating. Josh has accepted a postdoc postion at MIT during 22/23. Beginning Fall 2023, he will begin a TT position at Syracuse University.

Joseph Shin (PhD 2022) defended his dissertation, *In the Wake of Wrong: Essays on the Ethics of Blame, the Reactive Attitudes, and Apologies*, under the supervision of Sarah Buss and Brian Weatherson. His dissertation explains that moral norms are bound to be broken and when they are broken - and we are aware of it - we respond in characteristic ways such as feeling guilt, the need to apologize, and seeking forgiveness. Similarly, we respond to the wrongdoing of others with resentment or indignation or sanctions. Joe will begin a postdoc at Calvin University, Fall 2022.

Jonathan Sarnoff (PhD 2022) defended his dissertation, *Crimes and Risks*, under the supervision of Gabe Mendlow and Brian Weatherson. His dissertation analyzes three legal doctrines that regulate unintentional aspects of criminal conduct - liability, recklessness, and negligence. He addresses the extent of liability as well as its scope: each presents an account of one of the two types of *mens rea* used to define unintentional crimes. For 22/23, Jonathan will hold a clerkship position with the SD of NY, followed by a clerkship with the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals in 2023.

Laura Soter (PhD 2022) defended her dissertation, *Acceptance, Belief & Partiality: Topics in Doxastic Control, the Ethics of Belief, and the Moral Psychology of Relationships,* under the supervision of Peter Railton and Ethan Kross. Her dissertation contains both a philosophical and a psychological project and together they explore two central themes: doxastic control and the ethics of belief, and the moral epistemic import of close personal relationships. She was the recipient of this year's departmental Special Prize for Leadership in Cocurricular Enrichment (SPLICE) award. Laura has accepted a postdoc at Duke in Cognitive Science during 22/23.

Lingxi Chenyang (PhD 2022; JD 2020) has been appointed as an Associate Professor of Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. Lingxi was a joint JD/PhD student studying at both Yale and U-M. Her scholarship focuses on the intersection of property law, climate law, and food and environmental law. While at Indiana University Bloomington as an Environmental Law Fellow at the Environmental Resilience Institute, she published *Farming with Trees: Reforming U.S. Farm Policy to Expand Agroforestry and Mitigate Climate Change*, an examination of policy obstacles to climate-friendly agroforestry systems. She plans to defend her dissertation (title TBD) in December 2022.

Mercy Corredor (PhD 2022) defended her dissertation, *Expressing Emotions for Sexual Equality*, under the supervision of Elizabeth Anderson. Her dissertation explores how emotions and emotional processes operate under conditions of injustice. Further, she seeks to know how these emotions either aid or inhibit our ability to see and feel the appeal of living in a society of equals. Mercy will begin a TT position at VA Tech in Fall 2022.

Alumni News

Laura Schroeter (PhD 1999): has been promoted from Sr. Lecturer to Associate Professor, School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne. Her interests include epistemology, metaphilosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of action, and philosophy of language. She has written extensively on two-dimensional semantics, concept individuation, and normative concepts.

Andrea Westlund (PhD 2002): beginning Fall 2022, was promoted from Associate Professor to Professor, Florida State University. She specializes in ethics, moral psychology, and feminist philosophy as well as philosophy of action, social and political philosopy and philosophy of law. She currently serves as Director of Graduate Admissions and the Women's, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Steering Committee.

Blain Neufeld (PhD 2003): is Professor of Philosophy and Director of Graduate Studies, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee. His research focuses on political philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of action, and teaching interests also include applied ethics. He served as department chair from 2018-2021. He is the author of *Public Reason and Political Autonomy* (Routledge, 2022) as well as numerous articles.



Christopher Dodsworth (PhD 2007): Professor of Philosophy at Spring Hill College since 2018, specializing in philosophy of religion and metaphysics. He teaches courses in logic, philosophy of religion, bioethics, contemporary epistemology, as well as theology including graduate courses on Aquinas.

Liz Goodnick (PhD 2010): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, Metropolitan State University of Denver. She has published on the philosophy of David Hume, on consequences of the cognitive science of religion, and ethics of food. She is currently working on women philosophers in the Early Modern Period.

Ivan Mayerhofer (PhD 2010): was hired as Co-ordinator of Interfaith Programs, Buddhist & Interfaith Associate Chaplin, and Meditation Initiative Director at Davidson College. In 2012, he received his MA from University of Colorado - Boulder from the Department of Religious Studies, where his focus was on contemporary Buddhist studies. His final project, "Emergent Orientalisms", investigates contemporary discourses in light of the ongoing and lasting legacy of Orientalism in Buddhist Studies and U.S. Buddhisms. Ivan has practiced and taught Buddhism since 2007.

David Plunkett (PhD 2010): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Associate Professor to Professor, Dartmouth College. His core areas of current research include ethics (especially metaethics), philosophy of Law, philosophy of language, philosophical methodology, epistemology, and social/political philosophy. He will be a Humboldt Research Fellow with Humboldt Universität zu Berlin as well as a Visiting Fellow with Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin (Institute for Advanced Study) during 23-24.

Amanda Roth (PhD 2010): beginning Fall 2022, was promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, SUNY Geneseo. Her main areas of specialization include moral and political philosophy, bioethics, feminist philosophy, and gender and sexuality. She holds a joint appointment with both the Philosophy Department and Women's and Gender Studies. In 21-22, she organized a Carceral Studies Learning Community for faculty across disciplines.

More Alumni News

Lei Zhong (PhD 2010) beginning Fall 2021, has been promoted to Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He mainly works in philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and metaphysics, striving to develop a robust version of anti-reductionism about mentality and morality. (He aims to address relatively "big" philosophical issues in his articles.) He has also written in epistemology (explanation; intuition), political philosophy (liberalism; distributive justice), and comparative philosophy (Confucianism), and is currently working on a five-year project, "An Emergentist Theory of Mind", supported by the RGC Research Fellow Scheme of Hong Kong Research Grants Council ($5.2 million; 01/2022-12/2026). As a leading Chinese analytic philosopher, his research has regularly appeared in top philosophy journals and stimulated many responses and discussions in reputable peer-reviewed venues. His account of mental causation is listed in the key works of the "Exclusion Problem" entry in the PhilPapers index, and also acknowledged in major reference resources (such as *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and *Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy*). He received the Research Excellence Award of CUHK in 2020.

Alexandra Plakias (PhD 2011): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, Hamilton College. Her research focuses on issues in moral psychology, such as the role of evolution and culture in our moral values. She has also written about moral relativism and the role of empirical research in philosophical theorizing.

Stephen Campbell (PhD 2012): beginning Fall 2022, was promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, Bentley University. He holds a joint Fellow-in-Residence with Harvard University's EJ Safra Center for Ethics and the Harvard Medical School Center for Bioethics. His research focuses on ethics, healthcare ethics, business ethics, philosophy of disability, and philosophy of technology.

Sven Nyholm (PhD 2012): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, Utrecht University, Ethics Institute. His research focuses on applied ethics, robots and artificial intelligence, practical philosophy, and ethics of technology. He has written on topics such as the ethics of self-driving cars, humanoid robots, autonomous weapons systems, deep brain stimulation, human enhancement, and self-tracking technologies.

Jason Konek (PhD 2013): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Lecture to Senior Lecturer, University of Bristol. His research covers a range of topics in formal epistemology and decision theory. He has also been investigating the foundations and applications of epistemic utility theory.

Alex Silk (PhD 2013): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, University of Birmingham. He specializes in philosophy of language, ethics, and metaphysics. His main research projects include work on context-sensitive language and normative and evaluative discourse, as well as projects on Nietzsche, predication, philosophy of law, and mood.

Nathaniel Adam Tobias ~~Coleman~~ (PhD 2013): is currently an independent scholar-activist and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Warwick. He is also the Public Engagement Co-ordinator for Citizens Researching Together at the University of Bristol. He writes extensively and primarily on the subject of slavery. During his time as a Research Associate in Critical Philosophy of Race at University College London, he was named Online Communicator of the Year for a magnitude of vital public work alongside his research.

Ira Lindsay (PhD 2014): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Senior Lecturer to Reader with University of Surrey, School of Law. He also teaches taxation and property law. His publications have appeared in *Legal Theory, Florida Tax Review, Santa Clara Law Review, Columbia Journal of European Law,* and *Studies in the History of Tax Law*.

Chloe Armstrong (PhD 2015): beginning Fall 2022, has been promoted from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor, Lawrence University. Her research focuses primarily on early modern philosophy and she also has an interest in Leibniz's subsequent intellectual influence, contemporary metaphysics and epistemology, and early analytic philosophy.

Robin Zheng (PhD 2015): is a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Her research interests range from ethics, moral psychology, feminist, social, and political philosophy, especially with issues of moral responsibility, structural injustice, and social change, with an emphasis on issues of gender, race, and social inequality. She is the Associate Editor of *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*, and co-editor of the De Gruyter "Transforming Political Philosophy" book series. She has served as a member of the APA Task Force on Diversity and Inclusion and on the APA Task Force on a Good Practices Guide. As a bit of departmental history, Robin co-founded the Michigan chapter of the Minorities in Philosophy (MAP) network and also helped to co-found other departmental outreach programs including the Michigan High School Ethics Bowl (see page 37 for related article).

Rohan Sud (PhD 2016): beginning Fall 2022, will be joining the faculty at Virginia Tech as a tenure track assistant professor. Rohan works primarily at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of language, with special focus on issues related to vagueness, indeterminacy of meaning, and meta-ontology. He has additional interests in meta-ethics (especially expressivism), philosophical logic, formal epistemology, and rational choice theory. He has several forthcoming articles including "Quantifier Variance, Vague Existence, and Metaphysical Vagueness" (forthcoming in *The Journal of Philosophy*) and "Metaphysical Semantics vs. Ground on Questions of Realism" (forthcoming in *Analysis*).

Nils-Hennes Stear (PhD 2016): is a Research Associate with the Universität Hamburg and the 2022 Humboldt Research Fellowship for Postdoctoral Researchers, Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. His research concerns a number of topics in aethetics and ethics. His current book project (funded by the Humboldt Stiftung) addresses the relationship between ethical and aesthetic value in artworks, in particular whether an artwork's ethical value ever determines its aethetic value and how. Other publications include *202X Beyond Moralism* (under contract with Oxford U Press), "Autonomism" (forthcoming in *Oxford Handbook of Ethics & Art*), and "The Qua Problem" (forthcoming in *The British Journal of Aethetics*).

Boris Babic (PhD 2017): beginning Fall 2021, began as an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at University of Toronto. He has a joint appointment with Philosophy and the Department of Statistics. His primary research interests are questions in Bayesian inference and decision-making and normative questions in the implementation of artificial intelligence and machine learning. He is also a faculty affiliate of the Schwartz Reisman Institute and a visiting professor in the Decision Sciences department at INSEAD. He has authored many publications including "Approximate Coherentism and Luck" (*Philosophy of Science*, 2021)

Nina Windgätter (PhD 2017): has been promoted from Lecturer to Senior Lecturer, University of New Hampshire. Her research interests include business ethics, ethical theory, feminism, and political philosophy. She is also very passionate about pedagogy, and strives to teach classes that are meaningful for her students' lives.

Sara Aronowitz (PhD 2018): beginning Fall 2022, will be an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at University of Toronto - St George. Her research interests are in cognitive science, epistemology, Islamic Philosophy, and philosophy of science. She also studies learning and memory in humans, machines, and idealized thinkers. Recent publications include "Semanticization Challenges the Episodic-Semantic Distinction" (Forthcoming in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*) and "The Parts of an Imperfect Agent" (forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Philosophy*).

Zoë A. Johnson King (PhD 2018): beginning Fall 2022, will be an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Harvard. Her research interests are mostly in non-ideal moral psychology ("thoughts about motivation and creditworthiness for messy humans in an unjust world"). She has several forthcoming papers including "The Slow Clap Phenomenon", "Coat-Checkers are People Too", and "Reluctant Heroes".

Shai Madjar (PhD 2018): is currently completing his residency with U-M Department of Psychiatry. His areas of interest include philosophy of emotion, medical ethics and medical education. His clinical interests include anxiety, mood, and personality. He noted recently how grateful he was to be working and studying at U-M for he feels it is unusually committed to interdisciplinary thinking and scholarship which are important in a field such as psychiatry. Shai received the *Dean's Commendation for Excellence in Clinical Skills and the Art of Medicine* award in 2021.

Mara Bollard (PhD 2018): has been promoted from Assistant Director to Associate Director of the Weinberg Institute for Cognitive Science, University of Michigan. Her primary research and teaching interests lie at the intersection of philosophical ethics and cognitive science.

And Even More Alumni News

Eli Lichtenstein (PhD 2019): Following three years as a LEO Lec I with UM Philosophy, Eli began a position as a Teaching Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. He specializes in philosophy of science & technology, aesthetics, and the history of late modern philosophy. His research centers on value in science, the environmental ethics of human control over nature, and how modern science and technology relate to other forms of understanding - such as art, religion, or aesthetic experience. Recent publications include "Revaluing Laws of Nature in Secularized Science" (*Jerusalem Studies in Philosophy and History of Science*, pp 347-377, 2022).

Steven Schaus (PhD 2019): after graduating from Harvard Law, a clerkship for the US Court of Appeals, DC Circuit, and a two-year postdoc at the Project on the Foundations of Private Law at Harvard, Steve joined the U-M Law School as an Assistant Professor of Law in Fall 2022. He teaches and writes about tort law, remedies, and moral and legal philosophy. He teaches torts, which he sees as a foundation for legal study and practice. He plans to offer future classes in remedies and restitution as well as courses dealing with philosophical questions. His recent research focuses on various tort doctrines and other private doctrines in an effort to learn more about the connections between legal institutions and everyday moral concerns, and the interactions between them. His publications have appeared in *Notre Dame Law Review*, *Yale Law Journal Forum*, and *Michi-*

Kevin Blackwell (PhD 2020): currently a Research Associate at the University of Bristol, presented "An IP Solution to the Two-Envelopes Problem at the Formal Rationality Forum Talk." He argued that extant, precise analyses of the two-envelopes problem are not fully satisfactory. Although it is true that concerns about conditionally convergent series block the argument from conditional expected value to unconditional expected value, this is only a partial resolution. His current project is entitled "Epistemic Utility for Imprecise Probability."

Van Tu (PhD 2020): beginning Fall 2022, will be an Assistant Professor, California State University - San Bernardino, where she focuses her research on Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy.

Are you a UM Phil Alum? Please let us know so we can add your updated bio to *The Grue, Michigan Philosophy News*. Please send to phil-exec-sec@umich.edu

Visiting Scholars for 22/23

Richard Booth (PhD 2022, Columbia): Postdoc Research Fellow for 22/23. His dissertation, *Underspecific Modals*, discussed a semantic account of underspecific language in modal contexts that solves longstanding problems in natural language semantics and philosophical logic, including Ross's puzzle, the puzzle of free choice permission, and the Samaritan paradox. His research focuses on philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and philosophy of the mind. He will be teaching PHIL 409, Philosophy of Language, during Winter 2023.

Chris Hom (Texas Tech): Visiting Scholar for 22/23. He was this year's speaker for our Department Colloquium on October 7th and presented "Racial Epithets Under Quotation" (with Robert May), where he noted the "well-documented problem for truth-conditional theories of racial epithets called the *Projection Problem* where the offensiveness of such language appears to project or 'scope out' of various truth-functional and intensional operators". His research areas include philosophy of language and metaphysics, specifically on the topics of racial slurs, structured propositions, and normative language. His book *Moral and Semantic Innocence* (tentative title) with R. May is under contract with MIT Press.

EDGe Update

by Abdul Ansari (Co-Coordinator)

The University of Michigan's philosophy department has a lively tradition of excellence in philosophical ethics going back to the late 19th century. Our Ethics Discussion Group (EDGe) is committed, in its small way, to contributing to the survival of this tradition of excellent ethical philosophy--broadly construed to capture meta-ethics and normative theory, in addition to political philosophy and applied ethics. From Fall 2021-Winter 2022, EDGe invited speakers from outside the department: notably, last fall, Connie Rosati from the University of Texas, Austin, who presented on the nature of well-being and its suitability or fit with persons. EDGe also started a works-in-progress group--for faculty and grad students alike--that plans to restart this year. We also have planned a host of speaker invites, a workshop idea, and a reading group--so stay tuned on the department listserv and website for more information!

COMPASS Update

by Julian Rome (2021 Cohort)

COMPASS@Michigan 2022 took place October 20-22, organized by Gabrielle Kerbel, Lindy Ortiz, Julian Rome, and Valerie Trudel. We welcomed 11 participants to Ann Arbor for a weekend of philosophical discussion and mentorship. Participants arrived from a range of colleges and universities across the United States, as well as Canada and Scotland. This year's COMPASS workshop also featured a pilot program for Michigan undergraduates: Yuan Fang, Joshua Harrington, and Marley Hornewer joined as participants and co-organizers. They helped with logistical aspects of organizing the weekend as well as co-facilitated paper discussion sessions with Valerie, Lindy, and Gabrielle. As always, the workshop was made possible by participation across the department. Kristie Dotson delivered the opening remarks; Ariana Peruzzi, Joshua Petersen, and Julian Rome presented flash talks on their current research projects; Gillian Gray and Rebecca Harrison joined for the graduate student panel; fifteen graduate students served as mentors for participants; and Anna Edmonds and Janum Sethi joined for the faculty panel. Participants have reported increased confidence in graduate applications, feeling more welcome in the field, having made connections here and with other participants, and simply having had an enjoyable and enriching experience.

COMPASS Organizers: Valerie Trudel, Julian Rome, Gabrielle Kerbel, Lindy Ortiz

COMPASS@Michigan 2022 Participants

A2 Ethics Bowl Recap

by Julian Rome (2021 Cohort)

The University of Michigan Philosophy Department was well-represented in this year's Michigan High School Ethics Bowl! It was expertly organized by Laura Soter, Adam Waggoner, and Abdul Ansari, in collaboration with A2Ethics and teachers and staff at the schools involved.

Coaches included Abdul Ansari, Francisco Calderón, Sarah Colquhoun, Ben Ordiway, Lindy Ortiz, Neil Sykes, Adam Waggoner, and Maria Waggoner. Ethics Bowl coaches met with teams regularly throughout the year to teach them ethical theories, guide them through the cases, and prepare them for the competition.

Judges from the department included Kevin Craven, Rebecca Harrison, Sumeet Patwardhan, Julian Rome, Janum Sethi, Angela Sun, and Margot Witte. We also had some philosophy alumni judges: Mara Bollard, Zoë Johnson King, Eduardo Martinez, and Robin Zheng. The judging role involved scoring teams on clarity, identification of the central moral issues of the cases, thoroughness of arguments, respectfulness in dialogue, and responses to questions from the opposing team and from the judges themselves.

The Bowl took place virtually on February 5-6, 2022, with teams joining remotely from their classrooms and judges and moderators joining from home. Cases, submitted by community members, covered COVID issues, healthcare issues more generally, access to clean drinking water, drug use, and many other interesting and important ethical scenarios. Matches were structured as follows: the case was presented by the moderator, and, after a short prep time, the first team would present their arguments. Then, the second team would give a commentary on the first team's arguments, asking questions and suggesting additional considerations. The first team would then respond to the second team's comments. After the response, the judges would each ask a question of the team, and the team would respond in turn. This was then repeated with a different case, the second team giving the arguments, and the winner was determined based on the judges' scores for each team.

In the opening rounds, Greenhills and Avondale were the (tied) top-scorers, followed by Skyline, Huron, University Liggett, and Saline. In the Quarterfinals, Huron, Skyline, Avondale, and Saline came out in the lead. In the Semifinals, it came down to Avondale and Huron. Huron won the final round, earning the title of this year's champion. Huron will become the keepers of The Hemlock Cup for the year, eligible for a Regional Playoff and a trip to the National Bowl at the University of North Carolina's Parr Center for Ethics in Chapel Hill in early April. Congratulations to Huron! And, thank you to the organizers, coaches, and volunteers who made this event possible.

Minorities and Philosophy (MAP) Indigenous Peoples Day Symposium - Oct. 10, 2022

by Rachel Mintz, as appearing in the 10/11/22 Michigan Daily

Federal Indian Law Expert Talks Tribal Governance, Ogemakaan at Indigenous People's Day Symposium (presented by UM Philosophy's MAP Organization)

About 30 Michigan residents and University of Michigan students gathered in the Pond Room of the Michigan Union to attend the Indigenous People's Day Symposium Monday evening. Titled "The Rise and Fall of the Ogemakaan," the symposium featured **Matthew L. M. Fletcher**, the Harry Burns Hutchins Collegiate Professor of Law and LSA professor of American Culture, who spoke about the legal and political philosophy of modern Anishinaabe tribes.

The symposium was organized by the University of Michigan chapter of Minorities and Philosophy (MAP), a student-run organization that aims to address structural injustices and remove barriers for marginalized groups in philosophy. The event began with Rackham student **Margot Witte**, one of the organizers of the event, acknowledging that the University stands on land that was given by the Anishinaabeg tribes.

The Anishinaabe is a collective name for groups of indigenous people who live in the United States and Canada and include tribes such as the Odawa, Bodewadmi and Ojibwe communities.

Fletcher spoke about his research on the rise and fall of the Ogemakaan, a term coined to describe "artificial leaders" within the Anishinaabe tribes who encourage hierarchy and political opportunism rather than prioritizing the interests of their constituents. According to Fletcher, the Anishinaabeg people elect their leaders — called the Ogemaag — to act as true representatives of their people. He said he learned about Ogemakaan by reading work from other experts who study Native Americans in the United States.

"So, if you add this -kaan suffix to Ogemaag, what it meant according to this phrase book was 'artificial,'" Fletcher said. "It said artificial leader, and then in parentheses it said 'the elected official' basically and then fake."

Fletcher, a University alum, is connected to Michigan's Native American community as a member of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa Chippewa Indians. Fletcher also sits on four Anishinaabe appellate courts. As a tribal judge, Fletcher said while some tribes allow the U.S. Department of Interior to oversee their court system, the Grand Traverse Band does not.

"(Being a member of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa Chippewa Indians) gives me an opportunity as a judge to think about (broader U.S.) law in context of Anishinaabe law," Fletcher said. "I've been doing this a long time. I've been a tribal judge for 20 years, and … I'm trying to philosophize about these things."

Fletcher explained that Anishinaabe tribes are divided into seven clans, each based on an animal. "We have a clan system that is rooted in animals," Fletcher said. "We have an enormous amount of respect for animals. We want to be like them in some respects. So we aspire to be like (them and) we are assigned at some point to be a clan."

Fletcher said while elected officials in Anishinaabe tribes face similar challenges to other federal, state and local elected officials, there are greater levels of accountability and leaders rise to power in different ways.

"The amount of accountability that these elected officials have in tribal government is insane," Fletcher said. "They are not co-opted by the oil and gas industry or the prison industrial complex. They're not co-opted by any of that stuff. They're co-opted by their cousins. … They're elevated often by the size of their families. They're elevated by the influence that they themselves have over a relatively small number of people."

Fletcher said tribal governments are unique in that tribal leaders are often not elected because they're talented or well-educated but because of the promises they make to the people they represent and serve.

"Tribal leaders are not necessarily elected because they're any good at anything," Fletcher said. "They're not often educated in the same way that a lot of the bureaucrats are. Often they have great experiences at certain things, but that's not really why they're elected. Often they're elected because they have big families or because maybe they're good public speakers, or more so because they make big promises."

Fletcher said the beginning of the Ogemakaan downfall seemed to stem from corruption in the political system after Congress passed the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which established regulations for gaming on tribal lands. Fletcher explained the legislation allowed Native American tribes to individually send funds to individual members when there is a surplus in casino revenue.

"As soon as people in Michigan started to realize tribal members (and) their casinos were making a little bit of money and (that) you get to do a revenue allocation ordinance and pay out some of that money per cap(ita), that's when tribal politics at Grand Traverse band and probably every tribe in the state of Michigan went totally to shit," Fletcher said.

Attendees also had the opportunity to ask questions about the Anishinaabe governing philosophy. Some questions revolved around the gender representation of elected leaders.

"Traditionally, (women) were at least equal to the dudes, so to speak, in any law," Fletcher said. "There's a tradition of that, I think there's probably a 60-40 split (between) men and women (in elected positions)."

Rackham student **Gabrielle Kerbel**, another MAP organizer, said she was most interested in what Fletcher had to say about the increased corruption after casinos brought more money into the Anishinaabe tribes.

"'I'm really interested in why (Fletcher) thinks this corruption came about and how he thinks it can go away," Kerbel said. "Everything was new to me. So it was wonderful, informative."

Rackham student **Lianghua Zhou**, a MAP co-organizer, said events like the Indigenous People's Day Symposium are aimed to boost philosophical education and try to get more people from different backgrounds to become involved in philosophy.

"This is a great opportunity for us to learn from a professor like Matthew and the kinds of things that he is focusing on his research, showing that there are actually a broader range of philosophical questions that we can ask and that we can resolve to see if we can propose some good theories on them, et cetera," Zhou said. "I think this will be an example for showing that, actually, this is a valuable inquiry and we should pay attention to them."

Our MAP Organizers for 22/23 (clock-wise): Gabrielle Kerbel, Josh Petersen, Lianghua (Glenn) Zhou and Margot Witte

Counterfactual Reasoning in Art Criticism

Angela Sun (UM Philosophy PhD 2022), Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 80 (3): 276-285 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1093/jaac/kpac019

ABSTRACT

When we evaluate artworks, we often point to what an artist *could have done* or what a work *could have been* in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this *counterfactual reasoning in art criticism*. On my account, counterfactual claims about artworks involve comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works. The practice of imagining what an artwork could have been is critically useful because it can help us understand how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects. I conclude by responding to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.

I . INTRODUCTION

In one essay, Leo Steinberg considers how the effect of Pablo Picasso's *Demoiselles d'Avignon* would change if the figures depicted in the painting hadn't been prostitutes. He asks:

> Those five figures in it—did they have to be [prostitutes]? Could the proto-Cubist effects in the right half of the picture—the breakdown of mass and the equalizing of solids and voids—have been accomplished as well with a cast of cardplayers? (Steinberg, 1988, 11)

Later on in the essay, Steinberg decides that Picasso could not have achieved the same effect in *Demoiselles* if he had depicted card players because the sexuality of the figures depicted in the painting serves as a *uniquely* effective complement to the painting's Cubist form:

> The picture is about the image in its otherness locked in with the real world. And like those mystics of old who used sexual metaphor to express union with the divine, so Picasso will have used sexuality to make visible the immediacy of communion with art. Explosive form and erotic content become reciprocal metaphors. (64)

Demoiselles, in Steinberg's view, is not merely a formally revolutionary painting. It also comments on various forms of "otherness": the otherness of cubism and the otherness of the depicted prostitutes. And this meaning would be lost if Picasso had depicted card players.

This article is about the kind of reasoning Steinberg uses in his essay to establish the aesthetic significance of Picasso's depiction of prostitutes in *Demoiselles*. Steinberg does not reach his conclusion merely by considering *Demoiselles as it is*, analyzing the form and composition of the painting as it actually appears. Rather, he asks the reader to imagine what the effect of the painting *would be* if Picasso had chosen to depict card players. The fact that this imagined variation of *Demoiselles*—call it *Joueurs de Cartes d'Avignon*—is less impactful than the actual painting helps Steinberg explain the aesthetic significance of Picasso's depiction of prostitutes in *Demoiselles*.

When we evaluate works of art, we often deploy reasoning like Steinberg's; we consider hypothetical variations of artworks to make judgments of works as they actually are. For instance, we might say of Diane Arbus's photography, "Arbus could have photographed anything she wanted, but chose to photograph marginalized people. Therefore, there must be something significant about the subjects of her photographs." Or we might say of Kara Walker's enormous sugar sphinx sculpture *A Subtlety*, "The effect of the sculpture would completely change if it were made out of clay or plaster, or even some other edible substance like chocolate." When we reason in this way, we point to what an artist *could have done* or what an artwork *could have been* in order to say something about the work as it actually is. Call this *counterfactual reasoning in art criticism*.[1]

Counterfactual reasoning abounds in our discussions of art. We use counterfactual reasoning not only to explain the significance of an artwork's subject matter and the materials from which it's made—as in the two examples above—but also to illustrate how a work of art could be improved (as an art teacher might say to a student, "wouldn't that patch of red in the lower right corner better fit into the composition of your painting if the patch were round rather than rectangular?") and to convey the impression that a work of art leaves on us (as someone might say of Maurizio Cattelan's *Comedian*—a work consisting in a banana duct-taped to a gallery wall that generated considerable buzz in December 2019—"I can't believe I'm seeing this in an art museum; I could have just seen it in my kitchen!"), among other things.

Although we reason counterfactually about artworks all the time, aestheticians have not theorized the mechanisms that make this kind of reasoning possible. My aim in this article is to shed light on one way that counterfactual reasoning in art criticism works. I argue that counterfactual claims about artworks involve a special kind of comparative judgment between actual and hypothetical works of art, where the hypothetical works are just like actual ones in some but not all respects. By positing hypothetical counterparts to actual artworks and being clear about what features of the actual works we are holding fixed and which we are altering, we can explain how artworks achieve specific aesthetic effects.

The article proceeds as follows. I begin in Section II with a discussion of comparative aesthetic judgments. In Section III, I provide an account of hypothetical artworks. In Section IV, I bring the ideas developed in the previous two sections together to explain why counterfactual reasoning in art criticism should be understood as involving comparative aesthetic judgments between actual and hypothetical artworks. In Section V, I respond to an objection to my account on the basis that it violates the widely accepted acquaintance principle in aesthetics, on which aesthetic judgments must be based on firsthand perceptual encounters with their objects.

My aim in this article is not to provide a single theory that explains all instances of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. Rather, it is to shed light on what I think is an especially important way that we reason counterfactually about artworks. Given the diversity of counterfactual claims in discussions about art, I doubt that a single theory could capture them all. But I hope that this article generates discussion about an explanatory tool that is so commonly used, yet so poorly understood.

II. COMPARATIVE AESTHETIC JUDGMENTS

An aesthetic judgment is a judgment of an object that requires a special sensitivity or perceptiveness to make. Consider the difference between claiming that a sculpture is elegant and that a sculpture is gold. To make the latter claim, one need only have the ability to perceive color, but to make the former, one must possess a special aesthetic sensitivity. What exactly this sensitivity amounts to is admittedly vague and difficult to define non-circularly, and I do not attempt to provide an account of it here.[2] But there is clearly a sense in which some ability is required to see that an object is, say, subtle, harmonious, or vivid, that is not required to see that it is red, circular, or flat.[3]

Most aesthetic judgments involve a single object. For instance, you might say that Mondrian's De Stijl *Composition with Red Blue and Yellow*—with its characteristic black grid and patches of primary colors—is balanced. In making this judgment, you attribute an aesthetic quality to a single object. To explain your judgment of Mondrian's *Composition*, you might point to some of the work's nonaesthetic qualities (for instance, the fact that the effect of a large red patch in the upper right of the painting is counteracted by a smaller but equally vivid patch of blue in the lower left) that make the work balanced.

Theories of aesthetic judgment tend to focus on aesthetic judgments of individual objects.[4] But these are not the only aesthetic judgments we make. We also make aesthetic judgments of *collections* of objects, such as the works in an artist's oeuvre or a collection of works in an exhibit. For instance, you might judge that Georgia O'Keefe's landscapes are, as a whole, *dramatic*. Aesthetic judgments of oeuvres demand different justifications than aesthetic judgments of individual objects. You cannot point to the nonaesthetic qualities of a single member of an oeuvre to explain your aesthetic judgment; rather, you must identify *themes* that run through the oeuvre to use as a basis for your judgment about the oeuvre as a whole. For instance, although you could not point to the rugged mountains in *Black Mesa Landscape* to justify the claim that O'Keefe's landscapes are dramatic, you could point out that rough, rocky terrain is *characteristic* of O'Keefe's landscapes as a basis for the judgment of her oeuvre.

In addition to judgments of individual works and oeuvres, we also make uniquely *comparative* aesthetic judgments. When we make a comparative aesthetic judgment, we judge that a work has some aesthetic quality *relative* to some other work, even though it might not have that quality *simpliciter*. Suppose you are comparing one of Rothko's giant color block canvases to a Pollock drip painting. You judge that the Rothko is more *serene* than the Pollock, since the Rothko appears static, while the Pollock, with its dynamic splashes of paint, appears to depict movement. Although you think that the Rothko is more serene than the Pollock, you might not conclude that the Rothko is serene without qualification.[5] Indeed, you might think that the Rothko is far from serene. Considered alone, you might find the Rothko ominous or severe. But this need not invalidate your comparative judgment of the Rothko and the Pollock.

Picasso | Demoiselles d'Avignon (1907)



Georgia O'Keeffe | Black Mesa Landscape (1930)

The Silence of the Lambs (1991)

Star Wars (1977)

Given that claims we make about artworks in comparison to others need not translate into claims about the artworks alone, one might wonder what the point of making comparative aesthetic judgments is. What understanding do comparative aesthetic judgments confer? Admittedly, comparisons between artworks that are vastly different may not confer much by way of understanding. That *The Silence of the Lamb*s is more suspenseful than *Clueless* is so obvious that it is hardly worth stating. But comparisons between works that are alike in some interesting sense can be extremely illuminating. For instance, considering how two suspenseful films achieve suspense in different ways and to varying degrees of success is a useful critical exercise. The comparison can make it easier to identify the features of the more suspenseful film that make it more successful in that respect.

I am interested in comparative aesthetic judgments because they appear to be the judgments at play when we reason counterfactually about artworks. On my view, when we make a counterfactual aesthetic claim, we compare an *actual* artwork to a *hypothetical variation* of that work. Just as comparing two suspenseful films can help us figure out why one better achieves a suspenseful effect than another, comparing a work of art to a hypothetical variation of it can help us get clearer on how or whether an actual artwork achieves some aesthetic effect.

III. HYPOTHETICAL ARTWORKS

What is a hypothetical variation of an actual artwork? I opened this article with an excerpt from Leo Steinberg's essay on Picasso's *Demoiselles d'Avignon*. Here is my take on what he does in the essay. Steinberg posits a hypothetical variation of *Demoiselles*—which I called *Joueurs de Cartes d'Avignon*— that is just like *Demoiselles* except in its depiction of card players instead of prostitutes. By comparing *Demoiselles* to this variation, he is able to judge that Demoiselles' depiction of prostitutes serves as a uniquely effective complement to the painting's Cubist form.

Steinberg's counterfactual claim about *Demoiselles* is informative. Insofar as it explains why some feature of the painting (in this case, what the painting depicts) has the aesthetic effect that it does, it helps us gain a deeper understanding of the painting. But after some thought, the informativeness of Steinberg's counterfactual claim might seem puzzling. How can some made-up work of art help us gain an understanding—let alone a deep understanding—of an actual artwork?

When Steinberg reasons counterfactually about *Demoiselles*, he introduces a hypothetical variation of the painting that depicts card players rather than prostitutes. This is not a "random" variation of the painting; Steinberg is clear that he has in mind a painting that is just like *Demoiselles*, except in what it depicts. This is important: when we introduce hypothetical variations of actual artworks, we must be clear about what in the actual work we are holding fixed and what we are changing. Counterfactual claims about artworks that are not clear in this respect are not informative: they do not help us gain a deeper understanding of works of art. Although claiming simply that a work of art "could have been better" without specifying exactly what would have made the artwork better might be *suggestive*—such a claim might, for instance, prompt aesthetically insightful counterfactual inquiry into the work and how it could be improved—the claim is not informative.

Obviously, it is not possible to change only what a work of art depicts and keep everything else about it perfectly fixed. If we change the figures depicted in *Demoiselles* to card players, we will also need to change the painting's composition (as the figures would need to be seated around a table rather than standing with their arms crossed seductively over their heads) and the painting's colors (the figures in *Demoiselles* are nude, but the figures in *Joueurs de Cartes* would be clothed, so there would be fewer flesh tones in the hypothetical painting), among other things. Indeed, we may want to question whether *Joueurs de Cartes* is truly a hypothetical *variation of Demoiselles*, or whether it should be considered a hypothetical artwork in its own right.[6] I argue below that there are limits to what one may alter in a hypothetical artwork to use it in one's judgment of an actual work. This suggests that *Joueurs de Cartes* is a variation of *Demoiselles*; if it were a hypothetical artwork in its own right, it would not be subject to such constraints. But what I am most interested in is the idea of forming aesthetic judgments of hypothetical artworks, whether they are variations of actual artworks or artworks in their own right. Therefore, the question of a hypothetical work's identity is not crucial to my argument.

Although a painting that is "just like" *Demoiselles* except in what it depicts would not be like *Demoiselles* at all, we do not experience any imaginative resistance when asked to picture the hypothetical painting. Although we are asked to picture something quite bizarre, we do not need to exercise any particularly "violent effort" to do so; indeed, when asked to bring this hypothetical painting to mind, most of us do not bat an eye (Hume 1987, 247, quoted in Gendler 2000, 56). (One hypothesis for the lack of imaginative resistance we experience when asked to bring to mind different versions of an artwork is that, often, there is nothing of great *moral* significance at stake by changing certain features of an artwork. Since the puzzle of imaginative resistance is typically framed as the puzzle of explaining the difficulty of imagining fictional worlds that are morally deviant, not aesthetically deviant, it is unsurprising that we do not experience imaginative resistance when reasoning counterfactually about artworks (Gendler 2000, 56).) There is much more to be said about what picturing a hypothetical variation of a painting amounts to, and I will return to this topic in Section V when I discuss the trouble that the acquaintance principle poses for my account. But for now, I will take it for granted that we are very good at imagining hypothetical variations of artworks.

One question that arises at this point is whether there are restrictions on the kinds of modifications we can make in hypothetical variations of artworks. In what follows, I consider two constraints we might want to impose on hypothetical variations of artworks. The first constraint is that the proposed changes be reasonable given contextual facts about the time and place that the work was created. The second is that the proposed changes be under the artist's control. I argue that only the first of these is a legitimate constraint on hypothetical variations of artworks.

Let us start with the first constraint—that the proposed changes in the hypothetical artwork be reasonable given contextual facts about the actual artwork. I will use a simplistic example as a starting point. Let us suppose that I say, in my evaluation of Michelangelo's *David*, that while the work is sculpted from marble, it *could have been sculpted* from another material, but no other material would have so powerfully captured *David's* beauty.

If I wish for my counterfactual claim to constitute an aesthetic judgment of *David*, there are limits to what I may say the work could have been sculpted from. Terracotta, bronze, and wood are some examples of materials from which it's fair to say Michelangelo could have sculpted *David*, given facts about what materials were available to artists in sixteenth-century Florence. On the other hand, materials such as sugar and chocolate would *not* have been available for Michelangelo to sculpt from. These materials were, however, available for Kara Walker to work with in creating *A Subtlety* in twenty-first-century America. Therefore, it is reasonable to introduce a hypothetical variation of *A Subtlety* made out of chocolate rather than sugar, but unreasonable to introduce a hypothetical variation of *David* made out of chocolate rather than marble.

My point is not that it is never a useful exercise to consider what artworks could have been like in the absence of cultural, historical, and physical constraints. It might be a very useful exercise for a present-day sculptor to consider a chocolate version of *David* in the process of creating their work. My point is that it is unreasonable to use a chocolate version of *David* in one's aesthetic judgment of *David*. To illustrate this, consider how it is unreasonable to judge the original *Star Wars* films against contemporary film standards. Part of what makes *Star Wars* great is its innovation and originality; these are context-specific (rather than purely perceptual) qualities that today's audience cannot fully appreciate when watching the films. If *Star Wars* were released in its original form today, it would not have the aesthetic value that it does. But it is unreasonable to judge the film on that basis. (The same point can be made of a myriad of artworks. Contemporary audiences may understandably find *Psycho* tame and unfrightening, given how graphic and gory horror films are today. But it is unreasonable to count that as a mark against *Psycho* in one's judgment of the work's aesthetic quality.) All this is to say that when a hypothetical artwork is introduced *in order to make a judgment of an actual work*, the hypothetical work may vary from its actual counterpart only in respects that are reasonable given the context in which the actual work was made.

Another constraint that might be tempting to impose on what can be altered in hypothetical artworks is that the altered features must have been in an important sense *under the artist's control*. To say that *David* could have been sculpted from something other than marble is to say, more precisely, that *Michelangelo* could have sculpted *David* from something other than marble but chose not to. Whether we take a feature of an artwork to be artistically evaluable often depends on whether we believe that the artist intentionally included the feature in the work. If *A Subtlety* were vandalized and a thick stroke of red paint smeared down the middle of the sculpture, it would be unfair to evaluate the work as if the red stroke were part of the original as Walker had intended it. In doing so, we would not be giving Walker her due. Because Walker did not intend for the red stroke to be part of the sculpture, the stroke is not a feature of the sculpture that one can fairly appeal to in one's aesthetic judgment of it. (One might, of course, lament the vandalism of *A Subtlety* on the basis that the sculpture, post-vandalism, is much less effective than the sculpture was before it was vandalized. But this is not the same thing as appealing to the red stroke in one's aesthetic judgment of *A Subtlety*.)

Richard Wollheim (1987) argues that there is a basis for our intuition that a feature of an artwork is artistically evaluable only if the artist intentionally included it in the work. He argues that the difference between a painting that is artistically evaluable and mere marks on a surface is that painting involves *intentional thematization*: the artist who makes the work thematizes the features of the work for the purpose of "organiz[ing] an inherently inert material so that it will become serviceable for the carriage of meaning" (22). On the other hand, when someone merely deposits marks on a surface without the intention of thematization, the surface does not become apt for the conveyance of meaning. Intentional thematization, therefore, appears to be a necessary condition for a feature of a work to be aesthetically evaluable.

While in general, a feature of an artwork is apt for aesthetic evaluation only if the artist intended to include it in the work, intentional thematization is not a *necessary* condition for aesthetic evaluation. Our aesthetic appreciation of age illustrates this. Consider, for instance, the dozens of castings of Rodin's *The Thinker*.[7] Some of them are in more or less perfect condition, as Rodin saw them when they came out of their casts. Others—such as *The Thinker* displayed outside on the entrance steps of the Cleveland Museum of Art—are weathered from outdoor display or have been vandalized, and as a result have very different aesthetic effects than their pristine counterparts. Yet, the weathered looks of these sculptures are a crucial part of what we value about them. Carolyn Korsmeyer, drawing on the work of art historian Alois Riegl, calls this the "age value" of an object, and argues that age value is relevant in our judgments of aesthetic value (Riegl 1982, cited in Korsmeyer 2008, 122). The visible accumulation of time on some castings of Rodin's *Thinker* is relevant to their artistic value even though Rodin did not have control over the way time would change their appearance. While intentional thematization is *generally* required for a feature of an artwork to be a candidate for aesthetic evaluation, it is not a *necessary* condition for aesthetic evaluation. There are some features of artworks—such as the appearance of age—that are candidates for aesthetic evaluation even though they are not (always) intentionally thematized by the artist.

If intentional thematization is not a necessary condition for aesthetic evaluation, then it is possible to posit hypothetical variations of artworks that differ from their actual counterparts in ways that the artist could not have controlled. Suppose, for instance, that none of Rodin's castings of *The Thinker* were displayed outdoors. One might then ask: "What would *The Thinker* look like if it had been displayed in a garden all these years, rather than in a museum?" Given that it is common for bronze sculptures to be displayed outdoors, this is a reasonable question to ask. And the answer to this question might inform one's judgment about *The Thinker* as it is displayed in the gallery by making the pristine condition of the sculpture salient.

IV. COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING IN ART CRITICISM

In Section II I introduced the idea of comparative aesthetic judgments: judgments of artworks that hold only relative to the works under consideration. In Section III, I argued that hypothetical variations of artworks are imaginary works that are just like their actual counterparts in some clearly delineated respects. Now, we can tie these two strands together into a claim about what counterfactual reasoning in art criticism is. On my view, counterfactual reasoning in art criticism involves comparative aesthetic judgments between actual artworks and hypothetical variations of those works.

When I introduced comparative aesthetic judgments in Section II, I used a comparison between a Rothko color block canvas and a Pollock drip painting as an example. I noted that one might say in this comparison that the Rothko is more serene than the Pollock, even though one might not say that the Rothko is serene simpliciter. But a comparative judgment need not take two actual works as its objects. It might instead involve a comparison between an actual artwork and a hypothetical variation of it. And this, I think, is the kind of aesthetic judgment we make when we reason counterfactually about artworks.

When Steinberg judges that *Demoiselles* has a more powerful aesthetic effect than *Joueurs de Cartes*, he does two things. First, he introduces a hypothetical variation of *Demoiselles*, taking care to be clear about what he wishes to change about *Demoiselles* (its depiction of prostitutes) and what he wishes to hold fixed (everything else). Next, he holds the paintings "side by side" and judges that the actual painting more successfully comments on otherness than the hypothetical one does.

My focus in this article is on counterfactual reasoning in the criticism of visual art because it is in important ways the most difficult kind of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism to understand.[8] Consider, by contrast, counterfactual reasoning in the criticism of poetry and music. We can easily bring to mind or put to paper variations of poems: we need only swap out the relevant words or change the relevant rhythms. In music theory, scholars often recompose passages in order to make technical, critical, and analytical points; recomposition is an essential tool for music theorists (O'Hara 2017).[9] In literature and in music, it is possible to *exhibit* hypothetical variations of actual artworks. Unlike works of visual art, variations of works of poetry and music can easily be made real. Therefore, unlike hypothetical variations of works of visual art, hypothetical variations of works of literature and music do not pose challenges to the acquaintance principle, challenges that I discuss in the following section.

V. THE ACQUAINTANCE PRINCIPLE

The account of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism I have offered raises a puzzle with respect to one widely held view in aesthetics: the *acquaintance principle*. According to the acquaintance principle, aesthetic judgments must be based on perceptual encounters with their objects.[10] But when we introduce hypothetical variations of artworks, the hypothetical works do not magically appear in front of us; they exist only in our minds. Because counterfactual claims about artworks are based on *imagined* artworks that one has not encountered firsthand, it appears to violate the acquaintance principle.

However, there are different ways of understanding the acquaintance principle that are sometimes confused in the literature, and not all of them conflict with my account of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism. Distinguishing three interpretations of the acquaintance principle will help us figure out where exactly its tension with counterfactual reasoning in art criticism lies:

- AP-Inference: one cannot form an aesthetic judgment by applying inferential rules (e.g., I cannot conclude that a painting is dreamlike on the basis that it uses muted colors and all paintings that use muted colors are dreamlike).[11]
- AP-Testimony: one cannot form an aesthetic judgment on the basis of testimony (e.g., I cannot conclude that a painting is dreamlike purely on the basis of your telling me that it is dreamlike, without seeing the painting myself).
- AP-Representation: one cannot form an aesthetic judgment on the basis of a subpar representation of a work, such as a written description of a work's non-aesthetic qualities or a low-quality photograph of a work (e.g., I cannot conclude that a painting is dreamlike purely on the basis of a written description of the painting's non-aesthetic qualities, without seeing the painting myself).

My account of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism is compatible with AP-Inference and AP-Testimony: it does not require that one be able to form aesthetic judgments by applying inferential rules or on the basis of testimony. On my account, we judge hypothetical artworks in the same way we judge actual ones. So, if inferential rules and testimony cannot be used to form aesthetic judgments of actual artworks, they cannot be used to form aesthetic judgments of hypothetical ones. (Note that my aim here is not to give credence to AP-Inference and AP-Testimony, but to point out that if they conflict with the aesthetic judgment of hypothetical artworks, they also conflict with the aesthetic judgment of actual artworks.) The problem with my account is AP-Representation. My account requires that it be possible for aesthetic judgments to be made on the basis of (very) imperfect representations of objects: artworks that exist only in our *imagination*. Therefore, AP-Representation poses a much more difficult problem for the aesthetic judgment of hypothetical artworks than it does of actual artworks. For readability, moving forward, I will refer to AP-Representation simply as *the acquaintance principle*.

The acquaintance principle is not without its critics. Louise Hanson, for instance, points out that we can at least in some cases form aesthetic judgments of paintings, sculptures, and other works of visual art on the basis of photographs, and judgments about musical works on the basis of reading their scores (2018, 61).[12] But even if we can form aesthetic judgments on the basis of second-hand awareness of an object's perceptual properties gained through photographs or musical scores, rather than on the basis of firsthand encounters with the object, my account of counterfactual reasoning still appears to be in trouble. There are no photographs of hypothetical paintings or sculptures, recordings of hypothetical plays, or scores of hypothetical sonatas. Other than the images or sounds we form in our minds of hypothetical artworks, we have no way of gaining an awareness of their perceptual qualities.

One way of reconciling the tension between counterfactual reasoning in art criticism and the acquaintance principle is simply to reject the acquaintance principle.[13] My account of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism provides evidence that we can and do form aesthetic judgments on the basis of imperfect, imagined representations of artworks. There is other evidence that the acquaintance principle is false: as Robert Hopkins points out, we use sensory imagination to make aesthetic judgments every time we think about how to decorate a room and pick out an outfit to wear (2006, 93–4). Many nails have been hammered into the acquaintance principle—why not add another?

I think that the possibility of forming judgments of imagined artworks seriously weakens the acquaintance principle. But, for the sake of thoroughness, I also wish to explore one way of reconciling counterfactual reasoning in art criticism with the acquaintance principle that involves showing that visualizations of artworks, though imperfect, are *good enough* representations of artworks to serve as bases for aesthetic judgment.

Let us assume that it is sometimes possible to form aesthetic judgments on the basis of imperfect representations of artworks, such as photographs of paintings and recordings of musical compositions. This is a plausible assumption. We do, as a matter of fact, judge artworks on the basis of photographs and recordings all the time; the disciplines of art history and art criticism as we know them would be impossible without representational substitutes like photographs and recordings. Given this assumption, the question becomes *how* imperfect a representation can be for it nevertheless to serve as an apt substitute for an artwork. The high-resolution photographs of paintings and sculptures in online museum catalogs are generally good enough substitutes to use as a basis for aesthetic judgments of the real things. (Sadly, I am in no place to afford a painting by my favorite artist, Mondrian. But that does not stop me from buying prints of his work. Although the prints are imperfect representations of his paintings, they "do the job"; they are good enough substitutes for the real thing most of the time.) Of course, not all high-resolution photographs are good enough substitutes for the real thing. It is hard to grasp the grandeur and imposingness of *A Subtlety* without seeing the sculpture oneself. But it is plausible enough that in general, we can form preliminary and imperfect yet *legitimate* aesthetic judgments of artworks on the basis of high-resolution photographs in a way that we cannot on the basis of written descriptions of artworks.

Are blurry photographs apt substitutes for visual artworks? If high-resolution photographs are, *some* blurry photographs probably are, too. The difference between a crystal-clear photograph and a slightly blurry photograph usually would not be significant enough to make a difference in aptness as a substitute for an artwork. But just how blurry can a photograph of an artwork be before it becomes inapt as a substitute for an artwork? Could a mental image of an artwork be thought of as a kind of "blurry photograph" that is good enough to serve as an object of aesthetic judgment?

On one view known as *perceptualism*, mental imagery is a perceptual state of the same fundamental psychological kind as veridical perception, hallucination, and other kinds of visual experience. On this view, to picture something in one's mind *is to perceive it*; as Hume writes, "That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes our eyes in sunshine, differ only in degree, not in nature" (1739, 1.1.1.5). Because on this view mental imagery and visual perception are of the same kind, the mental image we form of a hypothetical artwork is akin to a blurry photograph of that work. So, if some blurry photographs are apt substitutes for artworks, it might be the case that some mental images are, too.

There is a lot to say in favor of perceptualism. There are important resemblances between visual perception and mental imagery: they share an "iconic" or "analog" rather than propositional format and a phenomenology, among other things (Cavedon-Taylor 2021, 3848).[14] But perceptualism is controversial.[15] Hopkins, for instance, argues that perception and visualization elicit affect in different ways: in the case of perception, affect is a response to what we perceive, whereas in the case of imagination, affect is part of what we imagine, rather than a response to what is imagined (2006, 93). But this difference between perception and visualization itself need not undermine the possibility of forming aesthetic judgments of imagined artworks. Hopkins himself argues that we can still form legitimate aesthetic judgments on the basis of visualization, but we form them on a different basis than we do judgments of artworks we visually perceive (93–4).

I have shown that one-way counterfactual reasoning in art criticism and the acquaintance principle can be made compatible by appealing to perceptualism. I will not pursue this argument further; my aim has simply been to show that this is a possible (and promising) argument. I do wish to make one more argument in favor of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism

despite its tension with the acquaintance principle. I think that even if counterfactual reasoning in art criticism violates the acquaintance principle and therefore does not yield "legitimate" aesthetic judgments, we should not care, because this kind of reasoning promotes something more important than acquaintance: *aesthetic autonomy*.

C. Thi Nguyen (2020) has observed that the demand for acquaintance when forming aesthetic judgments is often confused with the demand for aesthetic autonomy. This confusion has led theorists to over-emphasize the importance of acquaintance and under-emphasize the importance of autonomy. But there is an important distinction to be made between the two concepts. The acquaintance principle says that aesthetic judgments ought to be based on perceptual encounters with their objects. The autonomy principle, on the other hand, says that aesthetic judgments ought to be made through the application of one's own faculties and abilities. Acquaintance and autonomy often go together. Generally, judging an artwork oneself involves seeing the artwork firsthand. But in some cases, acquaintance and autonomy come apart. Nguyen uses a pair of cases to illustrate the difference between acquaintance and autonomy:

> Audio Tour: Brandon considers himself to be an art-lover. Whenever he visits the museum, he rents the audio tour and explores the museum at its direction. He looks at the paintings he is told to look at, studies those details which are called to his attention, and always assents to the audio tour's judgment of the quality, importance, and aesthetic properties present based on those details. He never looks for any details that aren't specified by the audio tour, nor does he ever form aesthetic judgments without the explicit guidance and suggestion of an audio tour. (Nguyen 2020, 1132).
>
> Inductive Kate: Kate watches a lot of movies, and forms strong, personal, carefully thought out reactions to all of them. After she has seen enough movies from a director or production group, she will sometimes begin to also form some inductive judgments. For example, she will say that Quentin Tarantino's *Hateful Eight* is clever, perverse, and postmodern without having seen it herself, based entirely on induction from previous experiences with Quentin Tarantino's movies. (1133).

Audio Tour Brandon is acquainted but unautonomous; Inductive Kate is autonomous but unacquainted. But, as Nguyen points out, although we might refrain from accepting Inductive Kate's particular judgment of *Hateful Eight* on the basis that she lacks firsthand acquaintance with the film, there is an important sense in which her aesthetic life is preferable—more fulfilling, rich, and meaningful—than Audio Tour Brandon's.[16] Audio Tour Brandon may be acquainted with all the works he judges, and his aesthetic judgments—which are based entirely on his deference to aesthetic experts—may be more reliable than Kate's. Nevertheless, his aesthetic life is clearly more impoverished than Kate's.

Counterfactual reasoning in art criticism bears similarities to inductive aesthetic reasoning. In both cases, we form aesthetic judgments on the basis of imperfect ideas of what artworks are like. But even if there is something imperfect about the aesthetic judgments that counterfactual and inductive reasoning produce, they promote aesthetic autonomy, a characteristic that we value highly in art appreciators (perhaps even more than we value acquaintance).

One fascinating feature of counterfactual reasoning in art criticism that illustrates its promotion of aesthetic autonomy is the way it mirrors the kind of reasoning that artists often employ in their creative processes. An artist considers the possible ways their work could be—where the next stroke of paint could be placed, whether to add a crescendo or a decrescendo to a score—and chooses to bring into existence the version of the work that will best achieve the aesthetic effects they envision. When we reason counterfactually about artworks, we place ourselves in the position of the artist. We consider what was possible for an artist to have created and we use these considerations to evaluate the artistic decisions they made. It is often thought that being an artist and being an aesthete require different inclinations, abilities, and attitudes; the artist, after all, assumes a creative role, while the aesthete assumes an *appreciative* one (Levinson 2017). But counterfactual reasoning in art criticism is one instance where the roles of artist and appreciator converge. When an artist stops to consider different ways their work could be, they become appreciators of hypothetical artworks; they bring to mind and evaluate these hypothetical works as their audience might, and only then choose to bring into existence the version of the work that best realizes their vision. When an appreciator stops to consider different ways a work could be, they become artists of hypothetical works: they paint, sculpt, and compose works entirely in their minds. Counterfactual reasoning in art criticism gives those of us who typically or exclusively assume the role of the appreciator an opportunity to adopt, however temporarily, an artist's psychology and all the freedom, play, and autonomy that comes with it.

That counterfactual reasoning in art criticism promotes aesthetic autonomy does not do anything to resolve the tension with the acquaintance principle. It does not prove that aesthetic judgments formed on the basis of subpar representations of artworks can be legitimate. But thinking about aesthetic autonomy does, I think, demonstrate that we might not want to care about whether we can form fully legitimate aesthetic judgments of hypothetical artworks. Counterfactual reasoning in art criticism undoubtedly helps us hone our aesthetic judgments of actual works, and it promotes something that we value just as much if not more than aesthetic acquaintance: aesthetic autonomy.[17]

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ENDNOTES

1. I use "art criticism" to refer broadly to our practices of coming to understand and evaluating works of art, rather than in the restricted sense of the work done by professional art critics.
2. It is tempting, for instance, to define aesthetic sensitivity as the ability to perceive aesthetic qualities. But this definition does nothing to help us understand what aesthetic sensitivity amounts to.
3. For discussion of the distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities and the abilities required to perceive them, see Sibley (1965).
4. See, for instance, Beardsley (1973), Sibley (1959, 1965).
5. Kendall Walton (1970) argues that the category that one takes an artwork to belong to determines (at least in part) the aesthetic properties that we attribute to the work. The claim I am making here is that the category in which we consider works when we make comparative aesthetic judgments consists in just the works being compared. So, we may attribute aesthetic properties to works when we are comparing them against certain other works, even if we would not attribute those properties to the works considered alone.
6. Thanks to an anonymous referee and the editor for raising this point.
7. I borrow this example from Alison Lanier, who uses it in an unpublished paper I coauthored with her and Erich Hatala Matthes.
8. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this point.
9. Thanks to Nathan Martin for bringing this literature to my attention.
10. The acquaintance principle, named by Wollheim (1980), has a long history beginning perhaps with Kant (2009, §8).
11. AP-Inference therefore rules out what Kant called "Principles of Taste": universal generalizations of the form anything F (where F is non-aesthetic) is G (an aesthetic property). See Hopkins (2006, 87). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this interpretation of the acquaintance principle.
12. For further discussion on the appreciation of visual art on the basis of photographs, see Hopkins (2006, 90–2).
13. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me to elaborate on this.
14. For further discussion of the similarities between mental imagery and other forms of visual experience, see Nanay (2015).
15. For another argument against perceptualism, see Cavedon-Taylor (2021).
16. This is not to say that Kate's judgment of *Hateful Eight* is *totally* unreliable. She is in a far better place to reliably judge the film than, say, someone who has never seen a Tarantino film.
17. For invaluable conversation and comments on previous drafts, I thank Elisa Caldarola, Danny Herwitz, Thi Nguyen, Adam Waggoner, and audiences at the University of Michigan, the 2021 American Society for Aesthetics Eastern Division Meeting, and the *Aesthetics for Birds* "Distant Birds" talk series. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor of *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* for their incisive comments that greatly improved this article.

Angela Sun (UMich PhD 2022) is an Assistant Professor at Washington and Lee University. Her research is in ethics, philosophy of action, and aesthetics. She is currently working on a series of papers that expand on themes from her dissertation and exploring other topics in normative ethics, action, and decision, including consent, inconsolability, and rationalization. Many of her side projects are in the philosophy of art. She is especially interested in aesthetic explanation, the social dimensions of art, and the high/low art distinction. (She is an ardent proponent of the lowbrow!)

Philosophy Undergraduate News

by Professor James Joyce, Undergrad Chair

2021/22 was a marvelous year for our undergraduate program in philosophy! Enrollments hit some of their highest points in recent years. We saw **41 students graduate with majors, and a similar number achieved minors**. Perhaps most important, we moved all our teaching back into the classroom. Even with everyone wearing masks, this was welcomed by faculty and students alike. We particularly enjoyed the in-person graduation ceremonies.

This year the following seniors defended honors theses in philosophy:

Student	Thesis Title	Advisors
Dominique Gaston	"The Shadow of the Object: Narcissism and the Usefulness of the Death Drive"	Andreas Gailus & Daniel Herwitz
Marley Hornewer	"The Part Apart: Understanding Anorexia, Autonomy, and Recovery"	Sarah Buss & Ishani Maitra
Yi Peng	"Merit, Luck, and Social Relations: On the Scope of Luck Egalitarianism and Relational Egalitarianism"	Elizabeth Anderson & Dan Lowe
Veronica Sikora	"Next-GenEthics" (Podcast)	Sarah Buss

All four projects showed great philosophical insight, and each made a substantial scholarly contribution to a central area of the discipline. The Department is proud to have students who produce scholarly work of this high caliber.

from l to r: Dominique Gaston, Marley Hornewer, Veronica Sikora, and Tristan Sirls

Veronica Sikora's "Next-GenEthics" deserves special mention for being the *first* podcast that the Philosophy Department has accepted as an honors project. Veronica is joined by various experts — in genetics, philosophy, anthropology, ecology, and more — to discuss pressing ethical issues raised by recent advances in genetics research and technology. The topics include: the moral and social challenges posed by genetic testing; the interaction of genetics, race and ancestry; the basics of moral thinking; and the mechanisms and moral implications of prenatal testing. You can find the podcast at https://anchor.fm/veronica-sikora/. We especially recommend episode 2, which features our own Dan Lowe!

As is our custom, the Department presents awards to students who have accomplished especially noteworthy things during their time at Michigan.

Haller Prizes for Excellence in Philosophy are given out each semester to students who perform especially well in upper level courses. This year's Haller winners were **Marley Hornewer, Ethan Muse (only a sophomore!) and Quanzhi Liang. *Congratulations to all three!***

Faculty Prizes for Extraordinary Contributions to the Intellectual Life of the Department. This year, the Faculty felt that it was important to recognize two students, **Veronica Sikora and Tristan Sirls**, for their extraordinary contributions to the intellectual life of the Department. Both have been active participants in the UM philosophical community and both were awarded $500 for their outstanding work and service. Veronica established and managed several Departmental organizations. In the summer between her sophomore and junior year, she founded *Comet*, a series of virtual seminars in which students could discuss philosophical issues with members of our faculty in a relaxed environment. She joined *Meteorite*, our undergraduate-led philosophy journal, as a sophomore, and served as its Managing Editor and Editor-in-Chief in her junior and senior years, respectively. Veronica also participated in the Bioethics Society, the Effective Altruism club, and Society for Deontology club. In addition, she won the Honors Program's prestigious Jack Meiland Scholarship in 2021. Tristan, who majored in both Philosophy and Cognitive Science, was the managing editor of *Meteorite*. He also restarted and was president of UM's chapter of the National Alliance on Mental Illness. He was a summer intern for a mental health non-profit called CPMHA (Concussions, Pain, and Mental Health Awareness). Currently Tristan is working at a corporate law firm (David, Polk and Wardwell) as a litigation legal assistant. He plans to attend law school beginning in the fall of 2023, and ultimately to advocate for people with mental health disorders and mental illnesses. Tristan is already publishing articles! His "Neurolaw, Folk-psychology and Metaphysics in Law" appeared last year in the journal *Prelaw Land*.

Finally, the **William K. Frankena Prize**, which is funded by a generous gift from Marshall Weinberg, is awarded to graduating seniors whose academic performance in the major was especially impressive. Normally we award this prize to a single student, but this year we had two candidates, **Marley Hornewer and Yi Peng**, who were so exceptional that we felt both should be honored. Marley graduated with a double major: one in Philosophy; the other in Cognition and Neuroscience. Their undergraduate thesis elegantly combined these two fields by considering how the mental illness anorexia nervosa sheds light on our theorizing about moral responsibility, or personal autonomy. Marley also edited *Meteorite*, taught a minicourse on the philosophy of gender, and co-created a video game about research ethics. Marley hopes to pursue a PhD in philosophy in order to better explore questions in ethics. They also have interests in epistemology, philosophy of education, and LGBTQ philosophy.

Yi Ping complied an exceptional academic record at Michigan, earning high grades across a wide range of difficult courses. He is especially strong in formal logic, and has serious research interests in political philosophy. Liz Anderson, his main honors thesis advisor, classified him as a "wonderful student." Yi's thesis dealt with the dispute between "luck egalitarians," who aim to promote a more egalitarian society by mitigating disparities in citizens' wellbeing that arise from their good or bad luck, and "relational egalitarians," who promote equality by ensuring that citizens have roughly equal authority or standing, so that no one is in a position to oppress anyone else. Yi made significant contributions to this debate, and he is well positioned to continue studying political philosophy and logic in graduate school beginning in 2023, as is his plan.

As we bid farewell to the class of 2022, we also look forward to another fulfilling year. Both our major and our minors are attracting excellent students, and we are finally, albeit somewhat tentatively, beginning to feel that the Covid days are behind us. *The best days for Michigan Philosophy are still ahead!*

PHILOSOPHY GO GRUE

Congratulations Class of 2022!

Emily Bedolis, Lena Bhagat, Kathryn Black-Mishaan, Gabriel Bornstein, Graham Branton, Emily Brown, Megan Chapelle, Alexandra Dortzbach, Kate Fazioli, Dominique Gaston, Desmond Giddens, Nadine Hojaij, Allison Hopkins, Marley Hornewer, Olivia Hurtado, Louie Klaus, Zihan Ma, Abigail Mansfield, Anna Maxwell, Kevin McCortney, Natalie McGuire, Noor Moughni, Margaret Mulligan, Yi Peng, Wanying Qian, Blake Querio, Megan Reidhead, Ethan Richards, Collin Sharpe, Veronica Sikora, Tristan Sirls, Kevin Sorstokke, Danielle Wachter, Andrew Wancha, Joshua Wyse, Steven Yenglin, Suen Wing Shannon Yeung, Paul Young, and Shannon Zheng

top row, l to r: Emily Bedolis, Kathryn Black-Mishaan, Alexandra Dortzbach, Louie Klaus, Zihan Ma, Kevin McCortney
bottom row, l to r: Natalie McGuire, Noor Moughni, Blake Querio, Kevin Sorstokke, Suen Wing Shannon Yeung

Block Grant Funding Academic Year 2021-22

Over the course of the academic year, the Block Grant funded co-curricular opportunities for Philosophy undergraduate students. The Department was able to fund an in-person internship over the summer of 2022, provide tuition support for a virtual summer course, and award two prizes for outstanding work for two undergraduate majors. We also planned to support publication of the annual *Meteorite* journal; however, due to the continuing effects of the pandemic, publication was delayed. In the current academic year, in-person activities are planned for late Fall and Winter terms including undergraduate student club meetings, Pizza with Professors course planning events, and internship funding.

Spring 2022 Internship

Cristian Rodriguez received funding for an internship with Family Futures in Grand Rapids to develop his administrative and business analysis skills. Family Futures is dedicated to supporting and educating parents of children through age five by offering enrichment programs in the community. Here is a brief description of his experience: "I hope to use this opportunity as a chance to learn greater skills and expertise in the realm of administration. I will further develop my skills pertaining to the computational and informational systems used in this administrative role. More specifically duties such as database management, program management, and analyzing data."

Spring 2021 Virtual Course Support

Over the Spring term, Philosophy major **Marley Hornewer** attended a virtual course at the Brooklyn Institute of Social Research called *Modern Sappho: Poetry, Sexuality, and Theory*. Here is a quote from Marley describing their interest in the course: "In addition to the ancient Greek poet Sappho, the course material will include Judith Butler, whose work is central in philosophy of gender, and other female thinkers. I am interested in supplementing my Michigan coursework with this non-credit Sappho course because 1) many of my philosophical interests, e.g., selfhood and autonomy in anorexia (my thesis topic), intersect with gender, and 2) I will be teaching a section of Honors 135 this coming fall called *Philosophy of Gender*."

William K. Frankena Prize Recipients - 2022

Marley Hornewer (BA 2022): Marley graduated in 2022 with a double major - Philosophy and Biopsychology. They are primarily interested in ethics, including metaethics, applied ethics, and moral responsibility, as well as epistemology, philosophy of education, and LGBTQ philosophy, namely insofar as these fields intersect with questions regarding ethical life. Their senior thesis, *The Part Apart: Understanding Anorexia, Autonomy, and Recovery* (advisor Prof. Sarah Buss/reader Prof. Ishani Maitra) received highest honors. They hope to pursue their PhD beginning Fall 2023.

Yi Peng (BA 2022): Yi graduated with a major in Philosophy and minor in Mathematics. His research interests include social and political philosophy, logic, and philosophy of artificial intelligence. His senior thesis, entitled *Merit, Luck, and Social Relations: On the Scope of Luck Egalitarianism and Relational Egalitarianism* (advisor Prof. Elizabeth Anderson/reader Prof. Daniel Lowe), received high honors. Yi hopes to be pursuing his MA at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy in Fall 2022.

PPE UNDERGRADUATE NEWS

BY PROFESSOR JAMES JOYCE, PPE CHAIR

The Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) program is thriving! PPE is an interdisciplinary major that asks students to take a wide range of classes across its three component disciplines. Because it requires the mastery of difficult technical material from all three areas as well as strong argumentative and writing skills, PPE provides students with very effective preparation for many walks of life.

We had thirty-seven PPE majors receive diplomas in May 2022, and there are currently more than eighty majors in the pipeline. Nearly a quarter of our majors graduated with honors this academic year. Here is a list of the honors students, together with their thesis titles and faculty advisors:

Student	Thesis Title	Advisors
Jacob Cohen	"Free Speech on Campus and Academic Freedom: Trigger Warnings and Outside Speakers"	Ishani Maitra
Ilan Elrom	"The Political Economy of the Federal Reserve's Emergency Arsenal: An Empirical Analysis of Legislation Enacted in the Post-Bretton Woods Era"	Robert Franzese
Lauren Jacobs	"How Level is the Electoral Playing Field? A Reconsideration Based on the Priming Effects of Gender Bias in the Media"	Nancy Burns
Angelina Little	"Re-evaluating the Economic Imperative to Learn: How Today's Undergraduates Understand the Purpose of Education"	Mika LaVaque-Manty
Rosalind Madorsky	"Taking Back Our Power: A Conceptual Review of Energy System Governance"	Mika LaVaque-Manty
Bennett McGraw	"I Know It's A Sin: An Empirical Analysis of Partisan Ideology in State Supreme Court Abortion Cases"	Deborah Beim
Adam Schnepf	"Orienting Neoliberalism: Illuminating Neoliberalism's Comprehensive Doctrine"	Mariah Zeisberg
Reid Schreck	"The Plight of Full-Time Gig Worker Rideshare Drivers: An Evaluation of the Current Implementation of the Gig Economy in the Rideshare Sector"	Daniel Lowe
Isabelle Zhan	"The Pervasiveness of Party Identity: How do Voters Form Opinions on the Electoral College?"	Lisa Disch

As you can see from the titles, PPE students work on a wide range of interesting and important topics. Ilan Elrom's thesis deserves special attention even among this outstanding group. The LSA Honors Program singled it out for the prestigious *Gerald Ford Public Policy Award*, which recognizes overall excellence or demonstrated potential for excellence in public service.

One real highlight of the 2021-2022 year in PPE was the *Ferrando Family Lecture*. Funded by a generous endowment from Jonathan and Kathryn Ferrando, this event brings distinguished thinkers and practitioners to speak at the University of Michigan and engage with PPE students. This year's lecturer was Yancey Strickler, co-founder of Kickstarter, a novel funding platform for creative projects. Strickler is well-known as the author of *This Could Be Our Future: a Manifesto for a More Generous World*, a book about building a society that looks beyond profit as its core organizing principle. His well-received lecture was entitled "Self-Interest and the Post-Individual."

PPE was also fortunate to receive a generous gift from *Robert J. Donia* and *Jane Ritter*, who have established the **Ian Fishback Fund** at the University's *Donia Center on Human Rights*. The fund honors the memory of Major Ian Fishback (MA Philosophy '12, PhD Philosophy '20). Fishback, who grew up in Michigan's Upper Peninsula, served in the US Army in Iraq. He was a tireless defender of human rights and respect for the law of war. A model public servant, he helped expose abuses of detainees in Iraq by U.S. Army forces, leading to important legislation to prevent such abuses. As a result of this gift, PPE is able to offer two of its majors up to $1,250 that can be used to fund intellectual experiences during the academic year. We are looking forward to awarding the first Fishback fellowships this year.

We look forward to another successful year for our PPE students and our ever growing major!

Congratulations Class of 2022!

Azzam Alzahrani, Leila Amin, Brian Carpenter, Kunqi Chen, Jacob Cohen,
Nicholas Colucci, Lydia Dunn, Kathryn Ellison, Ilan Elrom,
Mackenzie Fleming, Claire Hao, Alexa Harris, James Hill, Alvin Hom,
Lauren Jacobs, Megha Jain, Emily Johnson, Daniela Kabeth,
Evan Karmes-Wainer, Olivia Katz, Estelle Leibowitz, Angelina Little, Leo Lofy,
Rosalind Madorsky, Bennett McGraw, Rohan Mohan, Andrew Pluta,
Andres Ramos Salinas, Idell Rutman, Pallab Saha, Adam Schnepf,
Ethan Scholl, Joseph Shrayer, Reid Schreck, David Seaman, Ambika Sinha,
Skylar Waddington, Ellery Weiner, Yifan Xu, Ruby Yearling, Isabelle Zhan, and Ziqian Zheng

Professor Elizabeth Anderson, Keynote Speaker

Professor James Joyce, PPE Undergrad Chair

We had thirty-seven PPE majors receive diplomas in May 2022, and there are currently more than eighty majors in the pipeline. Nearly a quarter of our majors graduated with honors this academic year.

Research Report

A History of PHILOSOPHY JOURNALS



by Brian Weatherson, Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy

One of the distictive features of philosophy in the twentieth century was the centrality of *journals*. They weren't the only places that philosophy was discussed or distributed—books, letters, lectures, and conferences were all important too—they were a key part of the landscape. Most things that happened in philosophy were reflected, usually fairly quickly, in the journals. So this makes looking at journals a good way to get a sense of what was going on in philosophy throughout the century.

Journals come out reasonably regularly, and that makes them useful for historical analysis. It is much easier to compare what was being discussed in *Mind* (the oldest and still one of the most prestigious English language philosophy journals) over different years or decades than to compare the output of a major press (like, say, Oxford University Press) over similar time periods. *Mind* publishes four issues a year, and has done for a long time, and those issues have remained at a fairly similar length. Presses, and other forms of philosophical publication and communication, are much less stable. It is also easier to get the complete contents of a journal over its lifespan than to get the complete contents of a press (many of whose books are out of print). And it's even easier still to get the complete contents of a journal than to get the contents of a conference or a lecture. This is important if one wants to know not just what was being discussed in philosophy, but what was not being discussed. To see that something isn't there, you need to know that you're seeing everything.

But saying that it is easier to look at the complete contents of a journal than of, say, a press, does not mean that it is easy. Indeed, as little as a few years ago, it would have been impossible. There are too many journals, and they publish too many pages, for any person, or any reasonably sized team, to read them all. Fortunately, it's not necessary to rely on humans. Two technological developments have made it practical to use computers to do at least some of the reading.

The first development was that JSTOR used optical character-recognition (OCR) software to create text versions of many archived journals. They combined this with the original electronic versions of recent issues to create a full library of the text of many leading journals. And, crucially, they made this library available to the general public.

The second development was that personal computers have gotten fast enough that it is (just barely) practical to run text-mining algorithms over libraries as large as the ones JSTOR provides on personal computers. *Practical* here is a relative term; the models I primarily use here took eight to ten hours to complete on pretty good computers. But that's fine if a computer can be left running overnight. So even without having to use tools beyond what I had in my department office, I could use these algorithms to see trends in the journal data.

So that's one of the things I decided to do over the last few years. I downloaded the full contents of twelve leading journals, from their inception to 2013. (The data wasn't available beyond that when I started the project, and it seemed like a reasonable end date.) And I fed the results into what's called a topic modeling algorithm. I wrote up the results in a book (of sorts) that is coming out with Michigan Publishing called *A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume 1: Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013*.

It's a book "of sorts" because it won't be appearing in anything like a usual printed form. If you tried to print it out, it comes to over 1700 pages, though most of those pages are graphs and tables. And the printout loses some of the most useful features of the book: searchable, sortable tables, and animations. But it still feels a bit more like a book than a website, so I'm calling it a book.

The algorithm that I primarily used is a kind of *topic modeling* algorithm. In particular, it's the Latent Dirichlet Algorithm (LDA). An LDA model takes the distribution of words in articles and comes up with a probabilistic assignment of each paper to one of a number of topics. I ran this algorithm (for reasons I'll soon explain), on a corpus of about 33,000 articles, consisting of all the research articles published up to 2013 in twelve leading philosophy journals.

The basic idea behind the LDA is to use word frequency to estimate which words go in which topics. This makes some amount of sense. Every time the word *Rawls* appears in an article, that increases the probability that the article is about political philosophy. And every time the word *Bayesian* appears, that increases the probability that the article is about formal epistemology. These aren't surefire signs, but they are probabilistic signs, and by adding up all these signs the probability that the article is in one topic rather than another can be worked out.

But what's striking about the LDA method is that the topics are not specified in advance. The model is not told, "Hey, there's this thing called political philosophy, and here are some keywords for it." Rather, the algorithm itself comes up with the topics. This works a little bit by trial and error. The model starts off guessing at a distribution of articles into topics, then works out what words would be keywords for each of those topics, then sees if, given those keywords, it agrees with its own (probabilistic) assignment of articles into topics. It almost certainly doesn't, since the assignment was random, so it reassigns the articles and repeats the process. And this process repeats until it is reasonably satisfied with the (probabilistic) sorting. At that point, it tells us the assignment of articles, and keywords, to topics.

Unfortunately, there isn't any good way to tell in advance how many topics it would be good to sort the articles into. The best thing is to run it a few times with different numbers of topics specified, and see how good a job it does in sorting the articles in an intelligible way. Even more unfortunately, this takes some time. A single run of the model on my (fairly good) office computer took 8-12 hours. So there was a lot of trial and error, and a lot of running the computer overnight, until I found a good model.

The one I ended up with sorted these 33,000 odd articles into ninety topics. Some of these were very philosophically familiar. There are topics on, for example, Kant; Marx; Hume; knowledge; perception; truth; beauty; and causation. Some of them were more surprising, such as the topics on chemistry, or on conscience. And several topics were disjunctive, because there is no good way to come up with ninety neat categories that can hold all the articles in philosophy, even in twelve mainstream journals.

The topics were more fine-grained than the subdisciplines that we use to set out the big undergraduate class, or that we describe ourselves as working in. But it wasn't too hard to sort them by hand into those subdisciplinary categories. And then I could show how important the categories had been to the journals over time, as this graphic shows.



That's just the graph from 1900 onwards. If I'd started earlier, there would be even more about idealism, and it would throw off the scale of the graph.

That already shows us one of the things that was most surprising to me about the exercise. The focus of the philosophy journals up to World War I, and even through World War II, was very much not on the figures that we now pay most attention to from that time. Frege and Nietzsche were almost completely absent. Even English figures like Russell and Moore were not discussed much. Instead, the focus was on Idealism in the UK journals, and a slightly wider variety of anti-realist philosophies in the US. This included idealism, but also pragmatism and process philosophy. The kinds of realist philosophy that became dominant after 1970 is almost nowhere to be seen, and even positivism plays a very small role in the story.

This comes out even more clearly when looking at individual topics. The algorithm found a topic centered around Bertrand Russell's most famous journal article: "On Denoting", which was published in *Mind* in 1905. (It's about Russell's theory of how definite descriptions, phrases like *The King of France,* work, and how to square the possibility that these descriptions could be meaningful even when they don't pick anyone out.) This was a huge topic in late twentieth-century philosophy; it was common for the compulsory pro-seminar in the graduate program to be based around it. Here is what the computer thought was the frequency with which this topic was discussed in the leading journals over time.



There is a very brief flurry of activity after Russell's article is published, especially with some interesting articles by E. E. Constance Jones. But then it mostly dies off, and it is only after 1955 or so that it becomes the central topic that it seemed to be when I started in philosophy in the 1990s.

We can see the same thing with causation. I had always taken this to be a central, perennial, philosophical problem. And, like denoting, it is something that Russell influentially wrote about. But it also doesn't become a central topic until the later stages of the twentieth century.



In this case the take-off is even later, seemingly triggered by the work of Donald Davidson and J. L. Mackie in the 1960s.

The story of epistemology in the journals is just as striking. There are practically no articles that the computer thinks look like contemporary epistemology articles before the late 1950s. Here is the graph of the number of articles each year the computer is more confident go in epistemology than anywhere else.



The takeoff in the early 1960s was triggered by Edmund Gettier's three-page 1963 article *Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?* Gettier's paper launched the "analysis of knowledge" literature, dedicated to setting out the boundary between knowledge and non-knowledge. But this wasn't all there was to the epistemology literature. As I show in chapter 6 of the book, the analysis of knowledge debate rarely made up more than about 15 percent of the articles published in epistemology.



The dots there are the percentage of epistemology articles each year that are about the analysis of knowledge, the thick line is the best fit line through those dots, and the thin grey lines are the best fit lines for 39 other epistemology topics. I think a lot of people outside epistemology think that the post-Gettier debates about the boundaries of knowledge are the main thing contemporary epistemologists talk about. And they are a big deal, but recent epistemology is a much broader field than it is often taken to be.

There are lots more details like this in the book, but I'll end here with a couple of small observations about twenty-first century philosophy. There wasn't really enough data to see trends in the *content* of recent philosophy—these trends tend to show up years or decades after the significant philosophical advances in any case. But there are some striking trends in the *form* of philosophy. I had the anecdotal impression that journal articles had been getting longer over time, and this turns out to be very much the case.



For each year, I've sorted the articles by length, then plotted the lengths of the articles at five decile markers. The red curve is the length of the article that is 10 percent of the way up the length table, the olive line is the article that is 30 percent of the way up the length chart, the green line is the length of the median article (by length), and so on.

And as you can possibly see from the graph, the median article in the 2010s is as long as the ninetieth percentile article from the 1950s and 1960s. For a while there, articles over twenty pages were real outliers. Now they are the norm. The outliers are now over thirty-five pages. This feels like a bad thing; articles are getting bloated, and we need to find a way to get them back to a reasonable length.

Philosophy is also developing a new, and idiosyncratic, vocabulary. This isn't (just) because of new philosophical theories being developed that require new language. It's rather because of what look like fashion changes in which words are being used. We've started to personalise philosophical views, or at least how we speak about them. So instead of having *objections* to a *theory*, we now have *worries* and *challenges* about a *view*. This linguistic change was visible in the models, but it was even more visible in the raw data. In section 9.3 of the book I sketch out the frequency within the journals of a number of these distinctive words. Here, for instance, is the graph for *worry, challenge*, and their plurals.



The words *worry* and *worries* went from basically never appearing to turning up approximately one time per journal article. *Challenge* went from well under one word in 10,000 to nearly 1 word in 2,500 over a short period of time. And there are similar words with the same kind of rise.

There is little precedent for this in philosophy. There was a fashion in the 1950s, especially in the UK, for using shorter words as part of the turn to "ordinary language philosophy". But that part of ordinary language philosophy didn't last long, and was largely a British phenomenon to start with. I'm not sure what to make of this change in philosophical language, or indeed whether it is more than a superficial phenomenon.

If you'd like to see many many more graphs and stories like this, a draft of the book is available at lda.weatherson.org, and the full version will be coming out soon with Michigan Publishing. The book also includes fairly detailed instructions on how to do projects like this one, and I hope that my book will be a contribution to a growing field of computer-aided work on the history of recent philosophy.

Brian Weatherson is the Marshall M. Weinberg Professor of Philosophy. He has published many papers over the years, primarily in epistemology, game theory and decision theory, philosophy of language, logic, and the history of analytic philosophy. His first book, *Normative Externalism*, was published in 2019 with Oxford U Press. He is the editor of *Philosopher's Imprint*. His featured Research Report highlights his current book, *A History of Philosophy Journals, Volume I, Evidence from Topic Modeling, 1876-2013*. For more information on Prof. Weatherson, visit: https://brian.weatherson.org

COURSE REPORT

Introduction to Ethics (PHIL 110)

By Anna Edmonds, LEO Lecturer

PHIL 110 offers the first steps to rigorous reflection about the nature of morality and about the principles that guide such judgments. Professor Edmonds helps students reconsider and clarify their moral judgments and their views about the nature of morality in light of a variety of competing ethical theories, as well as the most trenchant arguments for and against those theories.

This is a report on a new moral reasoning course I'm developing and some background for how I started thinking that a new approach to introducing students to Ethics would be useful.

A few years ago I started teaching Philosophy 110, our department's new large introduction to ethics. It's been wildly fun: it's easy to see from our department's skyrocketing enrollments that students are hungry for philosophical reflection. The syllabus I created has a lot in common with what I think of as the standard Intro to Ethics playbook. We begin with some thoughts on what moral questions are about and how moral arguments work. We spend a few weeks covering some topics in metaethics about the status of moral claims – breeds of relativism, egoism, and the relationship between God and morality. We move on to questions about the content of moral claims, covering prominent historical views including utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, Rawls' contract theory, and Aristotelian virtue theory. In the second half of the class we consider questions about our obligations to the global poor and to animals, dating and reproduction, and freedom of expression.

The students enjoy the course a lot. But each time I've taught it, I've grown increasingly suspicious about whether it's doing much to further the most common goal students report having when they sign up for the course: learning how to make better moral decisions and become better people. Despite the fact that students say they love having the opportunity to discuss ethics with their peers and like having their eyes opened to new dimensions of moral inquiry, it's also common for them to come away from the course with new opinions about moral philosophy: that it's a lot harder than they thought, that there's very little agreement, that justification looks very different than it looks in the sciences, that answers are few and far between, but that that's ok – that philosophy's more about asking questions than settling on answers.

For many of them, the fact that we can't *disprove* the psychological egoist's argument that we can only be motivated by our own self-interests makes more of an impression than the strong reasons to dismiss egoism. They're surprised at

the number and variety of conceptions of wellbeing and inclined to find the concept insufficiently tractable to be useful. They're overwhelmed by the suggestion that the fact that a moral norm seems impossibly demanding isn't necessarily an indication that it isn't right, and many of them report feeling inclined to throw in the towel in response.

We're used to these responses if we've taught ethics. And we learn how to try to ward them off: we sharpen our case against the egoist, we make better pitches for degreed responses to demanding norms. But as I worked harder to do this each term and considered the demographics of my student population more carefully, I started wondering why I was so committed to this standard playbook to begin with. It started to feel like I'd simply assumed that a central goal of teaching philosophy was to teach students *about* philosophy. In other words, to get them up to speed on the standard views and arguments that make up the canon and to prepare them for further philosophical education. But, at least in many of the classes we teach, most students will not go on to take any further philosophy classes. This is especially true for me, since I teach roughly 1 in 6 undergraduates who go through UM. If the best strategies for teaching students about the discipline turn out to be significantly different from the best strategies for teaching students how to make better moral decisions, I realized that I value the latter aim more (as do the students, if we're to trust their professed goals).

So I started investigating ethics texts and syllabuses. I noticed that my own syllabus did indeed exemplify the most common structure for an introductory ethics course. These courses tend to begin by asking some vexing theoretical questions in metaethics – What are moral facts? Are there any arguments in morality that resemble proofs of the sort we see in the empirical sciences? What is the nature of "obligation"? Should we think we have any at all? – and next on comparisons between the traditions in the ethics canon – Should we think deontology or consequentialism or virtue ethics gets things right? Syllabuses often reserve time at the end of the course for an "applied" ethics unit: usually this involves looking at particularly intractable moral controversies (abortion, assisted suicide) through the lenses of the candidate normative theories. Assigned material often does what philosophers do best: covers a wide range of positions in logical space, exposes massive controversy, and complicates concepts and positions with previously unappreciated complexity and nuance.

As philosophers, we're inclined to view this role of philosophy favorably. And it probably does seem to most of us as if the kind of moral reflection we teach is intimately tied to improving our own moral decision-making. Classic examples of moral dilemmas tend to gain their status as classics due to the way they can showcase especially difficult features or conflicting values. One of the great virtues of effortful philosophical inquiry is exposing these features, helping us appreciate details of contexts that otherwise would have gone unappreciated. I agree that recognition of nuance and complexity is an extremely valuable skill. But when students ask if there are answers to the hard metaethical questions they tackle or any consensus about normative theories and we redirect their attention to the value of the process of intellectual inquiry – sometimes even saying that we don't care what position they end up defending as long as they're able to defend it adequately – we risk misrepresenting the value that's actually at stake and losing a great deal of the self-improvement momentum that students have when they first show up to our courses.

And our focus on teaching ethical theories has other downsides. As any of us who has tried to spend a week or even two weeks covering an influential ethical theory understands, it's almost impossible to do justice to the richness and nuance of each view. The simplified versions that we end up with often produce cartoon-like caricatures of ethical analysis when students apply them to concrete issues. I've also frequently observed students operating with the assumption that, given the apparent lack of normative theoretical consensus, a candidate choice is justified so long as it could be justified via any of the considered theories. More often this seems to me to be a form of rationalizing their own antecedent intuitions – a tendency we're all so prone to to begin with that it's worth going to lengths to circumvent it.

In short, students are entering ethics courses interested in improving moral decision-making and becoming better people but our standard methodology and pedagogical practices don't capture and nurture these interests in ways that translate into increased impact. This emphasis on disagreement and dilemmas over tractable cases and instructive examples of progress results in a misleading picture of our actual human circumstances. So much of our moral lives doesn't depend on settling thorny metaethical questions and doesn't involve the vaguest borderlines or the extreme limit cases. Putting aside the (proportionally smaller) set of questions for which clearly superior answers are hard to spot, very often there are clearly better ways to treat each other, better positions to hold, and better policies to support. No matter our metaethical stance or our favored normative theory, all of us live in communities in which we're forced to make decisions that affect each other, and there are plenty of ways to significantly improve how we make them.

So I secured a grant from Open Philanthropy, an organization that funds projects aimed at improving the long-term future, to support summer research and buy out some of my teaching load. My goal is to develop and disseminate a *genuinely applied* approach to ethics, one that uses an interdisciplinary approach to help anyone improve their moral reasoning regardless of which general moral theory they find most plausible. I'm hoping to develop the materials I'm creating for it into a textbook.

By way of background, I was already warmed up to the possibility of redesigning the wheel when such a redesign seems useful. For the last five years I've gotten to participate in David Manley's development of a new approach to critical reasoning. I've watched as he's sorted through the standard reasoning curriculum and uncovered all sorts of traditions that seem to have taken root via some favored insights of philosophers that turn out not to actually help students improve their reasoning. I've been blown away by the outcome. Students find the new course life-changing and often report significant and lasting changes to their reasoning a number of years later. With this model in mind, I started thinking about what it would look like to approach teaching ethics with the same question in mind: how would I teach an introduction to ethics if I were to start from scratch, aiming to improve day-to-day moral decision-making as much as possible?

The course will start, not from the metaethical ground floor, but from the overwhelmingly shared idea that the needs and wants of other people matter. It will dispense with the theory-driven approach to ethics in favor of an approach that, first, helps students gain enough of a conceptual toolkit to reason about moral matters, and second, helps them understand enough about our quirky cognitive psychologies to be able to spot and remedy the many ways in which our moral reasoning predictably goes astray.

We'll begin with an overview of how our reasoning systems have evolved to include automatic processing that isn't available to introspective awareness and more effortful, deliberate, introspectively available reasoning. We'll consider the social contexts of our ancestors: how cultural evolution can lead to unjustifiably endorsing the natural and falling prey to status quo bias, how disposed we are towards adopting and defending the beliefs of our tribes and judging ingroup members more favorably, why we feel the force of impartiality from the armchair but in practice feel willing to go to great lengths to help people in our inner circles but inclined to dismiss the readily available means to help the global poor. We'll think about the cognitive psychological processes that give rise to moral intuitions and learn how to carefully examine these intuitions, consider why we might have evolved to have them, and figure out whether or not, on reflection, we have good reason to endorse them. We'll think about what it feels like to learn that we might be wrong, why we're so resistant to changing our minds, and how we can work to be the kind of people that feel proud instead of reluctant or ashamed to recognize weaknesses in our moral reasoning and update our beliefs in response.

To do this, we'll make our way through a moral evaluation primer: We'll begin by thinking about what moral claims are, learning about the distinction between descriptive and normative claims and noticing different kinds of norms and standards. We'll consider different focuses of moral evaluation, including acts, states of affairs and characters, and different styles of moral reasoning, like arguing from theories, principles, or values. Such a primer equips students with helpful terms and distinctions (eg. right and wrong, permissible and impermissible, obligatory and supererogatory) while illustrating relevant concepts with material that highlights common moral reasoning pitfalls. So for example, when learning about evaluation of states of affairs, we'll consider the empirical data that shows how we fall prey to scope neglect, how we respond to victims as the number of victims increases, how we care more about the proportion of a problem we can solve than the absolute amount of good we can do, how we neglect low-probability high-value outcomes when we gauge the expected value of our actions, and how we fail to understand differences in how diminishing marginal utility affects different kinds of value. When we learn about evaluating characters, we'll look at data that suggests that we systematically misjudge intentions, demonize and fail to accurately consider perspectives of people who disagree with us, and we'll think about why we're inclined to take positive outcomes to be indications of our good character and negative outcomes to be unlucky situational flukes, but assume the reverse about other people. Most importantly, we'll learn and practice implementing reasoning tactics that help address these pitfalls. Sometimes these strategies involve adopting different perspectives in order to get ourselves to *feel* differently, and often they involve understanding the shortcomings of our empathic responses and intuitions and learning to override our faulty judgments with calculated System 2 reasoning.

In short, there is a great deal of progress that students can make by setting aside most theoretical and structural questions in ethics and embracing the idea that we are largely good, caring people who reason badly but can learn to do better. I hope to keep my old Philosophy 110 course in circulation. I think there's great value in teaching traditional approaches to ethics. But genuinely applied, genuinely practical, moral decision-making courses ought to exist in addition to these traditional approaches. And if I were forced to choose between teaching a huge class of Ross and EECS students, most of whom won't take any further philosophy courses, about the Categorical Imperative or about how to have higher impact careers and become more caring people, I'd choose the latter.

When not teaching her wildly popular PHIL 110, Professor Edmonds enjoys worldwide biking adventures. To learn more about her, visit www.annaedmonds.com

The Philosophy Department warmly welcomed **Yancey Stricker** (Kickstarter Co-Founder) as the **2022 Ferrando Family Visiting Lecturer** for Winter 2022, and also this academic year's second in-person event!

Strickler's talk*, *Self-Interest and the Post-Individual*, addressed that our definition of "self" has changed considerably in the past two decades. We are no longer defined as merely physical or even spiritual beings — we contain multitudes of selves — physical, tribal, digital, virtual, spiritual — that coexist inside us. This is producing a new human experience: the post-individual. The post-individual is a state of being in which liberated individuals carry multiple, overlapping, group-based identities that are extensions of their self, that define who they are, that are more theoretical in nature, and that fill the space previous generations reserved for relationships with others. The post-individual isn't the end of the individual, it's a new hero's journey brought on by technology and the threat of global catastrophe.

Strickler began by explaining that "we're moving from a belief in the power of individualism — illustrated by the magic wand way of thinking — to a belief in the power of groups and networks — democracy, cooperativism, fascism, and other forms of collectivism." This belief in the power of individualism "came to dominate Western societies over recent centuries. But as the world has been reset in the 21st century through the internet, then mobile phones, then COVID, and ultimately climate change, individualism has gone from the solution to our problems to a solution *and* a cause of them."

"The hyperchallenges we face," he continues, "are too big for any one individual to solve, and the collective outcomes of our individual human nature continue to exacerbate them."

This leads us to a new shift in human history — that of the era of the post-individual, or as some have referred to it, "youth mode", where younger people increasingly abandon outward displays of individuality because by looking normal it is easier to blend in. Strickler cited a 2013 report by research group K-Hole, which noted, "Once upon a time people were born into communities and had to find their individuality. Today people are born individuals and have to find their communities." Individuality was once an epic life-discovering quest. "[A]s individualism-by-birth reaches an apex, we're finding that individualism not only emancipates people from the constraints of their groups and cultures, it separates and isolates them."

Friendships are also changing (diminishing) over the years, possibly leading to more loneliness or even isolation. But how can this be when it seems we are in a time with the internet connecting us to one another like never before? This leads to his discussion of the post-individual, or a state of being in which liberated individuals carry multiple, overlapping, group-based identities that define who they are. " The spaces previous generations filled with close human relationships are now filled with these identities and groups. This is how people can be both more connected than any generation before while also being lonelier and having fewer close relationships than any generation in modern memory. We don't have relationships with each other. We have relationships with ideas and symbols of each other. The post-individual's relationships are more aesthetic, ideological, and theoretical than relationships of the past." While people may be more globally empathic, they are more locally apathetic.

Strickler reminds us that we as a society have been at this point before — specifically in the 12th century when individualism began to emerge as a new force in human history, and again in the 19th century's Gilded Age — a push against wealth and individualism and growing call for civic values as we are seeing today with global challenges (ie COVID, climate change).

Strickler cites a conversation he recently had with Argentinian democracy activist Pia Mancini who uses the term *yosotros* - seeing how individual actions reflect a group, while also seeing how a group's actions reflect on you. "*Yosotros* is meant to bridge collectivist and individualistic ideologies, creating new forms of agency and power."

He concluded that "the post-individual isn't the end of the individual, it's a new hero's journey of more complicated individuals finding themselves in a new world. Individuals coming together to freely associate, create, and collaborate in ways that respect them while harnessing the power of groups, and in which they are not just bound by blood, but by the many interests and affinities and beliefs they share."

*excerpts from 2022 Ferrando Lecture

Juliana Bidadanure (Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Stanford) was our keynote speaker for our **Fall 2022 Ferrando Family Visiting Lecture** held November 16.

She presented “Understanding Demonization”, and discussed that in the age of individual responsibility, those at the bottom of the income hierarchy are routinely shamed. Out-of-work benefits claimants are subject to particularly severe forms of vilification, their unemployment being portrayed as resulting from personal failings. When these shortcomings are constructed as moral failings, we enter the space of what she calls “demonization”. Demonization is the portrayal of individuals as wicked threats to the community and as worthy of deep moral contempt for their alleged behavior. Benefits recipients are demonized when they undergo sustained attacks on their moral character, when they are viewed as deliberately choosing idleness over hard work. The trope of the lazy free rider living at taxpayers’ expense is remarkably uniform across advanced economies and has been an effective strategy to undermine support for welfare. Because demonization diminishes its target’s moral standing, it poses a critical threat to our ability to stand as equals, which contemporary theorists allege to be an essential component of a just and democratic society. Starting from the example of benefits recipients, she identifies several morally significant steps in the workings of demonization, clarifies its social function, and characterizes precisely what makes it wrong.

Professor Bidadanure was a Tanner Lecture symposiate in Fall 2021; we were delighted to welcome her back to campus. She is the founder and Faculty Director of the Stanford Basic Income Lab, which has provided an academic home to the growing interest in Universal Basic Income. Her work is at the intersection of political philosophy and public policy. She has been working on how we should conceptualize the value of equality, in general, and on inequalities between age groups and generations in particular. She has published extensively on this topic, most notably the article "Making Sense of Age Group Justice: A Time for Relational Equality?" for the journal *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* and the book manuscript *Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals* (forthcoming with Oxford University Press). She holds a courtesy appointment with the Political Science Department.



Philosophy Faculty

DEPARTMENTAL FACULTY

Elizabeth Anderson - John Dewey Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, Arthur F. Thurnau Professor, Max Shaye Professor of Public Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies, College of Literature, Science, and the Arts; Moral and Political Philosophy, Epistemology, Feminist Theory, Philosophy of Social Science

David Baker - Associate Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science

Gordon Belot - Lawrence Sklar Collegiate Professor of Philosophy and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science

Sarah Buss - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ethics, Action Theory, Moral Psychology

Victor Caston - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ancient Philosophy, Medieval Philosophy, Austrian Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics

Emmalon Davis - Assistant Professor; Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Epistemology

Kristie Dotson - Professor of Philosophy; Professor, Department of Afroamerican and African Studies; University Diversity and Social Transformation Professor

Anna Edmonds - LEO Lecturer I; Ethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Maegan Fairchild - Assistant Professor; Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic

Daniel Herwitz - Frederick G. L. Huetwell Professor; Aesthetics, Film, Philosophical Essay, Transitional Societies

Renée Jorgensen - Assistant Professor; Social and Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Language

James Joyce - Cooper Harold Langford Collegiate Professor; Decision Theory, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science

Eric Lormand - Associate Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Language

Daniel Lowe - LEO Lecturer II; Moral and Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Moral Epistemology

Ishani Maitra - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Language, Feminist Philosophy, Philosophy of Law

David Manley - Associate Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language, Epistemology

Sarah Moss - William Wilhartz Professor of Philosophy and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology

Wade Munroe - Adjunct Lecturer in Philosophy; Research Fellow; Epistemology, Philosophy of Psychology, Ethics

Sonya Özbey - Assistant Professor and Denise Research Fellow; Chinese Philosophy

Peter Railton - Gregory S. Kavka Distinguished University Professor; John Stephenson Perrin Professor; Arthur F. Thurnau Professor; Ethics, Philosophy of Science, Political Philosophy, Moral Psychology, Aesthetics

Laura Ruetsche - Louis Loeb Collegiate Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Physics, Philosophy of Science

Tad Schmaltz - Department Chair, Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; History of Early Modern, History and Philosophy of Science

Janum Sethi - Assistant Professor and Denise Research Fellow; Kant, History of Modern Philosophy, Aesthetics

Chandra Sripada - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Ethics, Moral Psychology, Mind, Cognitive Science

Eric Swanson - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Formal Epistemology

James Tappenden - Professor and James B. and Grace J. Nelson Fellow; Philosophy of Language, Philosophy and History of Mathematics, Philosophical Logic

Brian Weatherson - Marshall M. Weinberg Professor; Epistemology, Philosophy of Language

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Linda A.W. Brakel - Research Associate; Adjunct Clinical Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Medical School

Nicolas Cornell - Professor of Law and Philosophy, UM Law School

Daniel Fryer - Assistant Professor of Law, UM Law School

Scott Hershovitz - Professor of Philosophy of Law, Ethics, Political Philosophy; Thomas G. & Mabel Long Professor of Law, UM Law School

Ezra Keshet - Associate Professor of Philosophy; Associate Professor of Linguistics

Mika LaVaque-Manty - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Arthur F. Thurnau Professor, Associate Professor of Political Science

George Mashour - Adjunct Research Associate of Philosophy; Robert B. Sweet Professor of Anesthesiology, Chair, Department of Anesthesiology; Adjunct Professor of Psychology

Gabe Mendlow - Professor of Philosophy; William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor, Professor of Law, UM Law School

Donald Regan - Professor of Philosophy; William W. Bishop, Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law

Kyle Whyte - George Willis Pack Professor of Environment and Sustainability; Affiliate Professor of Philosophy

Ekow Yankah - Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, UM Law School

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Stephen Darwall
Allan Gibbard
Louis Loeb
Donald Munro
Lawrence Sklar
Richmond Thomason
Kendall Walton
Nicholas White

Professor Gordon Belot has been elected as an **American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Fellow for 2021**. He is one of 20 U-M faculty members that were elected as initially announced in January, 2022. Professor Belot's primary interests are in philosophy of physics, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. His book *Geometric Possibility* (Oxford U Press, 2011) explores the feasibility of adapting standard accounts of physical possibility to provide an account of geometric possibility of the sort required by relationalism about space. Most of his papers are concerned with inter-theory relations in physics, with the interpretative, methodological, and metaphysical implications of symmetry principles, or with confirmation and underdetermination. His current project concerns general relativity, cosmology, and boundary conditions. Before joining the faculty at Michigan in 2008, he taught at Princeton University, New York University, and the University of Pittsburgh. He has held a post-doctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. *Geometric Possibility* won the 2014 Lakatos Award.

Congratulations, Gordon!

Assistant Professor Emmalon Davis has been awarded an **American Council of Learned Societies fellowship for 2023**. She was also the sole philosopher in this class! She notes that her project, "Paradoxes of Resistance: Maria Stewart's Political Philosophy", examines apparent contradictions in the political thought of Maria Stewart. It first taxonomizes scholarly efforts to recover Stewart's political voice, and argues that while these efforts acknowledge Stewart's place in the political canon, they do not fully engage the complexity of Stewart's thought, especially the tension between her dual advocacy of insurrection and moral suasion. The study develops an interpretive framework in which Stewart's materiality as a black woman, political thinker, and radical activist—in a society that does not provide the resources for her liberation—constitutes the starting point from which contradictions in her politics must be understood. "Paradoxes of Resistance" argues that these contradictions are not theoretical inconsistencies, but astute mappings of the paradoxical nature of resistance to oppression. Further, Professor Davis specializes in ethics, social and political philosophy, and epistemology, especially where these areas intersect with philosophy of race and feminist philosophy. She is committed to removing the barriers faced by underrepresented students in the university setting and to proactively creating social and pedagogical environments in which all learners can flourish. She has been a faculty mentor at the Princeton University Compass Workshop and the Rutgers Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy—both of which bring undergraduate students from diverse backgrounds together for philosophical discussion, networking, and mentorship opportunities—and she has led pedagogy workshops for graduate students on topics like developing inclusive syllabi and facilitating equitable classroom discussions.

Congratulations, Emmalon!

Sekhar Chandra Sripada has been **promoted to the rank of Professor** with both the Department of Psychiatry and the Department of Philosophy! His research examines agency, attention, and self-control from cross-disciplinary perspectives. His work integrates philosophical theorizing with results drawn from empirical disciplines, especially psychology, neuroscience, and psychiatry. He holds a joint appointment at the university in Philosophy and Psychiatry. Recent papers explore self-regulation (i.e., willpower), intentional action, free will, and the nature of norms, and appear in journals in philosophy (e.g., PPR, Nous) and the sciences (e.g., PNAS, Psychological Science).

Congratulations, Chandra!

Professor Ishani Maitra has been approved for the additional title of **Professor in the Honors Program**, with tenure, to begin in January, 2023. Her research specializes in the areas of philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of law. She has published extensively on assertion and testimony, silencing and pornography, and the right to free speech, among other topics. Her work has been published in top journals in the field, including the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Studies*, and the *Journal of Moral Philosophy*.

Congratulations, Ishani!

Visiting Faculty

Tamer Nawar (Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Groningen) the James B. and Grace J. Nelson Visiting Professor, Winter 2022, presented virtually *Conflicting Appearances, Suspension of Judgment, and Pyrrhonian Skepticism without Commitment,* noting that by means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a non-dogmatic manner is not entirely clear and raises broader questions concerning the rationality of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Further, he argued against existing accounts of the Modes and defended an alternative account which better explains the logical structure, rational nature, and effectiveness of the Modes. In particular, he clarified how the Modes appeal to concerns about epistemic impartiality and circularity, the nature of the skeptic's non-doxastic attitude(s), and how the skeptic can employ the Modes non-dogmatically.

Professor Nawar is a specialist in ancient and medieval philosophy with expertise in the history of analytic philosophy. In his relatively short career, he has published fifteen articles in refereed journals along with seven book chapters. His work has appeared in journals such as the *Journal of the History of Philosophy, Mind, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, The Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophers' Imprint, Phronesis,* and *Synthese*.

During his visit, he taught two courses for the department. The first, an undergraduate course entitled "Language and Reality in the Twentieth Century", covered classic articles of the analytic tradition, from Grege to David Lewis, and served as an excellent survey for the department's majors. The second, a graduate seminar course entitled "Fate, Freedom, and Necessity: Past and Present", focused on the issue of the status of future contingents in ancient and medieval philosophy, from Aristotle, Cicero, and Boethius to Al-Farabi and Ockham. Both courses greatly enriched the department's teaching during the winter term.

Jacob Klein (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Colgate University) the James B. and Grace J. Nelson Visiting Professor, Fall 2022, presented *A Stoic and Socratic Theory of Motivation,* noting that stoic moral psychology—dominant for several centuries within the Greek and Roman philosophical tradition—centrally includes a phenomenon designated by the Greek term *hormê*, which translators have variously rendered as *appetitio*, 'conation,' 'impulse,' 'desire,' *Trieb*, *tendance*, and (more recently) 'effort.' *Hormai*, of which the pathê or emotions are central instances, are characterized in the Greek sources both as representations with proposition-like content and as motions in some way directed towards an intentional object. Accordingly, they puzzlingly appear to have, and perhaps even to integrate, both belief- and desire-like features. He considers this element of Stoic theory against both its Socratic background and contemporary accounts of motivation.

His interests are ancient ethics and moral psychology generally, but especially as they relate to questions about the objectivity of norms and value. He has recently published two longer papers on some of the central features of Stoic ethical theory. One of these argues for an epistemic account of the value and disvalue the Stoics assign to so-called indifferents; the other reconstructs the Stoic theory of *oikeiôsis* to show how it supports Stoic claims about the human good. The latter paper, "The Stoic Argument from *oikeiôsis*," was selected by *The Philosopher's Annual* as one of the ten best articles published in philosophy in 2016. He is currently working on a book manuscript (*The Ethics of the Older Stoics*) that connects the conclusions of these papers to the Stoic theory of motivation and the details of Stoic moral psychology.

During the Fall term, he taught PHIL 429, "Ethical Analysis"(an undergraduate course) and PHIL 501, "Plato" (a graduate seminar), both of which, were well received.

Courtesy Appointments - Recent Additions/News

Nicolas Cornell is Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. He teaches and writes in the areas of contract law, moral philosophy, remedies, and private law theory. He has held a dry appointment with Philosophy since January, 2021.

Daniel Fryer (U-M JD '18) is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. His work draws on scholarship in social and political philosophy, law, the social sciences, and public policy. He is also influenced by social movements and intellectual discourse outside the academy. He has held a dry appointment with Philosophy since September, 2021.

Kyle Whyte is the George Willis Pack Professor of Environment and Sustainability with the School for Environment and Sustainability. He teaches in the SEAS environmental justice specialization. He is the founding Faculty Director of the Tishman Center for Social Justice and the Environment, Principal Investigator of the Energy Equity Project, and also an Affiliated Professor of Native American Studies. He has held a dry appointment with Philosophy since January, 2022.

Ekow Yankah (U-M BA '97) is the Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School. His work focuses on questions of political and criminal theory and particularly, questions of political obligation and justifications of punishment. He received a dry appointment with Philosophy this August, 2022.

Scott Hershovitz, the Thomas G. and Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, recently published *Nasty, Brutish, and Short: Adventures in Philosophy With My Kids* (Penguin Press 2022). See page 62 for excerpts. His book *Law is a Moral Practice* is forthcoming from Harvard U Press in 2023. He has held a dry appointment with Philosophy since 2012.

Ezra Keshet, Assistant Professor of Linguistics and Philosophy, has recently had his dry appointment with Philosophy renewed for an additional five years. His recent article "Unifying the E-type and Plural Dynamic Approaches to Improper Scope Phenomena" (*Linguistics & Philosophy*) with Steven Abney is currently in review.

Gabriel Mendlow, Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School, presented his paper "Thoughts, Crimes, and Thought Crimes" (*MI Law Review,* Vol. 118, Issue 5, 2020) at the Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop (RIW) on Knowledge, Information, and Society (KIS). He discussed how thought crimes are the stuff of dystopian fiction, not contemporary law. Or so we're told. Yet our criminal legal system may in a sense punish thought regularly, even as our existing criminal theory lacks the resources to recognize this state of affairs for what it is—or to explain what might be wrong with it. He has held a dry appointment with Philosophy since September, 2019.



Sarah Moss, William Wilhartz Professor in Philosophy, presented *Knowing What's at Stake: Epistemology and Criminal Justice Reform* at our inaugural William Wilhartz Lecture this past January.

In her lecture, she tells us that "in many criminal trials, judges are not allowed to inform juries of the sentences that a defendant may face if convicted. This prohibition is commonly justified on the grounds that informing juries about sentencing would 'inject irrelevant considerations into the jury's deliberations as to guilt.' Unfortunately, this justification is missing something big." In this talk, she argued that there is an important reason for jurors to know the potential consequences of a conviction—namely, without this knowledge, jurors may be unable to grasp the legal standard of proof that they are being asked to apply.

Professor Moss began her lecture by asking what exactly is proof beyond a reasonable doubt and what does it take to meet this burden of proof. Lawyers routinely define reasonable doubt in terms of threshold-justified confidence, however, this can lead to overturned verdicts. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt actually requires something more than just rational high credence. To be proven at a trial, a claim has to be knowledge for the fact finder - the judge or the jury.

Moss further notes: 1) for any claim that you want to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to prove it, the fact finder has to come to know that claim, 2) the fact finder's knowledge of the defendant's guilt has to be based on evidence that has been admitted at a trial, and 3) knowledge is actually important to understanding other standards such as the civil standard of proof (a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence). But knowledge plays a role in understanding all of these. And what someone knows can depend on what is at stake. Legal proof depends on knowledge and knowledge can depend on what is at stake; when combined together, one can conclude that legal proof can depend on what is at stake. If a defendant is believed to be guilty, whether that belief is knowledge might depend on just how bad it would be if you turned out to be wrong. The more at stake and the higher the cost, the more difficult the level of reasonable doubt becomes. Moss concludes that a jury has good reason to know what is at stake in their decision (for example, what the proposed sentence may be). This information would help clarify: what does the criminal standard of proof require?

She continues with just how serious an issue this is in our judicial system, citing examples of how a jury could not determine or guess at the proposed sentences despite knowing state statutes and what typical punishments may be. Juries do not know the stakes.

To view Professor Moss's lecture in its entirety, please visit: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=atFRgVigrHY

Professor Moss works mainly in epistemology and philosophy of language. Her research also addresses questions in formal semantics, philosophy of the mind, and legal philosophy.

* William Wilhartz graduated from U-M in 1891 and was simultaneoulsy enrolled in *both* LSA and Michigan Law.

**Collegiate-Endowed Lectures are at the heart of the college's extraordinary faculty. The LSA Collegiate Professorship is the college's highest faculty honor. It is awarded to those who demonstrate a sustained record of excellence in research and scholarship, in teaching, in service, and in other contributions to the university. Collegiate Lectures commemorate this significant milestone in a professor's career. Endowed professorships have long been recognized as both a hallmark of academic quality and a means by which a university honors its most esteemed faculty and teachers. These professors are the most eminent scholars in the field, and they attract outstanding graduate students, influence generations, and enhance the reputation of the department, college, and university while creating a philanthropic legacy.

Picture a philosopher, and you'll probably come up with someone old and wise, like Socrates, or avant-garde, like Simone de Beauvoir. Or maybe you'll imagine an academic, toiling in a tweed jacket. Whatever image you've got, you've likely pictured an adult. But the truth is that philosophers are more common on preschool playgrounds than college campuses.



That might sound odd, since we tend to think of kids as limited and literal thinkers. For a long time, that's the picture developmental psychology painted. Jean Piaget famously argued that all kids move through a set of developmental stages, arriving at the capacity for abstract thought at about age 12.

Of course, there's something to the idea that kids' minds mature as they get older. But Piaget was wrong about the cognitive capacities of little kids—wildly so. Children are sophisticated thinkers, more than capable of abstract thought. They're creative too. Indeed, in some ways, kids make better philosophers than adults. They question things grown-ups take for granted. And they're open to new ideas. We can learn a lot from listening to kids—and from thinking with them.

The late philosopher Gareth Matthews was one of the first people to notice this. One day, as he recounts in his book *The Philosophy of Childhood*, Matthews told his 4-year-old daughter, Sarah, that their cat, Fluffy, had fleas. Sarah asked where they had come from. The fleas must have jumped from another cat onto Fluffy, Matthews told her. "How did that cat get fleas?" Sarah asked. They must have come from a different cat, Matthews said. "But Daddy," Sarah insisted, "it can't go on and on like that forever; the only thing that goes on and on like that is numbers!"

At the time, Matthews was teaching a class that covered the cosmological argument, which aims to show that God exists. There are many versions of the argument, some quite complicated, but the basic idea is simple: Every event has a cause, but that can't continue back forever—so there must be a first cause, which was itself uncaused. Some—most famously, Thomas Aquinas—say the first cause was God.

The argument has problems. Why does the chain of causes have to come to an end? Perhaps the universe is eternal—endless in both directions. And even if there was a first cause, why think it was God? But it doesn't matter whether the argument works. According to Piaget, Sarah should have been in the preoperational stage of development, so called because kids in it can't yet use logic. But Sarah's logic was exquisite—far more compelling than the cosmological argument. Whatever you make of an infinite regress of causes, it's hard to imagine an infinite regress of cats.

Matthews decided to study kids and their capacity for philosophical thought, introducing many people to the idea that kids are serious thinkers. Over decades of conversations with children, he found that "spontaneous excursions into philosophy" were common from the ages of 3 to 7. And he was struck by the subtle ways in which kids reasoned, as well as the frequency with which they surfaced philosophical questions.

I've been struck by that too. I'm a philosopher and a father of two boys, Rex and Hank. From the time they could talk, they have asked philosophical questions and tried to answer them. "I wonder if I'm dreaming my entire life," Rex said one night at dinner. He was 4 and already a fine philosopher, so the question didn't shock me. "What a cool idea, Rex! A guy named Descartes wondered the same thing. Do you think you are dreaming?" I asked. "Maybe!" he said, happy at the thought that he might be hallucinating. And then we went to work trying to prove he wasn't. (Give it a try. It's harder than you think.)

My younger son, Hank, got in on the game too. When he was 7, I asked him whether God was real. We talked about it for a few minutes, then he begged off. "I don't like to talk about this," he said. "Why?" "Because God would find it insulting—if he's real."

I told him he was making Pascal's Wager. The bet is named after Blaise Pascal, the 17th-century French mathematician who also dabbled in philosophy. "You're thinking the same thing he was," I explained to Hank: "that you should believe in God, so that you don't upset him—if he's real." "I've always thought that," Hank said. "That's why I never want to talk about it."

I'm not sharing these stories to brag about my kids. In this respect, they are absolutely ordinary. Every kid—every single one—is a philosopher. In fact, they're some of the best around.

Why? For one thing, kids are constantly puzzled by the world. Several years back, a psychologist named Michelle Chouinard listened to recordings of young children spending time with their parents. In just over 200 hours, she heard nearly 25,000 questions.

That works out to more than two a minute. About a quarter of those questions sought explanations; the kids wanted to know *how* or *why*.

Kids also don't worry that they'll make mistakes or seem silly as they puzzle things out. They haven't yet learned that serious people don't spend time on some questions like "Am I dreaming my entire life?" Once they figure that out—at about 8 or 9—their spontaneous forays into philosophy stall out. Before then, they're fearless thinkers, unconstrained by grown-ups' ingrained habits of thought.

Developmental psychologists are catching on to kids' capabilities. Nowadays, most of them reject the idea that kids' minds improve as they age. In *The Philosophical Baby*, Alison Gopnik writes, "Children aren't just defective adults, primitive grownups gradually attaining our perfection and complexity." Their minds are different, but "equally complex and powerful." Child development, she says, is "more like a metamorphosis, like caterpillars becoming butterflies, than like simple growth—though it may seem that children are the vibrant, wandering butterflies who transform into caterpillars inching along the grown-up path."

It would be wonderful if we could help kids hold on to a bit of the butterfly as they get older. The world is a puzzling place. There's so much in it that doesn't make sense, especially now. If we can sustain kids' curiosity—and their willingness to go wherever their minds lead—they just might end up as more discerning adults.

Kids can help adults recapture our own courage as thinkers, too. All we have to do is talk to them and take them seriously. Chances are the cleverest person you know can't tie her shoes. But with a well-placed *why*, she can push you past your ability to explain everyday things, or call into question truths you hold dear. She can even help you see the world in a new way.

I realized how wise kids can be when Rex finally found a way to make peace with the possibility that he might be dreaming his entire life. For years, we played a game. Rex would try to find a way to prove he wasn't dreaming. I would knock it down.

"Wouldn't it be weird," Rex said at 7, "if you and I were having the same dream? And we have to be having the same dream if we're talking to each other." "Yeah, that would be weird," I said. "But what if I'm not real? What if I'm just a character in your dream?" He took time to process it. And repeat it. And extend it. "So my friends might be characters too?" he said. "Yeah, that's right." We were rounding the corner into our driveway. His mother, Julie, had just arrived home with Hank. "What about Mommy?" Rex said, pointing ahead. "She could be a character in your dream too." Rex's face fell. And he said, softly: "Then I don't want to wake up."

Scott Hershovitz is the Thomas G. and Mabel Long Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, where he directs Michigan's Law and Ethics Program.

This article has been adapted from Professor Hershovitz's book, *Nasty, Brutish, and Short: Adventures in Philosophy With My Kids* (Penguin Press 2022) and as appearing on-line, in *The Atlantic*, 4/26/2022 at https://www.theatlantic.com/author/scott-hershovitz/

Tanner Library Happenings

By Summer Mengarelli, Tanner Library Manager

With a new library manager beginning the 21/22 Academic Year, improvements have continued in our Tanner Library - still the best little gem of a library on campus

Dear Students, Staff, Faculty & Friends of UM Philosophy:

Allow me to introduce myself. My name is Summer Mengarelli. As we begin the Fall 2022 semester, I begin my second year as the manager of Tanner Library! Before starting as a graduate student in library science and digital curation at UM's School of Information, I got my bachelor's degree in philosophy (surprise!), history, and Spanish from a small liberal arts college in an Illinois cornfield. I fell in love with Ann Arbor as soon as I moved here, and if I'm not in Tanner or in class, I am likely camped out with a book in a nearby coffee shop. I wanted to take this opportunity, though, to get you caught up on what I have been doing in Tanner.

My two biggest tasks in the 2021-2022 school year were completing catalog metadata cleanup and conducting an inventory of Tanner's print collections. When my predecessor Stephen Hayden finished the admirable project of migrating Tanner's catalog from the Integrated Library System/Online Public Accessible Catalog (ILS/OPAC) LibraryThing to our current ILS/OPAC, LibraryWorld, the migrated records turned out to contain encoding errors. As Stephen detailed in last year's newsletter, these errors typically occurred with diacritics. As you can imagine, a philosophy library's catalog that is unable to return results for a search on "René Descartes," "*corporéité*," or "*Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit: Aus einem Feldweggespräch über das Denken*" is limited in its usefulness. Stephen completed much of the manual corrections, and I spent some time last year parsing through the remaining catalog records. I also worked on creating clear and helpful labels for links that take catalog users to excerpts, tables of contents, or digitally accessible versions of the item. Previously, these links were raw web addresses; now, you can keep your eye out for language like "Click here to access this item's table of contents" at the bottom of the record.

The conversion to LibraryWorld has proven to be a worthwhile endeavor. When I add new books, periodicals (i.e. journals) and (my favorite!) UM Philosophy and PPE undergraduate theses to the catalog, I need the flexibility LibraryWorld provides to use the MARC (machine-readable cataloging) fields appropriate for the material: 020 for a book's ISBN or 022 for a journal's ISSN, for instance. In fact, this year, one of my goals is to revisit the catalog records for periodicals that were cataloged in LibraryThing, our old system. Since it did not technically support materials other than books, previous Tanner librarians found workaround ways to add journals to the catalog, and I would like to standardize these records to improve search and discovery.

But back to last year – my other major project was an inventory of Tanner's collection. At its most basic level, this is a time-consuming process that involves pulling each book, journal, or thesis off the shelf and scanning its barcode into a spreadsheet. This also allows me, however, to get a sense of whether anything has gone missing (by comparing to the last inventory, completed a few years ago) or was reshelved in the wrong spot.* I could also combine this and the metadata cleanup workflow by searching each item in the catalog to check for encoding errors or unlabeled hyperlinks. I liked to imagine Tanner was looking a little tidier, too, as I realigned the spines along each shelf.

Just as things have changed in the library since I first opened the door last August, Tanner has witnessed changes in my own life – in fact, I completed my application to my second master's program in Tanner, taking advantage of my after-hours access. My hours at Tanner have been a unique opportunity to apply what I have been learning about cataloging, user needs, and information access; however, they have also been peaceful, industrious, and intriguing interludes to the lectures, coursework, and other obligations that fill the rest of my schedule. You may not know me, but my hope is that I have been able to maintain the Tanner Library as a peaceful, industrious, and intriguing space for you to find rest and inspiration. And if you don't know me – please reach out at tanner-library@umich.edu! I am happy to help, chat, or just get to know the UM Philosophy community a little bit more. I'm looking forward to the 22-23 academic year and continuing improvements in *our* library!

* Which reminds me (I can't let this opportunity pass me by)... if you pull an item from Tanner's shelves, please feel free to leave it at one of the tables, my desk, or the designated box on the table in front of my desk, and I will be happy to reshelve it. :D

Coming March 29 & 30, 2023

Tanner Lecture on Human Values

with Professor Sally Haslanger (MIT)

Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies

Professor Haslanger has published in metaphysics, epistemology, feminist theory, and critical race theory. Broadly speaking, her work links issues of social justice with contemporary work in epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. A collection of her papers that represent this effort over twenty years was collected in *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique* (Oxford 2012), and it received the Joseph B. Gittler award for outstanding work in philosophy of the social sciences. In addition to her research on social justice, Haslanger is deeply committed to promoting diversity in philosophy and beyond. She was the founder and convener of the Women in Philosophy Task Force, and co-founded PIKSI-Boston, a summer philosophy institute for undergraduates from under-represented groups.

Intersecting Social Systems and the Reproduction of Injustice

Societies are complex systems – or clusters of interacting systems – that reproduce themselves: their culture, their practices, and their structures, in ways that are unjust.

In this lecture, I will take up two broad questions:

- What does it mean to say that injustice is systemic, and how does that affect our efforts to promote justice?

- How do social systems interact and reproduce themselves?

By considering case studies involving the criminal justice system, the immigration system, and child protective services, I will argue that we need to rethink how gender and race are produced and reproduced. In this lecture, I am asking about the process of social reproduction rather than providing a normative theory of justice (or injustice). However, in order to understand and intervene in injustice successfully, we need to be clear about what we are up against.

Lecture: Wednesday, March 29, 2023 @ TBD — Rackham Auditorium

Symposium: Thursday, March 30, 2023 — 10:00 AM - 12:30 PM Rackham Amphitheatre
Symposiates:
Nora Berenstain, Professor of Philosophy (UT Knoxville)
Robin Dembroff, Assistant Professor of Philosophy (Yale)
Nancy Fraser, Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science (The New School for Social Research)

Lecture and Symposium are free and open to the public
Wheelchair and handicap accessible. ASL interpreted.

Farewell and Happy Retirement, Professor Emeritus Thomason

While we saw many changes during the last few years, one was the retirement of our long-time colleague and friend, Professor Rich Thomason. We bid farewell to Professor Thomason in 2022.

Professor Thomason was born in Chicago, IL and grew up in the surrounding area. He received his BA degree from Wesleyan University in 1961, his MA degree from Yale University in 1963, and his PhD degree also from Yale in 1965. In 1965, he was named the Sterling Fellow at Yale University. While at Yale, he was an Assistant Professor of Philosophy from 1966-1969, and in 1969, he was promoted to the rank of Associate Professor of Philosophy.

In 1972, he was appointed a Mellon Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pittsburgh, was an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics from 1973-1975, was promoted to Professor in 1975, and served in that capacity until 1998. Professor Thomason joined the University of Michigan faculty in 1999 as a Professor of Philosophy, Computer Science, and Linguistics, and held that title until his retirement.



Professor Thomason's central interests were in logic. He has published over thirty-five articles and a textbook in this area, and has served for over ten years as the Editor-in-Chief of the *Journal of Philosophical Logic*. He has been particularly concerned with adapting logical theories for applications beyond the purely mathematical sciences. This led into an abiding interest in linguistics, a field in which he had been active as a researcher and teacher since 1971; his main linguistic specialties are semantics and pragmatics.

During the last fifteen years, Professor Thomason had become increasingly concerned with issues relating to theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence. His chief research interests in computer science are knowledge representation (especially inheritance, nonmonotonic reasoning, and reasoning about knowledge), and the design of effective communication systems. Beginning in 1986, with NSF support and working with colleagues at Carnegie Mellon University and the University of Maryland, he worked to develop and apply a theory of inheritance systems. In 1994, he engaged in a research project concerned with the development of architectures for natural language interpretation and generation.

While at Michigan, Professor Thomason renewed his interests in philosophy, and started new projects in philosophy of language, the logic of context, the theory of practical reasoning, and the formalization of reasoning about the attitudes of other agents. For many years, he taught Minds & Machines as well as Philosophy of Language and Intro to Symbolic Logic. His personal interests include hiking, forestry and land conservation, and nature photography.

Our thanks and well wishes to you, Rich!

From the Grand Rapids Bar Association (August, 2022)

Kenneth E. Tiews, PhD

(1948-2022)

It is with sadness that we annouce the passing of Dr. Kenneth E. Tiews, who died unexpectedly at his home in Grand Rapids on August 10, 2022. Born November 8, 1948, Ken obtained four degrees from the University of Michigan: a BA in 1970, a JD in 1973, and an MA and PhD, both in philosophy, in 1975 and 1977, respectively. He began his legal career with Wheeler Upham, PC, in Grand Rapids in 1977 and was still practicing at the firm at the time of his passing forty-five years later. In addition to becoming one of Michigan's preeminent probate and estate planning attorneys, Ken taught courses in philosophy of law at Aquinas College and Calvin University in Grand Rapids, and lectured at numerous seminars dealing with Michigan probate law. He also served his community as a board member for a number of non-profit organizations. At the time of this writing, a memorial service was pending for November, 2022.

In Memoriam: Ian Fishback (1979-2021)

Dr. Ian Fishback (West Point: BS Middle Eastern Studies 2001; UMich: MA Philosophy 2012; PhD Philosophy 2020) died suddenly on November 19, 2021. He was 42. He achieved the rank of major in the US Army Special Forces. He was awarded with two Bronze Stars, and served four combat tours, two with the 82nd Airborne Division and two with the Fifth Special Forces Group, before retiring in 2014. Having witnessed military prisoners in the Middle East being beaten and abused by US soldiers, in 2005, Dr. Fishback reported these abuses to Sen. John McCain (AZ) and Sen. John W. Warner (WV). He, along with two other former 82nd Airborne members, revealed that prisoners in Afghanistan and Iraq were assaulted, exposed to extreme temperatures, stacked in human pyramids, and deprived of sleep in an effort to extract intelligence. These allegations of abuse eventually led the US Senate to approve anti-torture legislation in 2005 — the Detainee Treatment Act. *Time* magazine named him one of the most influential people of 2005.

From 2012-2015, he served as an instructor at West Point, and in 2013 he collaborated with Rutgers University to create a joint philosophy seminar for West Point cadets and Rutgers philosophy students.

His dissertation, *The Method and Morality of War*, linked just war theory to broader arguments about methods in philosophy, social science, policy, and law. After 9/11 and a string of irregular battles, practical and theoretical challenges to the traditional just war framework undermined its normative foundations. As it lost influence, revisionist just war theory (RJW) ascended. RJW, being more individualistic, asserts that the morality of war is the same as the morality of domestic self-defense, and claims that the traditional understanding of the morality of war is radically mistaken. Fishback argued that the morality of war is the same as the morality of domestic self-defense. However, revisionists misunderstand the empirical nature of war, the moral nature of war, and the relationship between the two.

In 2020, he was awarded the Fulbright-Lund Distinguished Chair of Public International Law to lecture and conduct research in Lund, Sweden at the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. He had plans to continue his work to preserve human rights. Dr. Fishback considered himself an expert on justice because justice is what mattered most to him.

"If we abandon our ideals in the face of adversity and aggression, then those ideals were never really in our possession. I would rather die fighting than give up even the smallest part of the idea that is 'America'." - Dr. Ian Fishback, Ret. Major US Army

On December 10, 2021, the Philosophy Department honored our friend Ian during a memorial event held at the Michigan Union. Attended by faculty, staff, current and former graduate students, and his family, due honor was given to him. Liz Anderson, former Chair and dissertation Chair, spoke fondly of her former student. Other speakers included Tad Schmaltz (Dept. Chair), Anne Curzan (Dean, College of LSA), as well as his father, John Fishback, and other family members. He is survived by his parents, sister, two aunts, and daughter.

The ***Ian Fishback Endowed Fund***, established in 2022 in honor of Dr. Ian Fishback, will be used to support undergraduate student research and enrichment for students enrolled in the Program in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) whose research addresses the roles and responsibilities of those in public life to advance human rights. Dr. Fishback was a tireless defender of human rights and respect for the law of war. A model public servant, he helped expose abuses of detainees in Iraq by U.S. Army forces with whom he served, leading to important legislation to prevent such abuses. (Information on how to donate to this fund is forthcoming.)

We hope to be "living the dream" as Ian always did

Memorial event in Ian's honor, attended by fellow Philosophy colleagues, friends, and family

Remembering Frithjof Bergmann



By Richard M. Perloff (AB, Philosophy '72)
Professor of Communication, Psychology, and Political Science (Cleveland State University)

You could feel the energy in the room, the excitement palpable. People got there early to grab one of the seats in the front of the auditorium so they could see close-up as he gesticulated, pondered, chose his words carefully, stroked that distinctive beard, and spoke, with that oh-so-so cosmopolitan German accent, effortlessly dropping insights into the room, suffused with silence, as we ruminated, grasped, and considered their implications for society, existential philosophy and, truth be told, ourselves.

September 1970. I had talked my way into Philosophy 412, Frithjof Bergmann's fabled Philosophy in Literature class, and had no idea what to expect, but, glancing around the room, feeling the feverish excitement, I felt this was a moment. When Professor Bergmann sauntered to the front of the room, with that blue jean attire, he surprised and unnerved me, contravening my expectations of what a philosophy professor should look like, but it was his opening salvo that took my breath away, words I still remember more than a half-century later: "We are always asking what is wrong with everyone else, with society, America. But I want to ask a different question: What is wrong with us?"

He had me and the class right then by turning the philosophical tables; and the readings – Sartre, Camus, Nietzsche, Kafka – and Bergmann's provocative lectures in this and other classes I took with him influenced me profoundly, and have stayed with me over the past half century.

Like so many of his students, I was greatly saddened to read of his death last year in *Michigan Philosophy News (The Grue)*, for he helped me see things I hadn't seen before, view ideas in different ways, and imbue life with richer meanings. His theory of freedom as identification, perception as openness, his ability to seamlessly integrate art and ideas, his imagination and...resistance to the immutable status quo (he was the first professor I had who said we could call him by his first name and broke up those large U of M lectures to meet with students *individually*, this in 1970-71); all this pried open a mind to new ideas.

As a philosophy major during my years as a Michigan undergraduate from 1968 to 1972, I gained exposure to a great philosophy department (Michigan still has a great department) that included the likes of William Frankena, Richard Brandt, Charles Stephenson, Abraham Kaplan, and many others. In contrast to Professor Frankena – whose gentle teaching I genuinely loved, even if social psychological research mightily challenges his optimistic notion that if people all had the same facts, they could work things out – Professor Bergmann was a locomotive of restless, teeming energy.

He was meant for the '60s, with his liberal philosophy, activism (helping to organize Michigan's famous teach-in, I believe), and willingness to challenge his students' well-socialized beliefs. His notion of freedom fit the '60s like a glove, tailored to a time when African Americans, women, and undergraduate students at different campuses were proclaiming their need to be free and unshackled from the material and psychological oppression that gripped them. Integrating Dostoyevsky's "Underground Man" with Walter Kaufmann's existentialism, he boldly argued that "an act is free if the agent identifies with the elements from which it flows." To be sure, many philosophers would not view freedom in this way; would raise questions about the meaning of identification; and wonder if one could identify with a cause, but, due to lack of exposure to alternative sources, be entirely free to reject its tenets. How insightful it would be to hear Professor Bergmann discourse on this today, on Merleau-Ponty, Camus and Sartre, and his beloved existentialism in a time of postmodernism and all the contemporary philosophical strains.

Years later, I still turn to Fritjhof's ideas, as I am sure others of you who took Philo 412 or other courses do in your own unique intellectual ways. I still think about freedom as identification, what it means today, how identification with prejudiced causes can perhaps enslave, but how it can, as Frithjof suggested with his existential optimism, also liberate the psyche and the spirit. I think also about the implications of philosophy for what ails us, as he suggested on that autumn day many years ago.

And so, so many years later, I want to say: Thank you Frithjof Bergmann for what you taught, how you taught it, your restless mind, your deep commitment to education -- and how you intellectually enriched so many students. We are the better for it, and we identify deeply, see ideas with more openness, and love life just a little more because of you.

Richard M. Perloff (A.B., Michigan, philosophy, 1972) is a professor of communication, psychology, and political science at Cleveland State University since 1979. He has written books on persuasion, political communication and news, and journal articles on the power of psychological perceptions.

We would like to acknowledge with sincere gratitude those who made contributions during the 21/22 Academic Year. We appreciate your on-going support!

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Philosophers Reimagine Socializing for 21/22

Our annual Winter Solstice Party turned out to be the department's first mask-optional event! It was great to have everyone together along with the revival of our Ugly Sweater Contest. Josh Hunt, with the playful reindeer, took 1st, Abdul Ansari with his nordic skier look came in 2nd, Anna Edmonds in her scary moray eel sweater (1st place in 2019) came in 3rd! We even had prizes this year in addition to bragging rights!

Staff's Annual Zingerman's Bakehouse Fun! For this year's baking event, we made German Stollen and Hungarian Walnut Beigli

End of Term Party

Our Annual End of Term Party honored our entire department for a job well-done as we made it through COVID and completed a very successful 21/22! Tad Schmaltz (Dept. Chair) and Brian Weatherson (Grad Studies Chair) presented the annual grad student awards

(see pages 20 & 21 for more details)

Tad Schmaltz, Dept. Chair

Brian Weatherson, Grad Studies Chair

Award recipients
(clock-wise)
Sumeet Patwardhan, Laura Soter, Angela Sun, Calum McNamara, Rebecca Harrison

Staff news

Welcoming New Staff and Acknowledging our Dedicated Team

(clockwise): Shelley Anzalone, Mia Arnold, Judith Beck, & Carson Maynard

Welcome to our new Events and Publicity Coordinator, MIA ARNOLD!

Mia joined UM Philosophy in Fall 2022! She received her Bachelor's of Arts in Arts and Entertainment Management, with a minor in Entrepreneurship. While pursuing her degree, she gained experience working for art fairs (Ann Arbor Summer Art Fair!), festivals (Ann Arbor Film Festival!), art consultant firms, museums (Greenfield Village!), and galleries. The roles she held at these organizations included gallery and programs intern, art consultant intern, graphic design intern, and sponsorships and partnerships intern. After graduating, she found that her favorite experiences were events and design and began to focus specifically on those aspects of arts management. This led her to work as an events coordinator for Maybury Farm and a gallery associate and logistics/design coordinator for Habatat Galleries. Now, she is excited to utilize and cultivate her skills and knowledge as the Events and Publicity Coordinator for the Departments of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies.

While these last few years have been trying and brought about many changes and challenges, our dedicated staff have remained ever more faithful, not only to UM but to our department! Go Grue!

Judith Beck, Undergrad Coordinator for both Philosophy and PPE, has been with UM and UM Philosophy for 13 years! Jude also coordinates facilities requests and classroom coordination. She enjoys working with the undergrads in terms of class selection and guidance, and since she is the department's longest running staff member, all rely on her for her vast wealth of information. She is also a UM grad herself (BA '91) so really gets what our undergrads are going through!

Carson Maynard (MA '03, Linguistics), Graduate Coordinator, has been with UM for 18 years and with Philosophy since 2018! Carson is the point person for inquiries about graduate degrees, admissions, student funding, GSI appointments, training and evaluation, fellowships, tracking student progress and milestones. His eagle eye and attention to detail is bar-none when reviewing The Grue prior to final publication!

Shelley Anzalone, Executive Assistant, has been with UM since 2007 and with Philosophy since 2018! Shelley celebrated 15 years with UM in 2022. She handles matters of departmental administration, including faculty recruitment, promotions, leave requests, and award nomination. She is also the editor/creator of The Grue!

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

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