


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***Satisfaktion* in Nineteenth-Century German Dueling Violence and Its Relevance for Literary Analysis**

Andrew Mills

This article examines the oft-cited, yet frequently underanalyzed notion of *Satisfaktion* in nineteenth-century Germanic culture and society, and aims to establish a concise understanding of the term for the study of German-language fiction. In the article, I analyze the Germanic conceptualization of *Satisfaktion* (*Genugtuung*) and propose a set of terminological parameters that underscore this concept's central role in literary scenes in which dueling violence threatens. My analysis elucidates the predominantly *nonviolent* nature of *Satisfaktion*, as well as the overemphasis scholars traditionally have placed on its violent rendering. I submit that analyses of nineteenth-century literature benefit from a reassessment and clarification of the term. As I demonstrate in my reading of Hoffmann's *The Sandman*, a salient conceptualization of *Satisfaktion* can result in a markedly different, entirely defensible interpretation of the motivations and behavior of the protagonists. The clarification of *Satisfaktion* further prevents misreading many canonical works as being "anti-duel" in essence, despite their apparent critique of the practice.

Keywords: dueling, *Genugtuung*, honor, literary analysis, *Satisfaktion*, violence

The duel's image in the present-day German studies canon of nineteenth-century literature is nearly universally pejorative, with the duel consistently portrayed in tragic, renunciative, or satirical terms. Approximations of this claim have been made already by scholars such as Peter Gay (98–99), Andrew Wisely (81–82), and Bernhard Schlink (378–81). I argue, however, that this scholarship has failed to recognize the extent to which duel-critical literature is unable to imagine a viable alternative to dueling for its protagonists. A nuanced understanding of the historical notion of *Satisfaktion* reveals the conformity of such works to the very masculine-honor-codex precepts that fueled dueling violence. I locate no conceptually viable literary critique of the duel in the traditional canon of German literature of the long nineteenth century and ground this conclusion in the inability of the period's literature to depict an "escape" from the entrenched social compulsion to demand or render *Satisfaktion*.

In this article, I draw on examples of interpersonal conflict amongst honor-bound males from the work and lives of a spectrum of nineteenth-century writers, including Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Eduard Devrient, E. T. A. Hoffmann, and Theodor Herzl. I discuss these specific cases as opposed to numerous other available literary manifestations of dueling and satisfaction because I view the former as producing the most salient examples of particular problems I wish to examine. Other instances involving satisfaction and dueling in the literary record are addressed as extensively as possible in the footnotes. In the following, I first trace the historical and etymological trajectory of the concept of *Satisfaktion* before reassessing the term and demonstrating its value for literary analysis.

A MULTITIERED CONCEPTUALIZATION OF *SATISFAKTION* (*GENUGTUUNG*)

My proposal to explore the nineteenth-century German duel through the lens of *Satisfaktion* is motivated by this historical concept's distinctiveness and inherent complexity. Although the ritualistic practice of the German honor duel is a relic of bygone times—reserved for that privileged minority of males who qualified as “satisfaction capable” (*satisfaktionsfähig*) on account of aristocratic ancestry, membership to the officer corps or to a “fencing” fraternity, or by merit of having achieved a particular social rank—the intimately related concepts of honor and masculinity continue to find sustenance in Western societies alongside diverse manifestations of intermale violence.¹ It is noteworthy that alone the notion of “demanding” or “granting” satisfaction in response to a perceived insult or offense is as quaint and anachronistic as the pistol duel itself.

Satisfaktion as a historical term has been underscrutinized in scholarly studies and is rarely discussed in a nuanced, terminological fashion. Even meticulous and deservedly well-received monographs by Ute Frevert, Kevin McAleer, and Norbert Elias utilize the term in a manner that most frequently appears to identify it as “that which is demanded or given” when a socially qualified male’s sense of honor is injured.² This tendency leads to the common assumption that *Satisfaktion* signifies a request to initiate ritualized dueling violence. In place of this characterization, I classify *Satisfaktion* as a dynamic, multilayered concept and wish to formalize our understanding of the term by distinguishing between three

¹See Bay.

²Kiernan, for example, renders the term vague treatment in his 1988 monograph, interpreting it as a call for single combat in response to an insult (13–14). The essence of *Genugtuung* (*Satisfaktion*) is not articulated in Frevert’s groundbreaking *Men of Honour*, despite the work’s discussion of satisfaction-capable circles in nineteenth-century middle-class society. This assertion is valid also for other instances in which Frevert directly addresses *Satisfaktion*, such as in the essay “Bourgeois” or “Der ‘Louis.’” McAleer refrains from defining *Satisfaktion* in his work *Dueling*, although he appears to recognize its predominantly nonviolent character. Gelber contains the chapter “*Satisfaktionsfähigkeit* and Jewish Pride” in which the term *Satisfaktion* is not defined. Wisely first uses the term in the context of the plural noun *Satisfaktionsfähigen*, which passes without definition or explication. Elias addresses the concept of *Satisfaktion*. However, he does not clarify the term, despite the prominence of its treatment in the chapter 1 subsection entitled “Dueling and Membership of the Imperial Ruling Class: Demanding and Giving Satisfaction.”

distinct levels inherent to it. I then undertake close readings of canonical literary works that thematize honor violence in order to highlight this historical concept's usefulness for the study of literature.

An examination of eighteenth- through twentieth-century German lexical and encyclopedic treatment of *Satisfaktion*, whose Latin derivation of *satis* [= *genug*] and *facere* [= *tun*] produces the Germanic *Genugtuung*, reveals that the two terms were once generally synonymous, developing into distinct concepts over the course of the nineteenth century.³ *Genugtuung* referenced either nonviolent, juridical means of restitution or Christian theological dogma and signified dueling violence only in a secondary manner as a means of recompensing honor-related insults. By the close of the nineteenth century, *Satisfaktion* had asserted itself as a separate lexical entry without such supplementary definitions of a legal, theological, or abstract nature, and is obtainable via two paths: peaceful *Revokation* or *Abbitte* (the “withdrawal of,” or “apology for,” an insult, respectively), or through the more ominous act of *sich stellen* (“physically presenting oneself at a duel, and ‘standing in’ for the offense”).⁴ As the twentieth century progressed, *Satisfaktion* retained its late nineteenth-century character in representing both the nonviolent and dueling placation of an offended party, whereas *Genugtuung* morphed into an entirely nonduel-oriented redress of a transgression.⁵

A baseline understanding of nineteenth-century *Satisfaktion* therefore acknowledges its signification of *Genugtuung* (the restitution for an insult or offense) by means of either an *Ehrenerklärung* or *Zweikampf*, where *Ehrenerklärung* refers to the nonviolent “public retraction of an insult or slanderous claim” (*Duden Deutsches* 389, my translation). The demand for *Satisfaktion* in the wake of a perceived transgression can be, therefore, an entirely nonviolent affair that merely refers to the request for an *Ehrenerklärung*—the explicit, public withdrawal of the insult—or a suitable apology, known as the aforementioned *Abbitte* or as *Deprezieren*. I characterize this nonviolent possibility as “first-order” *Satisfaktion*, as it represents the initial stage in an “honor situation” or confrontation in which one satisfaction-qualified male perceives himself offended by another and finds himself socially obligated to demand some form of *Satisfaktion* befitting the seriousness of the offense. First-order satisfaction also represents the most salient and readily comprehensible stage at which the majority of honor conflicts are remedied.

When an individual demands *Satisfaktion* from a fellow honor-bound male by whom he perceives himself to have been offended, the insulted party is demanding redress by means of a public retraction of the insult in a manner he deems acceptable. Only if this withdrawal or apology remains outstanding does the insulted party's demand for *Satisfaktion* shift to a second, distinctly different level. An exemplary canonical demonstration of the function of the *Ehren(erklärung)* is found in Goethe's tragedy *Clavidgo* (1774), where the ascendant writer Joseph Clavidgo is confronted by the enraged brother of Marie Beaumarchais, whom Clavidgo promised marriage and subsequently abandoned, thereby seriously

³See, for instance, Zedler; Heinsius; Grimm and Grimm; and *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexikon*.

⁴See *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexikon* and *Meyers Lexikon* (1929).

⁵See *Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon*; *Duden: Das große Wörterbuch*; *Duden Deutsches*; *Brockhaus Wahrig*; and *Brockhaus, Die Enzyklopädie*.

endangering her public reputation. The brother Beaumarchais's demand for an *Erklärung* from Clavidgo epitomizes the essence of first-order *Satisfaktion*, which at its core consists of a public acknowledgement and retraction of the offender's insulting conduct (Goethe 27). In addition to these necessary characteristics of public acknowledgement and retraction, the *Ehrenerklärung* must clear the offended party of wrongdoing, as Goethe literally spells out through Clavidgo's written declaration: "I have deserted her, without one fault or weakness on her part, which could afford any colour or excuse for this perjury. . . . On the contrary the conduct of the lady is wholly pure, irreproachable, and worthy of all reverence" (35).

A final component of the *Ehrenerklärung* is its delivery under the latent threat of the honor situation progressing to a decidedly more ominous level of *Satisfaktion*, should the declaration not be forthcoming. When a recalcitrant Clavidgo initially resists the notion of writing the requested *Erklärung* and hints at the possibility of a duel, for instance, the brother Beaumarchais replies, "Good, Sir! Right, Sir!" and demonstrates a readiness to accommodate the writer (31). Clavidgo, not desiring bloodshed, at this point agrees to write the statement (32–33). This feature of the *Ehrenerklärung* underscores its role in an honor situation as the last, salient procedural barrier against dueling violence.

What I term *second-order Satisfaktion* bridges the "violence gap" between the strictly peaceful *Satisfaktion* of the first level and the unmitigated dueling violence of the third and, thus, represents a further, distinct possibility within the confines of this concept. This second instantiation is verifiable through the historical record in the form of various case studies and is also embedded in nineteenth-century German literature, as I discuss in detail below. Second-order *Satisfaktion*'s terminological articulation can be found in contemporary sources such as Johann Heinrich Zedler's *Grosses Vollständiges Universal-Lexikon* from 1742, which defines violent satisfaction in terms of "sich stellen" at a proposed duel, which need not entail the actual act of dueling: ". . . to give someone satisfaction, . . . this means to satisfy one's insulted enemy and challenger with sword or pistol, and to stand at the proposed duel" (188, my translation).⁶ Similarly, the 1908 *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexikon* notes that a state of *Genugtuung* can be achieved through one's act of "standing" or "taking up position at a duel" (331, my translation).⁷ A twentieth-century echo of this long-nineteenth-century lexical understanding is found in Duden's *Das große Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* and *Deutsches Universal Wörterbuch*, from 1977–80 and 1996 respectively, which define *Satisfaktion* as the "withdrawal of an insult, or something similar, through one's readiness to duel" (*Wörterbuch* 2219; *Deutsches* 1293, my translation).

In a model of *Satisfaktion* that has been expanded to accommodate a second, bridging level, the withdrawal of an insult can be attained either via the nonviolent *Ehrenerklärung*, the demonstrated readiness or willingness to duel, or through dueling violence itself. This more nuanced formulation of *Satisfaktion* explains functional workings of the honor-duel process that remain largely unaddressed in scholarship. Examples include the demand for satisfaction through dueling that is issued and accepted yet ultimately permanently impeded by circumstances beyond the control of the insulting party, such as death, debilitating sickness, or some

⁶" . . . einem Satisfaction geben . . . das ist, seinem beleidigten Feinde und Ausforderer mit dem Degen oder Pistolen Genüge leisten, und zum angetragenen Duell sich stellen."

⁷"Stellen zum Duell."

other intervening event.⁸ In this case, violent satisfaction for a grievous offense has not been granted, yet there is no historical evidence to suggest that the unremunerated offended party would be deemed permanently dishonored and therefore no longer satisfaction-qualified. Second-order satisfaction further explains the appearance of would-be duelists at the site of an impending duel who, having displayed outward disregard for bodily harm or death until that moment, manage to achieve reconciliation before the commencement of combat, with both sides deeming *Satisfaktion* to have been rendered.

This variation of satisfaction, I contend, follows from the insulter's outward display of readiness to risk his life by dueling the man whom he insulted—an act distinct from the first-order *Revokation* or *Abbitte* that could transpire without peril in a coffee house. The willingness to duel that is inherent to second-order satisfaction revokes the insult ipso facto by means of its unmitigated acknowledgment that the insulter recognizes the offended as his social equal. In this moment, satisfaction is “achieved”; it is not the physical act of dueling that revokes the offense, but the act of the offender replacing his insult with his own physical presence in the impending perilous and ultimately incalculable rite of single combat. The insult that is grave enough to precipitate a duel, such as one man calling another a coward, subsequently could not be asserted at the site of the duel if the insult were not revocable through this demonstrated willingness—otherwise the insulter's presence on the dueling grounds would represent a tacit admission that he is lowering himself to duel the very individual he labeled a coward. As we shall see below, this insight will play a key role in my reading of the dueling scene in *The Sandman*.

An instructive literary manifestation of second-order *Satisfaktion* is provided by a scene from Eduard Devrient's 1836 drama *The Grace of the Moment* (*Die Gunst des Augenblicks*).⁹ Responding to Herr von Kiel's coarse behavior toward Fräulein Ernestine, the Landrath Brückner angers his rival by stating in the woman's presence: “Your conduct is entirely undignified, Herr von Kiel” (208). Incensed, von Kiel demands satisfaction. The figure of Brückner, who finds dueling to be a tasteless, foolish endeavor, and who repeatedly expresses this sentiment, initially resists Herr von Kiel's calls for satisfaction, but eventually finds himself unnerved by von Kiel's verbal affronts. Brückner at last relents and accepts a dueling pistol—now as the *offended* party, as the text makes clear, because of von Kiel's persistent insults—and purposely fires over von Kiel's head before coolly awaiting the return shot. After aiming a few moments, however, von Kiel lowers his pistol and “accepts” Brückner's “satisfaction” (Devrient 213).

Devrient's passage not only demonstrates the functioning of second-order satisfaction, it depicts an individual purposefully shooting errantly, thus illuminating the additional, paradoxical danger of losing one's social status by displaying readiness to duel by firing errantly—out of *unwillingness* to shed blood. Individuals who purposefully shot astray were held in contempt by German dueling purists of the nineteenth century, due to the fact that

⁸In Lessing's tragedy *Emilia Galotti* (1772) for instance, Graf Appiani insults Marinelli yet dies at the hands of Marinelli's assassins before he can render the satisfaction that Marinelli expressly demands and appears to authentically desire (324–25).

⁹The following translations of Devrient's work are my own.

their behavior was “perceived as a craven show of clemency in the hope that the gesture would be returned” (McAleer 69).

Although Devrient’s text makes explicit that, as the insulted party, Brückner enjoys the advantage of firing first, he uses his turn to fire astray. Herr von Kiel, an ardent supporter of the dueling codex “laws of honor” (210), clearly views Brückner’s intentional miss as illegitimate:

HERR VON KIEL. You did not aim at me!

LANDRATH. No, as I told you, I shoot at no man.

HERR VON KIEL. I must inform you that we are not facing each other for the purpose of a joke, and that I shall not return this consideration.

LANDRATH. I was not trying to induce you to any such thing; shoot. (212)

Satisfaction was not felt to be obtained by many German duelists whose opponents purposely fired astray, as this act necessarily diminished these duelists’ perception of their opponent’s sincere readiness to duel. Such a well-meaning gesture on the part of the errant shooter even could lead to further insulting one’s opponent through the perceived suggestion that the shooter did not consider his opponent courageous enough to face an aimed bullet. Moreover, if each duelist chose to fire over the other’s head, both could be found contemptible and no longer worthy of *Satisfaktion* by fellow satisfaction-capable witnesses. In this case, each of the duelists would be deemed no longer satisfaction-qualified because of his outward display of unwillingness to duel.

At this juncture, von Kiel indeed does not perceive himself as having received the necessary *Satisfaktion* and, verbally assured by Brückner that the latter is not making a “show of clemency” in hopes that von Kiel would return the favor, the nobleman prepares to fire:

HERR VON KIEL *aims a long while, lowers the pistol*. [. . .] Again, do you wish to retract your statements without more ado?

LANDRATH. I told you my conditions, just shoot.

Herr von Kiel prepares to fire. Pause. [. . .]

HERR VON KIEL. I do not wish to; I am satisfied. You are a man whose heart is in the right place. [. . .] I accept your offer of satisfaction. (213)

Herr von Kiel’s acknowledgement of Brückner’s “offer of satisfaction” transpires despite the latter’s own distain for dueling and lack of allegiance to the notion. More importantly, Devrient’s drama allows us to locate the *Satisfaktion* rendered by Brückner in precisely those moments during which he awaits von Kiel’s shot. Here we note that Brückner’s behavior does not constitute first-order satisfaction, as Brückner expressly refuses to revoke or apologize for his statements. We see that Brückner’s actions, likewise, do not fall under the classification of violent, third-order satisfaction, as Herr von Kiel refuses to acknowledge the lethality, seriousness, or procedural legitimacy of his opponent’s errant shot.

Brückner’s second-order readiness to duel is, strictly speaking, readiness to engage in a bout insofar as von Kiel’s return shot can be considered the act that would have completed the

“duel”: upon von Kiel’s firing, each man would have once faced the barrel of an opponent’s weapon and each would have discharged his own—objections from German dueling manuals of the time notwithstanding. Indeed, this latter question of how German dueling codices would have evaluated Brückner’s intentional miss is adeptly side-stepped by the narration in that no mention is made of any satisfaction-capable *witnesses* to the scene. In this way, neither man need worry about possible negative social consequences for considering the matter concluded.

In Devrient’s drama, reconciliation results neither from a first-order *Revokation* nor a duel but an understanding of *Satisfaktion* that recognizes the possibility of revoking an insult by demonstrably “standing in” for the offense at the site of the duel. This physical standing-in for the insult retracts it in the same manner as would an apology or withdrawal; thus, satisfaction is considered “granted,” and reconciliation becomes possible. It is crucial to note that only third-order satisfaction revokes an insult by means of dueling violence itself. As I observe below, it is the severe over-extension of this third-level understanding of satisfaction that led to *Satisfaktion* becoming a source of social tyranny for nineteenth-century men of privilege.

THE TYRANNY OF VIOLENT SATISFACTION

The notion of *Satisfaktion* was integral to the process of reestablishing one’s honor after being insulted by a fellow honor-bound male, as satisfaction denotes the very act of revoking or withdrawing the offense. In nineteenth-century satisfaction-capable circles, the concept of *Satisfaktion* assumed the role of a tyrannical force by pressuring many men to perceive any insult as a suggestion of cowardice, to be met with the most extreme demonstration of personal courage on the dueling grounds. The satisfaction these men so often had in mind did not conform to the longstanding, tacit understanding of *Genugtuung/Satisfaktion* as the withdrawal of an insult by multiple, and not necessarily violent, means, but instead signified third-order satisfaction—that of single-combat. The “tyranny” aspect of satisfaction’s social impact lies not in the possibility of dying or being wounded in a duel, but in the price one might pay for failing to answer the dueling compulsion. Men were compelled to duel out of a plausible threat of being no longer considered capable of satisfaction; this fear governed their decision-making process in moments of conflict with other satisfaction-qualified men. The state of being *nicht satisfaktionsfähig*, or no longer entitled to demand or receive the withdrawal of an insult, was equal to social, economic, and political ostracization from “good society” (Elias 133; Schlink 372–73). The loss of privilege, access, and mobility represented by the loss of satisfaction capability constituted a compelling motivation for otherwise disinclined men to take their chances in a duel.

This article refers to the oppressive social compulsion to duel as a “tyranny of satisfaction” as an alternative to the possible “tyranny of the honor codex” or “tyranny of honor.” My claim is that the prevailing nineteenth-century masculine honor codex itself need not be viewed as a driving force of gratuitous, lethal dueling. On the contrary, male behavioral codices defined the achievement of satisfaction as a primarily nonviolent affair and, in most cases, mandated attempts to remedy insult situations by means that circumvented dueling. The over-extension of third-order satisfaction did not stem from the formal

requirements of the masculine codex of behavior, but from the widespread, synchronic fear amongst nineteenth-century satisfaction-qualified men of losing the esteem of their peers, a prevailing sentiment that deemed only *violent* satisfaction to be capable of rendering an insult withdrawn.

In those especially grave cases where the honor codex stipulated mandatory dueling, such as for physical affronts, affairs, or the seduction of one's kin, it must be noted that the perceived necessity of the *withdrawal* of the insult—third-order *Satisfaktion*—lay at their core.¹⁰ Men who feared the duel's lethality in many cases feared the social ostracism of no longer being satisfaction-capable even more. It was not an expanded, exaggerated sense of personal honor or masculinity that led to what a number of scholars describe as “hair-trigger sensitivity” (Schneider) and “compulsory dueling” (Wisely; McAleer; and so forth), but the perception that a revocation of any perceived insult was absolutely necessary in moments of conflict, and that this revocation could only be effected by a one-dimensional, violent rendering of satisfaction by means of the duel.

The work of historians McAleer and Frevert, in particular, chronicles the pervasive fear of satisfaction-capable men as being perceived as cowardly. McAleer observes that “German duelists took this imperative [of displaying unqualified bravery] so seriously that they conceived of an insult—any insult . . . —as testament to the secret opinion of the offender that one was powerless to retaliate. . . . Thus, *every* insult implied the *supreme* insult among men of honor: imputation of physical cowardice” (44–45). Frevert concurs, “It would seem that for men from the society of satisfaction, being considered a coward was one of the most serious threats that they could face, and one to which they immediately responded by providing evidence to the contrary” (176).

The broad fear amongst satisfaction-capable men of being viewed as cowardly resulted in a compulsive social pressure to exhibit courage in all honor situations, effectively expanding the popular understanding of *Satisfaktion* to include only dueling, to the exclusion of the possibilities historically offered by the first two levels of satisfaction I identified above. The frequently observable result was a dueling gestation process that only went through the motions of attempting first-order satisfaction out of concern that a nonviolent revocation or withdrawal of an offense indicated a lack of courage. The fear of being perceived as cowardly appears to have become increasingly widespread over the course of the nineteenth century, such that even the more bellicose brinkmanship of second-order satisfaction came under duress. Although it was the duty of the duelists' seconds to attempt “intensively” the arrangement of reconciliation at the site of the duel if at all possible (Frevert, *Men* 218), this task was perceived by many practitioners to be but a formality, and a display of cowardice if agreed to (“Der ‘Louis’” 392–93). Although seconds were obliged to make the traditional

¹⁰German codices governing the classification of insults can be categorized in three levels of increasing severity, and were by nature considerably more serious and uncompromising than those of other European societies (McAleer 46–47). Classified under the tertiary category were cases of adultery or the seduction of another's female kin—both widespread causes of duels in nineteenth-century Germany (Frevert, “Bourgeois” 269). Third-level insults were considered only remedied by means of dueling (“Der Louis” 387), as first-order satisfaction was considered impossible under such circumstances (394).

“last-ditch attempt” at reconciliation directly before a duel, “[a]pologies at the site were roundly condemned by the dueling manuals for the suspicion of cowardice they excited” (McAleer 57).

McAleer describes the suspicion harbored by many honor-codex adherents against reconciliation achieved at the site of a planned duel: “The apologizer might have been playing at brinkmanship in the hope that his opponent would ultimately fold, thus gaining a cheap victory. Or he might have gotten a last-minute attack of nerves” (57). The overwhelming fear of appearing cowardly rendered the attempt at a mutual agreement “a transparent formality that stood little chance” (58)—even in cases where a duelist regretted his behavior and desired peace (Frevert, “Der ‘Louis’” 392–93). As Frevert claims, in such situations the duel had to take place, with apologies allowed only after hostilities had been initiated (392–93).

Whereas, for their own part, contemporaries generally appear to have collapsed dueling with the rendering of *Satisfaktion*, thereby approaching conflict situations with a great sensitivity to perceived imputations of cowardice, this article nevertheless distinguishes between the multifaceted nature of satisfaction and its frequently one-dimensional popular understanding. The aim is not to characterize the honor-codex sensitivities of nineteenth-century contemporaries as lexically erroneous, but to establish a conceptual clarity that guards against mistakenly interpreting the motivations or behavior of nineteenth-century literary figures out of an absence of nuance. Before moving to a literary analysis in which I will demonstrate this assertion, I wish to touch on a possible example of misreading *Satisfaktion* in Mark Gelber’s and Alex Bein’s analyses of the experiences of Theodor Herzl, where both authors separately appear to equate the retraction of an insult with a display of cowardice.

Gelber observes that on several occasions, “Herzl challenged opponents or critics to duels” but that no violence transpired because Herzl’s adversaries delivered “respectful apologies that signaled their formal submission and served as an admission of error or as a sign of their cowardice” (58). Although one cannot rule out the possibility that an apology or withdrawal of an insult is attributable to “cowardice” in the face of a potential duel, it should be noted that Herzl’s challenges were not calls to single combat, but requests that satisfaction be rendered. In turn, the formal apologies and conciliatory gestures of Herzl’s adversaries epitomize the essence of proper satisfaction, and prove that third-level dueling violence was not viewed by Herzl as having been necessary in those moments—a view with which his detractors obviously concurred (Bein 81).

Despite its outward bellicosity, Herzl’s decision to challenge his insulters to duels conforms to the dynamic conception of *Satisfaktion* theorized in this article, in that such challenges need not result in duels. While the term *fordern* in the sense of “to challenge, or to allow oneself to be challenged, in order to answer for something . . . in a duel”¹¹ (*Duden Deutsches*, my translation) appears to directly demand a duel, the emphasis of the matter falls on the offender retracting his insult, as opposed to necessarily dueling—conduct that is in compliance with the conventions of first- as well as second-order satisfaction. The veracity of my reading—and of Herzl’s own understanding of *Satisfaktion*—is reflected in the author’s acceptance of his adversaries’ apologies and retractions, which, for their part, were perfectly legitimate bestowals of satisfaction in accordance with nineteenth-century

¹¹“auffordern [lassen], sich im Zweikampf . . . für etwas zu verantworten.”

honor codices. To regard the same as public demonstrations of cowardice is to disregard the range of possibilities offered by the historical concept of satisfaction, of which Herzl and his adversaries chose to avail themselves.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THREE-TIERED *SATISFAKTION* TO LITERARY ANALYSIS

Violent, third-order satisfaction appears to have come to dominate its nonviolent alternatives in the minds of nineteenth-century contemporaries to such an extent that present-day scholars likewise comprehend *Satisfaktion* as a primarily combat-oriented term. The elaborately codified process that governed the behavior of honor-bound men in conflict, however, reveals that the process by which a duel came about, as well as the bout itself, was formalized with the original intent to avert violence when possible and to prevent the duel from being abused as a tool of revenge or bullying. These aspects of the modern duel include the seconds' pre-bout duties to attempt a reconciliation between the parties (Frevert, "Der 'Louis'" 392), the widespread recognition that dueling was not a retributive act, but one that socially reinstated the offended party (Frevert, "Der 'Louis'" 392; McAleer 56), and the purposeful, weighty role played by random chance (Frevert, "Bourgeois" 268). In this regard, the long nineteenth century's lexical and encyclopedic definitions of *Satisfaktion*, which emphasize revocation and *sich stellen* over dueling, entirely reflect historical satisfaction's formalistically nonviolent character.

The codification of a high degree of chance into the single-combat bout is of particular importance for my predominantly nonviolent understanding of *Satisfaktion* and concern for evaluating the German duel in literature. The incalculability of that moment in which the insulting party "stands in" for his insult is unpredictable on two levels: not only does the would-be duelist not know whether his demonstrated *readiness* to duel will be considered acceptable by the offended party until the instant before hostilities—thus ensuring that the insulter cannot render satisfaction based on readiness for something he presumes will not transpire—but the duel itself is characterized to a large extent by sheer chance.

In an effort to avoid scenarios in which the moral value of the readiness to duel would be compromised by individuals with superior physiques or weapons skills who desired to incite duels from a position of advantage, modern dueling codices regulated the bout in a manner that was intended to ensure the unpredictability of the combat's outcome. As a result, death or survival in a duel was often a matter of chance. Formal steps were taken by each duelist's seconds to increase the role played by chance, down to the widespread usage of dueling pistols that lacked iron sights (Frevert, *Men* 164). Even when accounting for inevitable dissimilarities in physical strength and weapon-skills, the outcome of a duel was ". . . wholly uncertain and impossible to predict under any circumstances" (157).

The frequent misplacement of emphasis by scholars regarding satisfaction's relationship to violence can be explained in part by the sheer difficulty in differentiating between the brinkmanship of second-order satisfaction's *Bereitschaft zum Duell* and third-order's physical act of dueling. "Readiness," "willingness," or "preparedness" to duel—each is an adequate translation of *Bereitschaft*—must be conditioned by the veritable expectancy that

a duel indeed will take place.¹² Second-level *Satisfaktion* is rendered by means of one's revoking an insult by physically "standing in" for the offense; it does not follow from the calculated assumption that a reconciliation may be forged shortly beforehand, at which point a would-be duelist could profit from the mere appearance of courage and steadfastness. As a result, satisfaction of the second level is indeterminable in many historical case studies, as disposition to duel is an interior matter perceivable to others only by means of observing readily interpretable behavior.

The demonstration of a sincere willingness to duel, for instance, does not guarantee that a duel is avoidable. The emotional and social impetus toward single combat may prove simply too powerful to impede. An insulted individual could easily interpret the offender's outward readiness to duel as the intention to offer only combat as revocation of the offense, and therefore refrain from seeking nonviolent satisfaction out of a desire not to appear cowardly. If a duel resulted from such a situation, as it undoubtedly had, the bout as it appears in its archival form is naturally indistinguishable from one characterized by third-order *Satisfaktion*, where satisfaction was granted by a combat both parties desired. The examination of dueling in literature, however, presents an obvious advantage, in that literary depictions of nineteenth-century honor confrontations frequently provide narrative insight to the motivations and thoughts of protagonists. This insight benefits literary analysis by clarifying the behavior of figures as they progress through the stages of an honor situation. When nineteenth-century duel-critical literature is viewed with the historical notion of three-tiered satisfaction in mind, it becomes clear that even those works fail to provide the necessary narrative framework for undermining the practice.

READING *SATISFAKTION* IN E. T. A. HOFFMANN'S *THE SANDMAN* (1817)

Scholars have pointed to the evident critical depiction of dueling undertaken by nineteenth-century German-language authors, in addition to the fact that those critical portrayals appear to have been ultimately ineffective.¹³ A nuanced conceptual outline of *Satisfaktion*, however, brings this generalized picture of authorial rejection into focus and reveals the utter absence of a viable critique of dueling through canonical literary depiction. I argue, below, that a "viable" literary critique of the duel portrays male and female figures escaping the dueling compulsion in a manner that does not destroy the foundation of their social and economic lives but, instead, refutes the dueling practice by comprehensively dismissing the conceptual basis on which it rests, without recourse to violence. An awareness of the intricacy of *Satisfaktion* further allows the scholar to establish whether its portrayal in a literary work is conflated with the perceived necessity to duel in all circumstances of insult, as discussed

¹²"Bereitschaft," *Concise Oxford Duden*.

¹³See, for instance, Gay: "Most writers who injected a duel into their fictions did not approve of dueling" (98–99), and Wisely, who argues that Germanic literature of Arthur Schnitzler's era did not portray viable alternatives to dueling obligations: "Fiction . . . showed the seemingly unstoppable force of convention in the face of even serious assaults" (81). "Even if honor tragedies pinpointed the mythos of honor, they perpetuated it by claiming this horror was unavoidable" (Wisely 82).

above, or if it is portrayed in an entirely unorthodox fashion altogether¹⁴—all of which influences one's analysis of the motivations and behavior of protagonists. Similar to the unnecessary attribution of cowardice to the gentlemen who insulted Herzl, literary scenes of mutual reconciliation and the avoidance of dueling, such as found in Hoffmann's *The Sandman*, could be interpreted mistakenly as sound literary critiques of the duel, when, in fact, such passages merely depict the compliant deference of male protagonists to the social compulsion to grant *Satisfaktion*. Finally, dueling-related passages in which satisfaction's significance is not fully recognized can influence one's interpretation of a figure in ways that carry repercussions beyond discussions of the duel itself. Each of these assertions can be tied into my reading of the near-duel passage found in Hoffmann's text.

Although the would-be duel between Nathanael and Lothar has sparked little scholarly interest in the depiction of dueling in *The Sandman*, I nevertheless wish to demonstrate the manner in which a conceptual appreciation of *Satisfaktion* might affect both a macro-level reading of the work's depiction of dueling violence as well as a micro-level view assessing the specific choices made by protagonists. Although Hoffmann's novella appears to take a critical narrative stance against the dueling practice, I argue that the near-duel depicted in the text is viewed best as only reinforcing the entrenchment of *Satisfaktion* as a social obligation for honor-bound males. Far from representing a literary example of figures successfully eluding compulsory *Satisfaktion*, I submit that *The Sandman* fails to depict any alternative to the functioning of the hegemonic masculine behavioral codex. As a consequence on the micro-level, I am drawn by the evidence to read the central, robust role that is nearly universally attributed to Clara in preventing Nathanael and Lothar's duel as a matter of fortuitous timing as opposed to her successful emotional plea.

Near the halfway point of Hoffmann's story, Clara's request that the tormented Nathanael destroy his morose and increasingly disturbing attempts at writing leads the young man to shout angrily at his lover and leave her in an indignant fury (Hoffmann 154). Anguished by Nathanael's behavior, Clara confides in Lothar, who is furious at his friend's prolonged indelicate treatment of his sister (154). When Lothar confronts Nathanael, a classic honor situation ensues, beginning in this case with Lothar's "harsh words" for Nathanael (154). The latter, described by the narrator as a university student studying in the city "G—," (150), responds with the insult, "Crazy, conceited fool," to which Lothar answers, "Miserable commonplace idiot," making a duel "inevitable" (154).

Hoffmann's text makes clear that these young men are to be seen as satisfaction-capable members of society. This privileged status is attributable most easily to Nathanael's standing as a matriculated university student (150), while Lothar's status remains ill-defined, yet nonetheless validated by Nathanael's willingness to square off with him on the dueling grounds—an attitude he would be highly unlikely to exhibit were Lothar incapable of satisfaction. As satisfaction-qualified men, both Nathanael and Lothar are obliged equally to respond to the other's insolent verbal affront. The result is a challenge to duel that, as the narrator claims, appears inevitable as a result of each party's unwillingness to apologize.

¹⁴Hebbel's *Maria Magdalena* (1844), for instance, boasts one of the most unorthodox renderings of satisfaction in the German canon, one brought about by physical coercion and characterized by a dubious qualification for satisfaction in the case of the forced party, the Kassierer Leonhard (84–86).

Nathanael and Lothar meet in silence the following morning, having arranged a dangerous rapier bout. With “their eyes aglow with the lust of combat,” the estranged friends prepare to attack one another (154). Clara, however, has taken note of the impending peril and appeals to the men’s affection of her: “You ferocious, cruel beasts! Strike me down before you attack each other. How am I to live when my lover has slain my brother, or my brother has slain my lover?” (154). Here, Hoffmann begins a sequence as unique in the German literary canon of the nineteenth century as it is succinct: a female protagonist, whose affections lie at the heart of a dispute between two men driven by the prevailing social ethos to demand and receive *Satisfaktion*, physically intervenes in a prearranged combat and appears to secure the peace and reconciliation (154–55).

This dramatic passage provides textual evidence for an anti-dueling stance taken by *The Sandman*’s narration. In Clara’s pleas to the men, killing in a duel is referred to as an act of *ermorden* (“murder”), in harmony with the contemporary, nineteenth-century, Judeo-Christian critique of dueling and contrasting starkly with the view of dueling proponents, who perceived such deaths to fall outside the moral realm. A literary example of the latter position is expressed at the close of the long nineteenth century by the figure Friedrich Hofreiter in Arthur Schnitzler’s 1910 drama *Undiscovered Country*. When Genia Hofreiter reacts to learning that her husband has killed her lover in a duel and cries, “Murderer!” the unflappable Friedrich responds, “It was a duel. I’m no murderer” (Stoppard 145).¹⁵

The rational, enlightened figure of Clara is key to *The Sandman*’s critique of dueling. Clara’s firm grasp of reason and her scientific manner of evaluating her surroundings is juxtaposed with Nathanael’s dark mysticism and belief in supernatural powers (Hoffmann 151–53). In articulating her salient and pragmatic viewpoints, Clara asserts that Nathanael’s encounters with the figure whom he considers to be the demonic solicitor Coppelius, murderer of his father, is merely a self-conjured phantom that gains sway over him only when he grants it legitimacy through fervent, irrational belief (151). Clara represents enlightened, scientific, nonmystical reason and clarity throughout *The Sandman*’s narration and, at its conclusion, is described as having apparently found peace, stability, a “pleasant-looking” partner, and a successful family life (167). This is not to argue that adherence to the dueling codex is tantamount to succumbing to “sinister powers” (151)—one recalls that the ostensibly emotionally sound Lothar likewise willingly engages in preparations to duel. Rather, Clara’s siding with all things rational and reasonable in *The Sandman* is but one example in a discernable trend in the German-language canon to associate reason and good sense with the willful resistance to or avoidance of dueling and to associate foolhardiness and folly with the dueling practice.¹⁶

Additional textual evidence for the critical narrative stance toward dueling in *The Sandman* is the description of the arms used: Nathanael’s rapier is identified as a “murderous weapon” (154). The usage of this term, *Mordgewehr*, represents the only instance of the novella’s narrative voice utilizing any specific language that endorses or rejects the practice of dueling, as well as a noteworthy deviation from the consistently descriptive and impassive narrative neutrality that otherwise characterizes this passage of confrontation and

¹⁵“Es war ein ehrlicher Kampf, ich bin kein Mörder” (317).

¹⁶See Mills.

reconciliation. The conclusion of the passage appears to depict the undermining of a socially compulsory *Satisfaktion*: Nathanael asks for forgiveness for his transgressions; the two young men each appears to forego his legitimate right to demand *Satisfaktion*; and all three figures are reconciled in a group hug reminiscent of Lessing's *Nathan the Wise* (154). Does Hoffmann's text, therefore, represent an instance when literary figures successfully circumvent the socially mandated obligation to demand and grant *Satisfaktion*? In contrast to Devrient's *The Grace of the Moment*, the men's refusal to carry on with the combat could appear as a courageous transgression of the reigning behavioral codex, given the likely preponderance of satisfaction-capable cohorts who would know of Nathanael and Lothar's armed encounter, and who would insist on the duel taking place under threat of ostracism from the good society of satisfaction-qualified circles.

We can be confident of the social compulsion inherent to the conflict, as the narration indicates the duel was arranged "in accordance with the local student custom" and because Clara learns of the men's intention to duel when she spies "the fencing master" bringing the rapiers (154).¹⁷ The presence of the fencing master lends further credence to the notion that Lothar, too, is satisfaction-capable, as adherence to academic dueling custom is highlighted in the passage and the local fencing master would be notably remiss in permitting an individual not capable of satisfaction to duel under his supervision. The reference to local "akademische Sitte" means the fencing master in question most certainly is affiliated with a fencing fraternity—one of the local *Corps*, *Burschenschaften*, or *Landmannschaften*, for instance—to which the university student Nathanael or possible former member Lothar enjoys contact. Later in the century, Mark Twain describes in his travel narrative *A Tramp Abroad* (1880) a similar sword bout over a "satisfaction affair" between two matriculated students who were not formal members of university fencing corps, yet whose bout was facilitated with the assistance of corps weaponry and oversight (32–33). Further evidence for fencing fraternity involvement in *The Sandman* is provided by the weaponry used, described by the narration as "sharpened foils" (Hoffmann 154).¹⁸

Because of the fraternity's facilitation of the conflict with its equipment loan, a reasonable probability exists for other fraternity members to be aware of the men's heated exchange and, thus, the necessity for an encounter on the dueling grounds (in light of the refusal of both parties to retract their verbal affronts). Certainly the fencing master's presence—other witnesses are not mentioned—dramatically increases the chances of negative repercussions for Nathanael and Lothar, should the men fail to meet their obligations as duel-worthy individuals. If one could convincingly attribute the two figures' reconciliation to a courageous,

¹⁷The English translation erroneously renders "der Fechtmeister" a plural (24). See German edition: Hoffmann, *Der Sandmann* (24).

¹⁸Such rapiers (*scharf geschliffene Stoßrapieren*) are identified by social historian McAleer as the "weapon of choice among most student dueling fraternities" and were banned from German universities with increasing frequency starting in 1819—two years after the publication of *The Sandman*—due to their penchant for inflicting intolerable rates of lethal puncture wounds to the lungs (121). Hoffmann scholar Drux notes the *Stoßrapier* was only used at the universities of Erlangen and Jena in the nineteenth century, cities that boast a strong fencing-fraternity tradition (32). Despite Nathanael's matriculation at a university in the city "G—," Drux suggests there are interesting ties linking Nathanael to Jena (41).

willful refusal to duel, in defiance of entrenched honor-codex precepts, the result would be a significant literary finding indeed: *The Sandman* would represent a work in which a classically stringent and oppressive interpretation of the behavioral codex is trumped by an emphatic empathy. All the more remarkable would be the precipitation of such defiance by a female figure, inherently excluded from satisfaction-capable circles and strictly marginalized by the masculine honor codex. In essence, Hoffmann's dueling passage could be viewed as providing a legitimate literary model for subverting honor-codex-mandated violence.

The actions of Nathanael and Lothar, as viewed in terms of the historically verifiable notion of *Satisfaktion* discussed throughout this article, nevertheless indicate that the two young men are indeed uncritical, compliant participants in German dueling culture. Each figure has, by the moment Clara appears on the scene, displayed that outward fearlessness and stoicism inherent to violent, third-order *Satisfaktion* and also necessary for the rendering of satisfaction of the second level. Each has arrived at the field of honor prepared to engage in potentially lethal violence as a matter of reaffirming and reestablishing his own personal honor. Facing one another, the two armed men comport themselves as expected under the eyes of the fencing master, thereby conforming to and reaffirming the established functioning of the codex. No textual evidence is present to suggest that either man is prepared to offer forgiveness or abandon the duel or that either has attempted to do so.

For this reason, the mutual agreement to break off the impending bout at Clara's unexpected intervention, just as the two were prepared to attack one another, appears entirely within the boundaries of the duelists' discernment, so long as all the requirements of the masculine codex vis-à-vis *Satisfaktion* have been duly fulfilled, which Hoffmann's portrayal demonstrates in the affirmative. A remarkably similar dueling passage from the French writer Georges Ohnet's novel *Le Maître des forges* (1882) discussed by the historian Robert Nye in his *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France*, supports this reading of second-level *Satisfaktion*. When the protagonist Claire de Branlieu cannot bear the thought of her husband Philippe dying in a duel fought over her honor, she "rushes between them at the last instant, receives a wound in the hand, and is carried, bleeding, back to the house" (Nye 149). Nye reports that after this incident, "The affair of honor is concluded amicably, both men having displayed their courage, and Philippe returns home" (149, emphasis added).

The commentators to this article embrace a dissenting argument that views Clara's intervention as being central to the prevention of the men's duel. I am in agreement with this perspective in terms of the fortuitous timing of Clara's action. There is every textual indication that the perilous duel would have proceeded had Clara failed to intervene. Her presence, however, is only "all-deciding" insofar as she serendipitously arrives on-scene in that moment at which Nathanael and Lothar already have demonstrated that neither fears the imminent duel. Although neither party is inclined to retract his insult before Clara's intervention, the two men have every reason to reconsider in the wake of her action, as no honor is lost by doing so. Taking into account the historical, lexical, and literary evidence for what I have described as second-level satisfaction, it is reasonable to suggest that Clara's intervention may not have been successful on the basis of the agency that scholarship traditionally has assigned it.

At this juncture, a nuanced conceptualization of *Satisfaktion* carries weight beyond a mere analysis of the nineteenth-century literary canon's dueling critique. A three-tiered

understanding of satisfaction alters one's assessment of Clara's intervention, an act that has been influential in shaping previous scholarly discussions of her personality and influence. Susan Brantley's essay, for instance, refers to the "'fiery' confrontation between Lothar and Nathanael which at the last moment is reconciled by Klara's expression of love for them both" (328). Birgit Röder references *The Sandman's* *duelus interruptus* in the context of citing "plenty of examples of Clara's capacity to show emotion and feel for others" (62) and discussing "the warm, caring side of her personality" (63), cautioning the reader that "we must not forget that it is Clara who prevents Nathanael and Lothar from fighting a senseless duel" (63). Rudolf Drux, likewise, references Clara's halting of the duel as evidence of her positive character (55), while John Ellis bases a significant aspect of his reading of Clara on her having prevented the duel. Clara's plea for the impending duel to be halted is even read by Ellis as being "the first and last time" Clara shows a "genuine sign" of concern for the victimized Nathanael (13).

I suggest that, by reducing the complexity of Nathanael's and Lothar's honor situation to a mere "confrontation" between men, soothed over by the love of a caring woman, and by unquestioningly crediting Clara with the duel's prevention, the observer undertakes a serious misattribution of agency. I find for reasons explicated in my reading of Hoffmann's near-duel passage that Clara does not so much prevent the duel as unwittingly provide Lothar and Nathanael a suitable opportunity to decide whether or not they wish to end their obligatory encounter at the level it reaches on her intervention. The "oddly intense relief" Ellis views Nathanael as sensing at Clara's "strong expression of emotion" (13–14) could as easily be explained by the profound comfort felt by Nathanael at having withstood the most fundamental and consequential of tests as a young *satisfaktionsfähiger* university man. Immediately following this rendering of satisfaction, any signs of conciliatory regret and "lacerating sorrow" can be granted free expression in declarations of faithfulness and in group hugs amid "countless tears"—all without consequence or obligation (Hoffmann 154).

My approach finds support in Nathanael's continued undeterred adherence to the precepts of the honor codex in those pages directly following the near duel. When his friend Siegmund inquires incredulously about Nathanael's bizarre love for Olympia, the robotic female humanoid created by the professor Spalanzani, Nathanael responds with a threatening reference to dueling: ". . . thank heaven you are not my rival, for if you were a rival, the blood of one of us would be spilled" (Hoffmann 161). Tellingly, Nathanael is described in this passage as first wishing to reply in anger before quickly collecting his thoughts and responding to Siegmund: "Nathanael was about to lose his temper, but he quickly gained control of himself and replied" (161). Thus Nathanael's ominous threat to challenge Siegmund to a duel over his mechanical flame Olympia is not a result of a momentary loss of composure, but a characteristic of his wholly uncritical relationship to his society's male behavioral codex. Nathanael's dramatic reconciliation with Lothar at Clara's behest has no transferring effect to his attitude toward dueling, as he once again embraces the notion of spilling a friend's blood. The fact that Clara's intervention has done nothing to change her lover's attitude toward threatening others with dueling is not addressed by those scholars who attach significance to her alleged prevention of the duel with Lothar. It is clear that, despite *The Sandman's* critical narrative stance toward dueling, the text's treatment of

such violence fails to mount any theoretical or conceptual threat to the functioning of the honor codex. The text instead implicitly reaffirms the codex's authority.

To be sure, my reading of Hoffmann's near-duel passage leaves a significant portion of Clara's intervention as a benevolent and successful act wholly untouched. Clara's clear concern for brother and lover remains intact, and although her insertion into the conflict may not force the men to break off their fight out of "an expression of love," it indeed provides a suitable moment at which both men can desist from taking the conflict to the level of dueling violence—achieving the same nonviolent result. The change in interpretation that I suggest resides in the question of agency: I confess to find the success of Clara's boldness only in the luck of her timing, transpiring as it did at a point when both men could consider themselves "satisfied." The intervention only meets with success at the whim of Nathanael, Lothar, and the fencing master, who decide the matter for themselves. Peace and reconciliation carry the day, but this need not be the case if Clara had arrived a moment earlier—an aspect of the story that must rob her of the credit she has traditionally received in secondary literature.

CONCLUSION

My investment in this reading of Clara's action is closely tied to my interest in determining the parameters of a literary model that successfully depicts the subversion of the nineteenth-century dueling compulsion. The narration of serendipitous chance, of the sort that allows Clara to witness the fencing master bringing rapiers to Nathanael and Lothar, and which allows her to undertake a one-woman dueling intervention, is no foundation on which to base such a model. Nathanael's subsequent continued allegiance to honor-codex precepts only reaffirms the failure of an emotive appeal against dueling. I assert that a careful, multitiered understanding of *Satisfaktion* clarifies a number of matters as regards what must be located in a viable literary critique of dueling. The recognition that satisfaction has historically operated on three distinct levels produces the realization that this concept must be defused in its *entirety* for dueling to be depicted in literature as refuted, as even first-order satisfaction constitutes an implicit affirmation of the dueling practice. Although itself nonviolent, such satisfaction presupposes allegiance to the codex of masculine honor and, if refused, can seamlessly progress to a more violent manifestation.

A literary *critique* of dueling, effected, for instance, by portraying the practice in a pejorative fashion by means of tragic, satirical, or absurdist representations, is likewise ineffective, as it cannot contain the potentially deadly outcome intrinsic to the dueling process, nor does it provide a framework for a model of behavior that allows protagonists to elude the dueling compulsion. As I shall demonstrate in a future article, the sole successful means of delegitimizing the duel through literary depiction is one that wholly refutes the core operative concept of honor dueling in a manner that leaves the notions of personal manhood or masculine honor unassailed. Such an approach, in fact, does not even disparage the dueling practice itself as a barbarous and asinine affair. Instead, the socially compulsive "trigger" mechanism of *Satisfaktion* is depicted as being quietly and peacefully disengaged, meaning that satisfaction-capable protagonists who are required to demand or render satisfaction simply ignore the behavioral-codex mandate to do so—without consequence. The literary remedy in this model would be one of a binary nature, consisting of plotline action that displays a willful disregard on the part of protagonists to conform to compulsory

behavior, coupled with an engagement on the part of the narration that depicts a society in which this noncompliance is not met with the catastrophic consequences typically associated with losing one's satisfaction capability. The result is "escape from *Satisfaktion*," a state in which the reigning honor code's dueling mandate has been effectively and durably undermined.

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